Margaret
and
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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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by Owen Harries

Time to Disengage in Europe
by Christopher Layne

Sanctions '86—The Inside Story
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'Exporting Democracy' —and Getting it Wrong

Owen Harries

WHEN, IN MAY of this year, a *New York Times* editorial spoke of "ugly police-state repression," it was not referring to Romania or Cuba. And when shortly afterwards that newspaper's magazine carried a cover-story about "a city of fear," the city in question was not Beirut or Belfast (or, as many Americans may have anticipated, New York itself). In each case the subject was Singapore.

If you have recently been absorbed by the big issues—the Meaning of *Glasnost*, the End-of-the-Cold-War-As-We-Have-Known-It, How Dan Quayle got into the National Guard, etc.—it may have escaped your notice that the American press has been launching a sustained attack against Singapore. But as that attack illuminates some of the problems the United States has in dealing with friendly Third World countries that are less than perfectly liberal and democratic, it is a phenomenon that merits some attention.

The press's relegation of Singapore from a paragon of virtuous free enterprise to police state is a consequence of three interrelated issues: the detention by Lee Kuan Yew's government of a number of people allegedly involved in subversion; the expulsion of an American diplomat; and the restriction of the circulation of four American-owned newspapers and magazines. Each of these involves a clash between prevailing American views of what democratic rectitude demands and a small country's notion of what its security requires.

Owen Harries is co-editor of *The National Interest*.

The Detentions

IN THE SPRING of 1987 the Singapore government used its powers under the Internal Security Act (inherited from the British) to detain without trial twenty-two people accused of involvement in a Marxist conspiracy. All but one of these were released by the end of the year, the government having concluded that they were pawns manipulated by others rather than dangerous subversives. Eight of them, however, were rearrested in April 1988 after issuing a statement claiming that they had been mistreated while in captivity and that earlier self-incriminating statements they had made on television had involved coercion and distortion by editing. Two prominent lawyers were also detained at this time, one for allegedly insti-

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gating the recantation and the other for questioning about his relations with an American diplomat.

Some of these have subsequently been released. At the moment, the total number of political detainees in the "city of fear" is six.

Almost unanimously, American commentators have maintained that the detentions were unjustified, that they were the result of "panic" (*Wall Street Journal*), or of a "persecution complex" (*Journal of Commerce*), or, more pretentiously, of "a deep Conradian fear of being swallowed up by the jungle" (Ian Buruma in the *New York Times Magazine*). Others have interpreted the arrests in terms of the coming general election, seeing them as an attempt to perpetuate one-party rule by "intimidating into conformity various segments of the population" (Jerome Alan Cohen, writing in the *NYT*).

Some or all of these characterizations may be right. But no serious grounds for believing them are provided in any of the pieces quoted. Indeed, evidence of any hard investigative reporting of the background and circumstances of the detentions is singularly lacking in the American press. We are told that the twenty-two people arrested last year were young and well educated, and that they included human rights lawyers, religious activists (mostly Catholics), and social workers. Buruma also reports that "these alleged revolutionaries were polite, even timid, neatly dressed . . . . " And that is about it.

The clear implication in many of the pieces is that it is absurd to maintain that such people could have been involved in any subversive activity. But, unfortunately, it is by no means absurd. Attempting to appropriate the human rights issue and using it to undermine the authority of governments is a common and often effective tactic of the extreme left, both in the Third World and the West. And since the advent of "liberation theology" and the conversion of the World Council of Churches into an instrument for the furthering of Third World radical causes, religious affiliation—particularly of an activist kind—no longer justifies a presumption of innocence. This is not to say, of course, that the twenty-two detainees in the Singapore case were necessarily involved in any subversive activity, but merely that the description of their backgrounds offered by American newspapers does not clarify the matter.

Ironically, an article published in *Asiaweek*, a Hong Kong based publication that subsequently had its circulation restricted by the Singapore government because of events flowing from that same article, gives a fuller and more balanced account of the detainees than any that have appeared in the American press.[1] The article maintains that "Associates of the detainees, by and large, do not deny the bare facts in the government's allegations. It is the interpretation of those facts that is in dispute." It then goes on to say that the accused clearly were critical of the governing party; that several of them had been members of a "study group" in England organized by an activist who had fled from Singapore after serving a jail sentence; that many of them were, "at least at one time, influenced by Marx and Mao;" and that they "did, in a sense, form a network" in Singapore.

The supporters of the detainees put one interpretation on all this, the Singapore authorities another. In the eyes of the former, the people involved were "socially-oriented liberals committed to creating a more democratic and equitable country," according to *Asiaweek*. The government, on the other hand, while conceding that the detainees posed no immediate threat in themselves, maintained that over time their more ruthless manipulators could have transformed them into dangerous agents. Arguing that the government could not afford to wait for "a smoking gun or a blood-stained parang," Home Affairs Minister Jayakumar distinguished open opposition from the intolerable activities of those who "engage in subversion, purveying Marxism, infiltrating the legitimate organizations, hiding under cover of religious organizations and publications."

[1] "Battle Against Leftism," *Asiaweek*, September 13, 1987.

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In television interviews, several of those detained made statements compromising themselves and others. One admitted that he foresaw peaceful protests leading to "disorder and maybe even rioting, bloodshed." Another said that Tan Wah Piow, the alleged leader of the study group in Britain, had links with the outlawed Communist party of Malaysia. But as these statements were made while in detention and have since been repudiated by some of the detainees, their value is limited. More significant, perhaps, is a remark that, according to *Asiaweek*, one of those detained made to a friend *before* she was arrested: "We are only *kuching kurap* [small fry]." This, which amounts to less than a declaration of innocence, was precisely the conclusion reached by the Singapore authorities after interrogating the detainees.

Several of those arrested claimed to have been tortured. The Singapore government insists that no one was, though it acknowledges that a certain amount of psychological stress and disorientation is part of its interrogation process. Jerome A. Cohen, late of the Harvard Law School and acting on behalf of Asia Watch in this instance, rejects the distinction: "Mr. Cohen said he found deeply disturbing both the use of psychological torture and what he called a pervasive Singaporean, if not Asian view that 'if you haven't hit somebody, it isn't torture' " (*NYT*, May 12, 1988).

What the detainees have specifically complained of is that in the course of their interrogation they were kept in very cold temperatures, made to stand for long periods while being questioned, deprived of sleep, held in solitary confinement, forced to wear prison clothes, and, in some cases, slapped on the face.

Such treatment is certainly repugnant. But is it really "torture"? If so, it will be necessary to find a new term to describe the much more extreme measures that have usually been described as torture (violent beatings, the application of electric currents to testicles, the tearing out of fingernails, massive doses of castor oil, the use of mind-destroying drugs, etc.). Moreover, we must recognize that every police force in the world (including those of the United States, at least until very recently) employs "torture" in the sense that is now ascribed to Singapore.

This semantic dispute could almost have been invented to illustrate a point recently made by Irving Kristol:

> One of the successes of the 'human rights' movement has been to broaden the definition of 'torture' to include what would otherwise be classified as 'police brutality'. Americans would be disapproving of but not outraged by police brutality or the use of third-degree methods against prisoners in distant lands; we are, after all, familiar enough with this phenomenon at home, and would not be surprised to learn that it is far more common in 'less civilized' (i.e. most other) countries. But torture, real torture, is an abomination to the bourgeois-liberal sensibility, a violation of that sense of human dignity which is at the very root of our liberal individualism. So a focus on torture is a brilliant bit of public relations (*The National Interest*, Winter 1986/7).

The Hendrickson Case

THE SECOND of the three questions at issue involves the request of the Singapore government that the United States withdraw a political officer, Mason Hendrickson, from the one hundred-strong U.S. Mission in Singapore, on the grounds that he had improperly interfered in the domestic affairs of the country. Under the Vienna Convention governing diplomatic relations, such interference is impermissible. The United States had no option but to comply. Subsequently it retaliated by requesting the withdrawal of one officer from the small Singaporean mission in Washington, though the officer in question was not accused of improper conduct. The government of Singapore based its charges against Hendrickson on the sworn testimony of the lawyer Patrick Seong, given when he was under detention, that the diplomat had, sometimes in the presence of more senior State Department officials, encouraged dis-

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gruntled Singaporeans in anti-government activities.

The dispute obviously turns largely on what Hendrickson actually said in his meetings with Singaporeans. But it also involves opposing interpretations of what is permissible and proper behavior on the part of diplomatic officers. Whatever happened in this particular case, there can be little doubt that—given the American concern to promote democracy in the world (something repeatedly stressed by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz), and the enormous dependence of many Third World countries on the United States—American diplomats often take a broad view of what they are entitled to do, indeed what they *should* do, in relation to the domestic politics of the countries in which they are stationed. (Does anyone believe that they respect the letter of the Vienna Convention in, say, Honduras, South Korea, or the Philippines?) The government of Singapore, on the other hand, being extremely sensitive about its domestic politics and feeling very vulnerable to subversion from sources other than the American embassy, interprets the Convention strictly.

In this instance, the ongoing criticism in the American press and the fact that the U.S. government had recently reneged on a deal to extend Singapore's eligibility for trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in return for the adoption of copyright legislation by Singapore, almost certainly influenced the decision to press the issue publicly, rather than deal with it discreetly. Discussing the Hendrickson episode in his speech to Parliament on June 1, Lee Kuan Yew made a point of saying that members of his government felt they "had been taken for a ride and treated shabbily" over GSP.

The Singaporeans have shown every confidence in the merits of their case. Lee has proposed a committee of three international experts to look into the facts and to decide whether Hendrickson and other State Department officials had or had not acted legitimately. If it found that they had, the Singapore government would apologize to the State Department. Lee offered the idea "as a fair way to put an end to the matter." Despite the traditional American fondness for conciliation and arbitration, the proposal has not been taken up by Washington.

Restricted Circulation

THE THIRD AND MOST interesting quarrel between the American press and the government of Singapore involves the restriction of circulation of four foreign publications—all American owned and all reputable. These are *Time* magazine (whose circulation in Singapore was reduced from 18,000 to 2,000 in October 1986); the *Asian Wall Street Journal* (cut from 5,000 to 400 in February 1987); *Asiaweek* (11,000 to 500 in October 1987); and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (9,000 to 500 in December 1987). The restrictions on all but *Time* magazine are still in force.

The dispute is the more interesting because, of all the 120 or so Third World countries, Singapore is probably the most hospitable to the foreign press. Any news addict given a choice of which Third World country to live in for a few months would do well to opt for the city-state, for his taste would be well catered to. Over three-and-a-half thousand foreign publications are available there, including such staple fare as the *Economist* and the *International Herald Tribune,* and the BBC World Service is received around the clock.

How then did the dispute arise? The first three cases listed above—*Time,* the *Asia Wall Street Journal,* and *Asiaweek*—are essentially the same. These publications ran articles about the internal politics of Singapore; the government of Singapore considered the articles unfair and inaccurate and responded with letters to the editor; the editors declined to publish the letters as received; the government reacted by "gazetting" the publications and restricting their circulations. Shortly after it was gazetted, *Time* published the original letter from the Prime Minister's press secretary and nine months later the restrictions on its circulation

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were lifted. *Asiaweek* also published the original letters a month after being gazetted, but eight months later the restrictions had not been lifted. The *AWSJ* did not subsequently print the letter in dispute and its proprietor (Dow Jones Publishing Company (Asia) Inc.) filed a motion in the Singapore High Court for leave to annul the restriction. The motion was heard and dismissed with costs in May of this year. A notice of appeal has been filed.

The *Far East Economic Review* case is somewhat different and developed against a background of long-standing acrimony between the magazine and the Singapore government. It involved an article quoting a Catholic priest's secondhand account of a meeting between Lee Kuan Yew and the Archbishop of Singapore, following the 1987 detentions. The Singapore government asserted that the account was false, defamatory (the Prime Minister has taken out a writ for libel), and that it interfered in domestic politics in a serious way by attempting to pit the Catholic Church against the Prime Minister. While the *Review* did publish the letters of the government spokesman, it claimed that it was under no obligation to check the facts in the article as it was merely reporting the priest's views and taking no position as to their veracity:

> Let us spell it out in the simplest possible terms. If Kim Jong Il, the son of the dictator of North Korea, should announce that his father is a reincarnation of the Buddha, we would possibly consider that noteworthy. If we printed the story, it would not mean in any sense that we believed it, or that we were presenting the dictator's reincarnation as a fact.

The Singapore government's response to that position:

> *FEER* is thus propounding the thesis that a newspaper can legitimately print anything it wishes, whether true, false, or even defamatory, so long as it is able to quote a source who actually made the statement. It claims it is under no obligation to check its facts, satisfy itself as to the truthfulness of its source, or verify the assertions against other witnesses, nor can it be held answerable for any lies and libels which may thereby be published. This is a preposterous thesis which will sanction journalistic mendacity.

The upshot was that the government restricted the magazine's circulation and the *Review* responded by ceasing *all* circulation and distribution in Singapore. The Prime Minister's libel action is still pending.

At various points in these controversies the State Department intervened to express regret at the actions of the Singapore government in restricting the circulations of the magazines and the hope that the issues would soon be resolved. These statements provoked furious protest from the Singaporeans on the grounds that they represented "an unprecedented interference in Singapore's internal affairs." The subsequent exchanges between the two governments cast light on the causes and nature of the dispute.

The State Department responded to Singapore's protest by claiming that the U.S. government took no sides regarding the specific claims of any party to the dispute, but that its statements reflected the government's "fundamental and long-standing commitment to the principles of a free and unrestricted press." It then went on to elaborate:

> 'Free and unrestricted' in American usage means that within broad limits, set at the boundaries of other individual liberties (e.g. criminal libel), the press is free to publish or not publish what it chooses, however irresponsible or biased its actions may seem to be. Where the media are free, the marketplace of ideas sorts the irresponsible from the responsible and rewards the latter.

At various times, and depending on who is speaking, the Singapore government has responded to this position at two levels. On one—favored by Singapore's Ambassador Tommy Koh in Washington, among others—they have mounted a defense in terms that appeal to American notions of fairness. They point out that Singapore has not banned the publications in question but merely limited their circulation, that they are available in libraries and that articles may be photocopied.

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The object has been to punish the journals in question, not to deprive Singaporeans of information.

Further, they stress that at least in three of the four cases, the dispute turned not on what was published about Singapore but on the denial of the Singapore government's right to reply. Whatever the formal legal position, the government maintains that basic fairness, let alone courtesy, required the respecting of that right; and, indeed, even in law, the Fairness Doctrine in the United States specifies that broadcasters have an obligation "to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." In practice, it is asked, would the American press ever deny an American president or member of the cabinet a right of reply? Why, then, treat the prime minister of Singapore and his colleagues differently?

"A Kind of Arrogance"

EVEN ALLOWING for the touchiness and aggressiveness of the Singaporeans in responding to criticism, the editorial judgments of the publications involved do seem to have been poor. The correspondence between the Singapore government and the journals, which has been published by the former,[2] reveals an unattractive combination of arrogance, evasiveness, disingenuousness and irresponsibility on the part of the latter. After printing an article that, to the layman at least, seems clearly to defame the Singapore government, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* gave as a reason for not printing a reply the fact that it defamed the author. The *AWSJ* claimed to have the information to support one serious allegation but, despite repeated requests, refused to provide it. In several cases, articles that were clearly opinionated—if only in their very unbalanced and uncritical use of sources—were defended as examples of straight reporting. *Asiaweek* printed a letter under the name of the press secretary of the minister for home affairs which had not only been cut but had had several hundred words *added* to it, without consulting or informing the author.

The editors in question were, presumably, on sound grounds legally. But they would have done well to remember Edmund Burke's admonition to the British government in its dealings with the American colonies: "It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason and justice tell me I should do. Is a political act the worse for being a generous one?" And in standing on their legal rights, the editors would have done well also to remember that in this instance they were dealing with a sovereign government other than their own, one which had legal means of retaliating.

As it was, the use by the Singapore government of a passage written by Vermont Royster, an editor emeritus of the *Wall Street Journal*, seemed entirely appropriate:

> Our craft is quick to correct the misspelling of a name or the wrong cutline under a picture. Most papers have a box nearly every day for such corrections.
>
> Let the complaint be, however, that a story was unfair to someone, that it contained unwarranted invasion of a person's privacy, that it was mistaken in some of its main facts—in those cases a wall of silence is likely to descend on the editorial sanctum. That kind of error is rarely apologized for, or even acknowledged. All too often the attitude is 'We stand by the story' no matter what. And that certainly is a kind of arrogance.

Singapore's case does not rest there. The government—and Lee Kuan Yew in particular—also responds at another level, one that invokes Singapore's circumstances rather than American standards of fair play. In fact it specifically rejects the notion that the U.S. model provides either a universal standard or one appropriate to Singapore. In a speech given to the American Society of Newspaper Ed-

[2] *Singapore and the Foreign Press*, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore, March 1988.

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itors in April, Lee observed that the media play different roles in different countries, reflecting different historical experiences, political systems and national temperaments. He referred to the BBC World Service, "which reports events impartially, but provides an interpretation from a definite perspective" as being more appropriate to Singapore than the American model. He also referred approvingly to the Japanese model, "which stays out of active politics, but goes beyond plain reporting to shape public opinion to help build up a national consensus on important issues."

According to Lee, the American ideal of an unrestricted contest in the marketplace of ideas is unsuited to newly-independent nations. Where it has been tried the results have not been happy. In Sri Lanka and India it produced "confusion and dissension, rather than enlightenment and consensus." In the Philippines before the period of martial law, it resulted in "a wildly partisan press [which] helped Filipino politicians to flood the marketplace of ideas with junk, and confused and befuddled the people." In Singapore itself, with its volatile racial and religious mix, when the concept had been tried it had "time and again led to riots and bloodshed."

Along with the "marketplace of ideas," Lee rejects the idea of the press as the fourth estate. The British never allowed it that status in the colony, and there are good reasons for not allowing it now. If the press were permitted to assume "the role of invigilator, adversary and inquisitor of the Administration," it would radically change the nature of Singapore society, said Lee, and "I doubt if our social glue is strong enough to withstand such treatment."

According to this view, no foreign publication has a *right* to circulate in Singapore; circulation is a privilege granted by Singapore on its own terms. It is denied to some. *Izvestia,* for example, is not allowed to circulate, and as Lee pointed out in his speech, in the interest of lessening inter-communal conflicts, Singapore and Malaysia have banned each other's newspapers for about twenty years. The essential condition is that there be no involvement in Singapore's domestic politics, and Singapore itself must be the sole judge of whether that condition is being met.

Circumstances and Statesmanship

FOR MANY AMERICANS brought up on the First Amendment and accustomed, particularly in recent years, to regard freedom of the press as an absolute right, such a defense by Singapore of its actions will be unacceptable, perhaps even shocking. Others—those who believe that the application of principles should take account of circumstances and likely consequences–may react differently. For Singapore's circumstances are exceptional.

When the country became an independent state in the early 1960s, many good judges gave it virtually no hope of surviving, let alone prospering. It was tiny—one-fifth the size of Rhode Island. Its population, no larger than that of the Bronx, was composed of Chinese (themselves divided into several different dialect groups), Malays, Indonesians, Indians, Pakistanis, and Eurasians. These had never formed one community, and under the British they had occupied separate, officially demarcated segments of the island. There was no common language.

The island had virtually no material resources whatsoever, apart from its people. Even its drinking water had to be piped over from the Malaysian mainland, as it still is today. Living standards were low.

This city-state came into existence in what was at the time the most turbulent, volatile and violent part of the world. Coups, insurrections, subversion, ineffectual central governments, and regional revolts were commonplace. To the north, a serious communist insurrection, supported by China, had just been quelled by the British with great difficulty. To the south, Sukarno was on the rampage and the largest communist party outside the Communist bloc was preparing to attempt a coup. To the north-east were the Vietnam-

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ese, and Singaporeans did not need much sense of history to remember the speed with which the Japanese had swept down from Vietnam two decades before to take the supposedly impregnable British fortress.

Given this set of conditions the subsequent history of Singapore—the sustained 7 percent growth rate; the creation of an educated middle class society with a per capita income higher than that of Italy; the provision of the best housing of any Third World country; the improved life expectancy and infant mortality rates that now almost equal America's; and, not least, the maintenance of internal order combined with a substantial level of personal freedom—is nothing short of miraculous. The people responsible for the miracle were Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues. One could, indeed, mount a strong case that, pound for pound and measured in terms of the improvements they have wrought in the lives of ordinary people, Singapore has had the best government in the world over the last twenty years. Yet this is the government that is now being trashed by the American press.

Many of those who do the trashing concede the brilliant record of Lee's government—indeed, how could they not?—but use it against him in the current controversy. It is precisely *because* the Singaporeans have achieved so much and *because* so much is expected of them that their recent behavior warrants sharp criticism, it is argued. For they deserve to be judged by higher standards than most Third World countries, and recent behavior represents a back-sliding or self-betrayal on the part of what is (with the possible exception of Japan) the most "modern" state in Asia. It is not a convincing argument.

First, given their outstanding record, the presumption must be that Lee and his colleagues are better judges than American editors of what is right for Singapore at this stage of its development.

Second, far from back-sliding, the Singapore government has been utterly consistent throughout concerning what internal security measures are necessary to ensure the country's progress. Over twenty years ago the then deputy prime minister of Singapore, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, spelled it out:

> The first and most important of the prerequisites to success is, I regret to say, an efficient secret police, or 'Special Branch' to use the delicate British colonial term for it . . . It is however of the utmost importance that the highest standards of conduct on the part of the secret police are maintained . . . checks should be real and not perfunctory measures.

The secret police would, he said, arrest and detain those suspected of subversive activities and regrettably the due process of law could not be applied on these occasions for three reasons: legal procedures would blow the cover of the police operations; some forms of conspiratorial activities were not illegal; and the government could not afford to hold its hand until such times as crimes were actually committed.[3]

Lee's government has lived by these tenets consistently for the last quarter century. Repeatedly it has detained individuals believed to be agents of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), sometimes seizing quantities of arms and ammunition in the process. Repeatedly it has exposed and shut down newspapers it considered subversive. These tenets have been part of an ethos stressing discipline, vigilance, control and restraint as essential ingredients of success for a society in Singapore's circumstances. Those who now accuse the Singapore government of betraying its own heritage and promise are either disingenuous or uninformed.

Third, and most compelling, it is not true that Singapore has now reached a position where it is free of danger and can afford to dispense with the procedures that have served it well in the past. The country still consists of a cluster of communities imperfectly

[3]Goh Keng Swee's speech, which was delivered in Canberra, Australia in 1967, is still a key document. It was quoted by Lee Kuan Yew in a major speech to the Singapore Parliament earlier this year and reproduced in full by the *Straits Times* in June.

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joined. The CPM has not closed shop. The attraction of Islamic fundamentalism for Malaysia and the uncertain future of Indonesia after Suharto pose potentially serious threats to Singapore's internal stability. The current examples of the Philippines and Sri Lanka serve as reminders of the dangers posed by communist subversion and communal strife respectively. Vietnam, with the world's fourth-largest army, continues to menace its neighbors. To dismiss all this as "a deep Conradian fear of being swallowed up by the jungle" is not merely irresponsible but fatuous. Lee Kuan Yew has more to fear than the jungle.

His fears may yet turn out to have been exaggerated. The problem is that neither he nor anyone else can be certain, and he is in no position to take risks. Adam Smith once responded to a lament that Britain was ruined by observing calmly, "There is a lot of ruin in a nation." As far as large, powerful, cohesive nation states are concerned he was right. But small, internally divided states existing in insecure surroundings are a different matter. They work on very slim margins of safety, in an environment where conditions can deteriorate rapidly and a single serious error of judgment may have catastrophic consequences. This is true of Israel, and it is true of Singapore. For many Americans, living in a huge and powerful country well insulated by oceans, it is a truth that is difficult to appreciate. But what they readily dismiss as "paranoia," or "panic," or a determination to cling to power at all costs is sometimes the consequence of that "imagination of disaster" which is an indispensable prerequisite for statesmanship in managing the affairs of small and vulnerable countries.

Lee Kuan Yew has other qualities of statesmanship. In the current controversy, he has been the only one who has demonstrated any interest in keeping the issue in proportion and relating it to wider questions. While holding firm to the Singaporean position on the three issues in dispute, Lee has stated the U.S. position fairly and drawn a distinction between the reaction of the younger, second-generation Singaporean leaders (who include his son) and that of himself and his older colleagues. While he understood his younger colleagues' outrage at the intervention of the United States, he and the other elders were concerned to "register our protest in a way that does not damage the fundamentals of our relationship with the U.S. The U.S. role in the Western Pacific is vital to the security and stability of non-communist Asia, and therefore it is very much in Singapore's national interest." In his speech to Parliament, he quoted from a note he had written to all cabinet ministers:

> "Of course, we must attack the Americans when they do us in, as they did over the GSP and Copyright. But we must use language which does not convey to our people that they have become our strategic enemies .... They are our friends and we are angry because they were behaving badly, or mistreating us, as friends."

He expressed concern at the xenophobia that is deeply embedded in much of Asian culture and the deliberate efforts both by communists and some non-communists to stir up anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia.

Anyone who has followed Lee Kuan Yew's career knows that these were not views fashioned for an occasion. They are consistent with the opinions he has expressed over the years, not only in Singapore itself but in international forums ranging from the Commonwealth to the Non-Aligned Movement, where expressing them has often carried a political cost. Because of his intellectual force, and because Singapore—which receives no aid from the U.S. and which has never hesitated to disagree with Washington on particular issues—cannot convincingly be depicted as an American lackey, he has probably been the most effective defender of the U.S. position in Third World debates.

Common decency requires that such a man receive more thoughtful and sympathetic treatment from America than he has recently been getting. But more than decency towards Lee Kuan Yew is involved here: small as Sing-

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apore is, the issue bears on a central theme of United States foreign policy.

Americans of all political persuasions believe profoundly that it is their right and duty—indeed their destiny—to promote freedom and democracy in the world. It is a noble and powerful impulse, one not casually to be ridiculed or dismissed. But acting on it—if one is concerned to be effective and not merely to feel virtuous—is a complicated and delicate business, and the dangers are many. Success requires that this impulse be balanced against, and where necessary circumscribed by, other interests that the United States must necessarily pursue, more mundane ones like security, order and prosperity. For these represent not merely legitimate competing claims but the preconditions for a lasting extension of democracy.

Success requires, too, an awareness of the intractability of a world that does not exist merely in order to satisfy American expectations—a world that, for the most part, *cannot* satisfy those expectations in the foreseeable future. While determination and purposefulness are important ingredients in any effective policy, the attempt to force history in the direction of democracy by an exercise of will is likely to produce more unintended than intended consequences. The successful promotion of democracy calls for restraint and patience, a sense of limits and an appreciation of the wisdom of indirection, a profound understanding of the particularity of circumstances—all of which have been conspicuous by their absence in recent dealings with Singapore. As Carlyle once put it, "I don't pretend to understand the Universe—it's a great deal bigger than I am ... People ought to be modester." Indeed.

Psychotherapy by Other Means

UNFORTUNATELY, THE OLD and rather banal discovery that most human actions have unforeseen consequences has not been fully incorporated into the world view of the presidential candidates. Neither have they acknowledged that the world has grown more complex, that even the most powerful nation on earth cannot produce at will exactly and only the changes it wants in other nations, and that the attempt to do so in the name of morality often produces in even the fruitiest of banana republics only nationalistic resistance and resentment. The failure to recognize that the days of easy foreign interventions are over could be as disastrous for the United States as the failure to recognize the decline of power was for Britain.

Thus foreign policy is a blunt instrument whose too frequent use ends in humiliation or worse. If Mr. Dukakis is not merely making electoral promises which he has no intention of keeping, the South African question, to take only one example, may yet return to haunt him. The South African government will long outwit him, because they are struggling for survival while he is only struggling to feel good. He will learn the hard way that to assume unlimited responsibility with only limited power is a recipe for failure and defeat, both personal and national.

A world in which it is necessary for nations to deal with each other, and in which for the foreseeable future most governments will be found wanting by the Enlightenment standards of the American Constitution, is no place for sudden accesses of moral enthusiasm on the part of a dominant power. Foreign policy is not the continuation of psychotherapy by other means.

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Continental Divide

Time to Disengage in Europe

Christopher Layne

THE TIME HAS come to reappraise fundamentally American policy towards Europe. The existing structure of the Western Alliance is based on a premise that, once clearly and explicitly stated, is both unconvincing to Europeans and unacceptable to Americans: that the United States will automatically use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe if the latter is attacked, even though such use would lead to the destruction of the U.S. itself. The recently-ratified INF treaty is important because it exposes starkly that the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO is incredible (in both senses of the word).

This article will argue that Washington should take the initiative in seeking mutual superpower disengagement in Europe. Given the policies now being pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev, and their implications for both Eastern Europe and East-West relations, such a disengagement may be achievable. Even if events prove that it is not, the advocacy of disengagement by the United States will still be sound policy, for it will put Moscow to the test and deprive it of unearned diplomatic advantage in Western Europe. Regardless of whether the Kremlin accepts, such an approach would also signal to West Europeans that United States policy inevitably will change, placing the decision whether or not to defend Europe with nuclear weapons where it belongs: with the West Europeans.

The proposal to pursue mutual disengagement will be strongly opposed. Appealing to the old saw, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," many will argue that Washington should remain loyal to the Alliance's familiar structure and policies and make only the minimal changes necessary to keep it in business. After all, in the past, a NATO Alliance based on an American nuclear guarantee served both the U.S. and Europe well, and much political, intellectual and emotional capital is invested in it. While this reaction is understandable, it is also mistaken. Today, the old transatlantic arrangement is "broke" beyond fixing: not only is the Alliance based on an untenable premise, but its untenability is increasingly evident to some of its key participants. Failing to acknowledge in good time the decay of NATO's foundations will lead only to the Alliance's disintegration in an atmosphere of acrimony and purposelessness.

Christopher Layne, an attorney with the law firm Blecher & Collins in Los Angeles and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, has written widely on foreign policy. An earlier version of this article was published as a Cato Institute policy analysis.

The Suicide Pact

AS THE LATE Robert E. Osgood noted, the American nuclear guarantee to Europe faces a problem: "The

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United States must reassure the allies that it will use nuclear weapons in their behalf but also that it will not precipitate their destruction if deterrence fails." The recently ratified Soviet-American treaty eliminating intermediate range nuclear forces (INFs) underscores that it is increasingly difficult for Washington to persuade West Europeans that either half of this extended deterrence equation is true.

Nuclear weapons are the "glue" holding NATO together, and the role of American nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy is the most politically sensitive issue in U.S.-West European relations. The INF treaty, though of limited military significance, is crucially important because it has forced into the open the debate about the future of NATO's strategies of extended deterrence and flexible response. In the process, the divergent political and strategic interests of the United States and West Germany—the Alliance's two key members—have been highlighted and the intractability of NATO's risk-sharing dilemma has been underlined. A re-examination of the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO is thus long overdue.

In West Germany, the traditional Atlanticist security elite has always feared that, in a crunch, Washington would not use its strategic nuclear weapons in Europe's defense, precisely because it would be suicidal for the United States to do so. On the other hand, the West German public and successor generation security elites fear that, in the event of war, America *would* use nuclear weapons but seek to confine the conflict to German soil. The INF deployments stirred fears that the United States could involve West Germany against its will in a nuclear war and fueled the emergence of a politically and intellectually potent anti-nuclear peace movement. The INF episode has had a pronounced effect on Bonn's foreign and security policies.

On this side of the Atlantic, extended deterrence is being rethought as part of a wider debate about the future of the U.S. commitment to Western Europe. Over the years, the most frequently voiced American objection to the transatlantic status quo has been that the United States spends too much on Europe's defense and the Europeans too little. Propelled by America's fiscal and trade woes, and the timely publication of books by David Calleo and Paul Kennedy, "burden-sharing" has emerged as an important issue during the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign.[1]

There is, however, a second, more basic objection to America's involvement in NATO: Rational states do not base their strategy on a pledge to commit suicide to protect other states' security. But in fact, what West German analysts refer to as "deterrence identity," means exactly that: for the purposes of nuclear strategy West German territory and American soil are identical. The United States is obligated to respond to a Soviet attack on West Germany precisely as it would to an attack on the American homeland itself. Remarkably, the American public is largely unaware of the nature of the United States' nuclear undertakings to Western Europe. For example, a 1984 Public Agenda Foundation survey found that 81 percent of Americans believe—wrongly—that Washington's policy is to use nuclear weapons *only* in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.[2] The Strategic Defense Initiative and President Reagan's negotiating position at the October 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit implicitly reflected official American concerns about the dangers to America of extended deterrence.

The INF treaty has focused attention on two intimately connected issues: First, the role of American nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defense and second, the nature of future European security arrangements—that is, the relation of the United States to Western Europe and of both to the Soviet Union. In the treaty's wake, modernization of NATO's remaining in-theater nuclear forces and the East-West conventional balance have surfaced as the leading items on the transatlantic agenda. American Atlanticists believe the Soviet threat to Western Europe has not abated and they want to bolster NATO by modernizing the Alliance's battlefield nuclear weapons, deploying longer-range "gray area" systems not prohibited by the INF treaty, and building up

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the Alliance's conventional capabilities. This militarized approach to European security is certain to prove counterproductive. Invariably, American attempts to strengthen the Alliance militarily backfire and weaken it politically—thus pushing America and Western Europe further apart.

The majority of West Germans do not share the American Atlanticists' stark view of the Soviet threat. On the contrary, they believe that Mikhail Gorbachev's emphasis on internal restructuring and diplomatic "new thinking" offers an unparalleled opportunity to ease significantly East-West tensions and mitigate the effects of Europe's partition. Given this prevailing political climate, U.S. pleas for a new NATO build-up are bound to receive a chilly reception, especially since fiscal constraints practically ensure that America's own NATO contribution will not increase. Moreover, U.S. calls for modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and new nuclear deployments will have an especially harmful impact on U.S.-West German relations. Such calls will alienate Bonn from its security partners, set the West German government against its public, and further undermine America's political standing in West Germany.

Some American Atlanticists are candid enough to admit that their post-INF program of nuclear modernization and conventional build-up is a non-starter; yet, they offer no alternative. The U.S. cannot afford this kind of sterile thinking, or the policy immobility it produces. Much has changed in Europe and the world during the past four decades, yet America's European policy has remained static. American Atlanticists are responding to yesterday's dangers instead of today's, and they have failed to identify the salient issues in post-INF Europe. This single-minded focus on the military aspects of European security is misplaced. It is virtually impossible to construct a plausible scenario for a deliberate Soviet "bolt-out-of-the-blue" war of conquest against Western Europe. No Soviet geopolitical interest could justify the risks in such a step. This does not mean war in Europe is impossible, only that the real military threat to European security lies elsewhere: in Eastern Europe where an outbreak of popular unrest could spark an uncontrollable chain reaction precipitating a wider conflict.[3]

By the same token, today the most serious Soviet threat to transatlantic cohesion is political, not military. Gorbachev is well positioned to exploit the widening gap between the United States and West Germany. The Soviet Union has overhauled its diplomatic image and successfully projected itself as the leading force for "peace" and constructive change in Europe while depicting Washington as the chief obstacle to the stabilization of East-West relations.

A New European Policy

AS THE POSTWAR ERA draws to a close, it is obvious that the United States needs a new European security policy. Washington's objectives should be the reduction of the nuclear exposure extended deterrence imposes on the United States; enhancement of West Germany's security; diffusing of tensions in Eastern Europe; and the blunting of Gorbachev's West European "peace offensive." While these goals may appear contradictory, there is a policy that can reconcile them: the United States should shift from extended deterrence to residual deterrence while simultaneously pressing for the superpowers' mutual political and military disengagement from Central and Eastern Europe. As part of this broader disengagement package, Washington should push for the third "zero"—elimination of Soviet and American short range nuclear weapons in Europe because U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe are a danger for this country and a source of poison in American-West German relations. To regain the diplomatic upper hand in Europe, the next U.S. administration on taking office should challenge the Soviets by unilaterally withdrawing from Europe (and demobilizing) one American division and one thousand of the shortest range U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.

It was not foreordained that Western Eu-

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rope's defense should depend on American nuclear weapons. On the contrary, as conceived between 1947 and 1949, America's containment strategy envisioned that the Soviet Union would be checked by powerful local forces of resistance on its periphery. Despite West European attempts to entangle the United States more deeply in European security, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was seen by Washington as primarily a symbolic gesture of reassurance. It did not obligate the United States to go to war if Western Europe was attacked, did not establish an integrated military command for the Alliance, and did not commit America to deploy combat troops in Western Europe permanently.

It was only after the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 that the structure of the Alliance and the nature of American strategy changed radically. A unified NATO military command with an American as supreme commander (SACEUR) was established and U.S. combat troops were dispatched to Western Europe on a permanent basis. But it was evident that neither Washington nor the Europeans were prepared to build up their conventional forces to the levels thought necessary to defeat the Soviet army. Instead, a decision was made to Americanize and nuclearize Western Europe's defense. America, superior in long-range nuclear delivery systems and virtually immune from Soviet retaliation, could credibly threaten to strike the Soviet homeland if the Kremlin marched against Europe. In essence, the protective "umbrella" of American nuclear power was extended to protect Western Europe as well as the United States.

As early as the mid-1950s, however, strategic analysts understood that the advent of U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity would compromise fatally the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. Once Moscow acquired the capability to respond in kind to a U.S. nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, America could not be relied upon to come to Western Europe's defense if it meant exposing its own cities to nuclear destruction.

Nuclear parity should logically have caused NATO to shift from nuclear deterrence to conventional defense, or led to the Europeanization of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Indeed, for a quarter of a century, American defense planners have acknowledged the need to reduce extended deterrence's risks by "raising the nuclear threshold"—that is, by decreasing NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons. Doctrines and concepts such as Flexible Response, No First Use, Air Land Battle 2000, and Follow On Forces Attack were all efforts to raise the nuclear threshold, as was Samuel Huntington's proposal that NATO adopt an offensive strategy of responding to a Soviet attack by thrusting deep into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. However, while a high nuclear threshold would advance America's strategic interests, West European traditional security elites do not believe it would serve theirs. Any policy that lowers NATO's strategic risks to the United States raises—or at least is perceived to raise—the strategic risks to Western Europe, particularly to West Germany. Consequently, the major Western European governments remain committed to the Alliance's current nuclear posture.

Western Europe recognizes the diminishing credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, and in response Britain and France are expanding the capabilities of their respective independent nuclear forces. West Germany, on the other hand, though committed to nuclear deterrence, is a non-nuclear power; Bonn looks to the United States to provide the nuclear deterrent it lacks. Extended deterrence is thus the underlying foundation of the U.S.-West German relationship. Much of NATO's recent history has consisted of American attempts to reassure Bonn that the U.S. will risk nuclear war in West Germany's defense.

Inflexible Response

BECAUSE OF its geographic position, *any* European war—conven-

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tional or nuclear—would be disastrous for West Germany. Bonn's overriding objective is war avoidance, through a NATO deterrent strategy that makes U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a conflict as nearly automatic as possible. An Alliance strategic posture that makes less certain NATO's prompt resort to nuclear weapons weakens their deterrent effect and makes conventional war more attractive to the Soviets. As Josef Joffe puts it, "Raising the 'nuclear threshold' . . . would surely lower the price of conventional aggression for the Soviets and increase it for the Europeans."[4] While American strategists have responded to strategic parity by urging NATO to become less dependent on nuclear weapons, West German defense planners have responded by seeking new ways of bolstering extended deterrence. Although the Americans have had the upper hand in the battle to shape the Alliance's declaratory policy, NATO's actual posture still reflects the strategic preferences of West Germany's traditional security elites.

The dilemma of NATO strategy is often posed in the following terms: Would an American president trade New York for Hamburg? Traditional security elites in West Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe, however, do not want an American president even to have the option of deciding whether to make this trade. West German strategists want to *ensure* that if the Soviets attack Europe, New York *will* be traded for Hamburg. In other words, their goal is to deny United States freedom of choice—to commit America in advance to using nuclear weapons in Europe's defense. In a crisis America is not to be permitted to decide between honoring its commitment to Europe—regardless of the cost—or abandoning it. As Egon Bahr, one of the SPD's foremost foreign policy experts, says:

> Europe does not want to allow America the freedom to decide when to put its own existence on the line, but rather wants to link the United States indissolubly, in an almost automatic manner with Europe's own destiny.[5]

Joffe succinctly defines "coupling" as consisting of tying "America's hands by rendering it just as vulnerable to Soviet aggression as Western Europe is by dint of its weakness and geography." From the West German viewpoint, coupling is the *sine qua non* of an effective NATO deterrent strategy.[6]

It is of course one thing to state the theory of deterrence through coupling; it is quite another thing to implement it. After all, no matter how logical extended deterrence may seem from the West European viewpoint, it still rests on the questionable assumption that the United States would court its own destruction by using nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defense. Accordingly, because Washington almost certainly would not cold-bloodedly initiate nuclear warfare, NATO's military structure is designed to ensure that America will do reflexively what it would not do deliberately. This is the Alliance's dirty little secret.

The Battalion Commander's Decision?

AMERICAN strategists conceive of flexible response as a strategy that allows for carefully controlled escalation through three levels of conflict: conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic. From the American viewpoint, the use of tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is an intervening step between a conventional conflict and a strategic nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. In the American view, flexible response is essentially a war-fighting strategy. The West Germans, however, are interested in deterrence, not war fighting. For them, there is nothing flexible about flexible response: tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe are there to ensure that any European war would automatically become an all-out nuclear conflict. West German planners regard these weapons not as a means of gaining battlefield advantage but rather as a trip wire device linking U.S. strategic nuclear forces to Western Europe's defense. As Yale professor Paul Bracken explains, tactical (and inter-

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mediate range) nuclear weapons are the key to NATO's real strategy, one of suicidal deterrence not of flexible response:

> In the face of the suicidal consequences of a war in Europe, it is easy to see why a rational political leader would never take steps leading to devastation. What is needed instead of a rational procedure for going to war is a posture that is so complex that war could be triggered in any one of a number of different ways without rational control.[7]

NATO's tactical nuclear weapons serve this objective perfectly and in effect, Bracken notes, they constitute a regional doomsday machine. In wartime, eight NATO nations in addition to France would control nuclear weapons. Unlike strategic forces, NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are imbedded in the structure of conventional military units where they likely will be regarded as "just another weapon" once the shooting starts.

In peacetime, NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are kept at a small number of storage facilities. Because of their vulnerability to attack, these weapons would have to be dispersed to their assigned units in a prewar crisis. Because of the short reaction times imposed by the nature of the European battlefield and the confusion and disruption of communications that would occur during combat, authority to use nuclear weapons would have to be pre-delegated to battlefield commanders (if these weapons are to be dispersed with the intention of using them). Notwithstanding official statements from top Alliance leaders that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons resides solely with civilian authorities at the highest level, the reality is that if NATO actually intends to implement its flexible response strategy, battalion commanders in the field would make the momentous decision to initiate nuclear warfare in Europe.[8]

With the coming of strategic nuclear parity in the 1970s, West German strategists and politicians began to re-examine the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. Although firmly wedded to nuclear deterrence, they began feeling queasy about battlefield nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. What the Germans wanted was the coupling of American *strategic* nuclear forces to their defense; they preferred to shift the risk of nuclear war back to the United States. If the worst happened and deterrence failed, the Germans wanted the superpowers to fight the nuclear conflict over their heads, not on their soil. In a February 1988 speech, SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, noting American second thoughts about extended deterrence, pointedly observed that West Germans had their own doubts about NATO's nuclear strategy. "We too," he stated, "cannot rely on threats with short-range nuclear missiles and theater weapons expected to destroy what they are intended to defend."

The INF Decision

FORMER WEST German chancellor Helmut Schmidt was one of the first European leaders to grasp the implications of strategic parity between the superpowers. In his 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, he took the initiative to restore the credibility of America's extended deterrent, and thereby set in motion the events that culminated in the INF deployments.[9] Even before this seminal address, Schmidt had made clear his views that the Alliance's strategic risks were not fairly shared; West Germany was bearing too much of this risk because under the prevailing conditions of superpower parity, America could not be counted upon to honor its nuclear commitment to NATO. These concerns were intensified by the controversy surrounding the proposed deployment of U.S. neutron warheads in West Germany. Many West Germans concluded that this weapon's limited range and the likelihood it would be used during Soviet attack would quickly transform a conventional war in Europe into a nuclear war limited to European soil. It was a weapon that would permit the United States to confront the Soviet Union on German territory without putting the American homeland at risk. Thus, Schmidt

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viewed the INFs as both a means of equalizing NATO's nuclear risks and as an answer to the Alliance's strategic conundrum in an age of superpower nuclear parity: the problem of restoring credibility to a threat that rational American policy-makers would never carry out.

Throughout the entire INF episode—from NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy intermediate range cruise and Pershing II missiles until the treaty's ratification—a variety of rationales was advanced to explain why the INFs were deployed in the first place. The most popular of these was that NATO's deployments were needed to counter the Soviet build-up of mobile, highly accurate, triple warhead SS-20s. This argument was never convincing. The bulk of INF warheads (464 of a total of 572) were on slow-flying cruise missiles and posed no counterforce threat to the SS-20s. Moreover, the 572 NATO INFs were not sufficient to regain escalation dominance over the Soviet SS-20 force of 1200-plus warheads. And the suggestion that the INFs gave NATO limited nuclear options (for selective, low yield strikes) rested—like the escalation dominance argument—on the hotly debated contention that nuclear weapons are militarily-usable.

Another frequently invoked rationale for the INF deployment was that it represented nothing more than a "modernization" that improved the survivability and penetrability of NATO's in-theatre nuclear weapons systems. Had survivability been the main concern, however, the INFs ought to have been deployed at sea; on land they were vulnerable and a magnet for a Soviet preemptive strike. Finally, although the SS-20s may have had a significant political and psychological impact in certain NATO circles, their effect on the actual military balance in Europe was much less certain. All of the SS-20s' targets in Western Europe could have been covered by Soviet strategic nuclear forces without significantly depleting the strategic warheads available for targeting the United States. Indeed, it has long been known that a significant portion of the Soviet strategic arsenal is dedicated to West European targets.

While most American officials relied on these arguments to justify the deployments, West Europeans were more forthcoming in explaining the real reason they wanted the INFs. Simply put, the weapons were viewed as a means of recoupling American strategic nuclear forces to Western Europe's defense. For coupling to work, both superpowers had to be disabused of the belief that the clash between them could be contained to Central Europe; both had to realize that their respective homelands would not remain untouched sanctuaries. Thus NATO's strategic posture needed to make clear to Moscow that even a *conventional* attack on Western Europe would inevitably unleash an all-out nuclear war between the superpowers. The INFs thus were a rung inserted between tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear levels on the escalation ladder to recouple the United States to West Germany's defense. They shared all the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons that make the latter ideal triggers for suicidal deterrence. Like tactical nuclear weapons, the INF forward deployment in West Germany meant that, in a conflict, NATO would have been pressured to "use 'em or lose 'em." However, the INFs had two unique characteristics that set them apart from tactical nuclear weapons: they were wholly under American control and they were capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union itself. These two factors meant that the INFs would have shifted much of the risk of nuclear suicide from West Germany to the United States.

From the West European perspective the INFs were preeminently *political*—not military—weapons. The INFs promised to restore the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent while simultaneously relieving West German fears that a NATO posture based on tactical nuclear weapons or conventional defense would enable the superpowers to fight a war confined to Europe (read: Germany). A Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe would provoke American INF strikes against

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the Soviet Union; this in turn would trigger Soviet retaliation against the United States thus touching off a full-scale nuclear conflict between the superpowers. This almost certain sequence of events would deter the Soviets from ever attacking Western Europe in the first place.

ON THIS SIDE of the Atlantic, most analysts either do not understand or do not wish to admit the true rationale for the INF deployments. Instead, like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, they assert that the INFs were intended to give Washington a "less cataclysmic" alternative to using strategic weapons in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Such arguments rest on the fallacious assumption that Moscow would react differently to an attack on the Soviet Union by West German-based Pershing IIs than it would to an attack by North Dakota-based Minuteman missiles. In fact, as then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt admitted in a moment of ill-advised candor, for America the INFs would have *increased* the risk of a nuclear apocalypse, not lowered it. "The Soviet Union," he said, "would most likely respond to an attack on its homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the United States. Thus, the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less." In the perverse view of American Atlanticists, this was a good thing.

The most important question raised by the INF affair is the one American policy-makers are afraid to ask: Should the United States allow itself to be irrevocably committed to fight a nuclear war on Europe's behalf? The answer clearly is "No." Western Europe is important to America but its security is not identical to that of the United States. Whether based on INFs or tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence is not a strategy that serves American interests. In a nuclear world, alliances are high-risk entanglements, not a source of national strength. America should retain its autonomy and not allow itself to be automatically bound to risk nuclear war on another nation's behalf. Defenders of NATO's strategic status quo say extended deterrence/flexible response works and has kept the peace for forty years. But the critical question is what happens if deterrence fails? Many on both sides of the Atlantic will argue that a retraction of the American nuclear umbrella will "make Western Europe safe for conventional war." But American leaders need to remember that NATO's present strategy keeps Europe safe from conventional war by exposing the United States to almost certain nuclear destruction if NATO is attacked.

Even if U.S. nuclear weapons and troops were not deployed on the continent, Europe's security would be protected by the residual deterrent effect of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Because deterrence is inherently existential, the mere fact that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and *might* use them in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe is sufficient to dissuade Moscow. Deterrence can be effective even without the explicit understandings and visible symbols of a formal alliance. This was demonstrated in the late 1960s when Washington used its deterrent threat to prevent Moscow from launching a preemptive war against China—a nation with which the United States at that time did not even have official diplomatic relations.

For America, there would be a critical difference between residual deterrence and NATO's present strategy of "suicidal" extended deterrence. Today, the United States does not control its own destiny; as long as American nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe, the United States' survival is hostage to Western Europe's fate. Residual deterrence, however, would enable America to regain its freedom to choose whether to use nuclear weapons.[10]

The Singularized Germans

AS BONN'S reaction to the INF accord shows, any change in

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NATO's extended deterrent/flexible response strategy has important implications for West Germany's overall diplomatic and security policies. The post-INF dilemma in U.S.-West German relations already is taking shape. In the wake of the INF accord, Washington is pressing NATO to modernize its short range battlefield nuclear weapons (especially the Lance missile). But battlefield nuclear weapons make the Germans feel nervous and "singularized." Singularization is simply a clumsy term that restates long-standing West German fears that, if a conflict occurs, a NATO deterrent strategy based on tactical nuclear weapons will tempt the superpowers to fight a limited nuclear war at Germany's expense. As CDU foreign policy spokesman Volker Ruhe puts it in a catchy and widely quoted phrase, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." (Of course, German extended deterrence advocates never explain to audiences on this side of the Atlantic the corollary of their position: the longer the range, the deader the *Americans*.)

Bonn's security partners say West German fears of singularization are misplaced, but these reassurances ring hollow. For example, France and Britain say that because their long-range nuclear weapons are capable of reaching the Soviet Union, they are more likely to be hit by Soviet nuclear strikes than is West Germany. This argument misses two obvious points: West Germany is in the front line if the Soviets attack Western Europe but Britain and France are not, and precisely because they *are* nuclear powers, Britain and France control their own fate in a way that Germany does not. Another approach, adopted by Richard Burt, now America's ambassador to Bonn, is to tell the West Germans that the INF treaty really has not changed anything—all it does is return NATO to the 1979 status quo ante. But, as Burt of all people should know, Bonn insisted on the INF deployments because the status quo ante was unacceptable; and as today's controversy demonstrates, nothing has transpired during the past nine years to make singularization more palatable to the West Germans than it was in 1979.

Finally, many U.S. officials tell Bonn that the INF treaty leaves the American nuclear umbrella unaffected because there still are some 4,000 United States nuclear warheads in Europe. But because almost all of these are on short-range delivery systems, such comments jangle rather than soothe German nerves. They simply demonstrate that West Germany indeed *is* singularized in a very special sense: In a war, it is the only NATO member certain to be destroyed by its *allies'* nuclear weapons.

Recent developments have aggravated German fears rather than assuaged them. Intentionally or otherwise, the Iklé-Wohlstetter Commission's report seems to validate German concerns that extended deterrence has been vitiated and that Germany has been singled out as the conventional and/or nuclear battlefield if the Soviets march west. The report implicitly repudiates the deterrence through coupling strategy advocated by West Germany's traditional security elites. Western strategy, it states, should be structured to ensure that a conflict "does not rapidly deteriorate into an apocalypse." "To help defend our allies," the report maintains, America "cannot rely on threats expected to provoke our own annihilation if carried out." For those West Germans who missed the point, the report further observes that "[t]he Alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider and more devastating war—although the risk of further escalation would still be there—but mainly as an instrument for denying success to invading Soviet forces." Finally, the report states that a NATO capability of defeating a Soviet attack with conventional forces—and, if necessary, the discriminating use of nuclear weapons—is a more effective stance than a policy that attempts to deter the Soviets by raising the specter of escalation to all-out nuclear war.[11] German apprehensions that America is seeking to shift back to them the main part of NATO's strategic risks were also fanned by defense

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secretary Frank Carlucci's February 1988 threat to withdraw U.S. troops unless Bonn proceeds with modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Such approaches suggest that American policy-makers learned nothing from the INF episode. Those who seem to have forgotten recent history should remember that although West Germany's traditional security elites are addicted to American nuclear weapons, the West German public is allergic to them. If the United States persists in trying to force Bonn to accept modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons, it will trigger a repetition of the domestic crisis that gripped West Germany during the early 1980s.

The Pyrrhic Deployment

ALTHOUGH PROCLAIMED by some Atlanticists as a "victory" for the Alliance, the INF episode has been a pyrrhic one at best. The INF deployments—which were supposed to recouple America and West Germany—have dramatized the politico-military differences that separate Bonn and Washington. The postwar security consensus in Germany has been shattered by the INF episode. Within the SPD, Helmut Schmidt's Atlanticist followers have been driven to cover. The SPD's emerging leaders—like Saarland premier Oskar Lafontaine and Andreas von Bulow—talk about taking West Germany out of NATO's integrated military command, demanding withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany and shifting to an avowedly neutralist foreign policy. The SPD already is on record as favoring a "security partnership" between Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact and a central European nuclear-free zone. On the Right, conservative members of the Christian Democratic party reacted with bitterness to the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting and the double zero INF treaty. Alfred Dregger, the CDU's Bundestag floor leader, has accused the U.S. of "betraying" German interests and "abandoning" the Federal Republic. In a position paper, Dregger's colleague, Bernhard Friedmann, argued that because America inevitably is going to withdraw from Europe, Bonn should seek Soviet support for a united, neutral German state. On both the political Right and Left, German nationalism—and the question of German reunification—has been revived by the INF affair.[12]

The German Question lies at the heart of NATO's nuclear dilemma and the broader issues of European security. The interplay of strategic factors with its own national aspirations makes Bonn's relations with the West inescapably ambivalent. Committed to the long term goal of reunification, Bonn's top foreign policy priority is *Deutschlandpolitik*—its political, economic, and cultural outreach to East Germany. To allow this policy to flourish, West Germany seeks to relax political tensions in Europe and to avoid any moves that could heighten East-West tensions. Bonn's policies cause friction within NATO but in recent years both former SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl have made it plain that West Germany's national policy will not be subordinated to Washington's definition of Alliance solidarity.

NATO's nuclear dilemma is a second factor undergirding Bonn's delicate balancing between East and West. West Germans understand better than many U.S. policy-makers that America's interests require Washington to lower the nuclear risks of U.S. alliance commitments. Nothing the United States says or does is likely to convince West Germans that America would really put its national existence on the line for their sake. The Alliance's strategic anomaly has always been that its most vulnerable and vital European member is a non-nuclear power that must rely upon others for its security. As long as this remains true, Bonn has powerful incentives to seek a political accommodation with Moscow that will resolve its security dilemma as well as preserving its interests in more intimate relations with the other Germany. Thus a new consensus is emerging in West Germany that

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seeks security in a "second phase of detente," involving comprehensive arms control and closer economic relations with Moscow.

The Kremlin is well positioned to take advantage of West Germany's nuclear angst, rising neutralism, and the growing friction in U.S.-West German relations. The Soviets have leverage because they can link progress in intra-German relations to Bonn's willingness to make political, security, and economic concessions to Moscow. Merely by flashing the German card, the Kremlin pulls Bonn eastward, thereby sharpening the strains between America and West Germany. If the Soviets ever did decide to play the reunification gambit, they would bring about NATO's sudden collapse. Though the conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets will never allow German reunification on any terms, it would not be wise to base American strategy on the assumption that the Soviets aren't smart enough to make an obvious, winning move. Moreover, the Soviets can use the "German card" even without offering outright reunification. In fact there are signs that Gorbachev may offer to tear down the Berlin Wall in exchange for a central European nuclear-free zone and/or withdrawal of all foreign troops from East and West Germany. If such an offer is made, it is hard to see how a West German government that refused it could survive politically. The rumored unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary demonstrates that such dramatic Soviet gestures should not be discounted.

Going Beyond Yalta

TODAY, THE post-World War II settlement of Yalta is crumbling. There is growing disarray in NATO; there is a resurfacing of the German Question; and there is simmering discontent in Eastern Europe. Evolutionary forces are at work on the continent which will determine the future relationships between the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. Change cannot be prevented but it can be directed. Washington's challenge in the post-INF environment is to formulate policies that will smooth the transition from the present European security system to a post-Alliance world.

American Atlanticists are pursuing a policy that lacks vision and has no objective other than preserving the ossified postwar security structure for its own sake. Yet, more than two decades ago, then-Professor Kissinger warned that it is an illusion to regard NATO as the "natural" structure of Atlantic relations and to think that sound policy consists only of attempts to improve the Alliance. The objective of America's European policy should not be to preserve NATO intact but to maintain peace and stability in Europe and to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining political ascendancy over the continent. American policy-makers must ask whether the postwar arrangements still serve their intended purposes, or whether those purposes would be better met through new structures.

They should start by recognizing the obvious: because the credibility of extended deterrence cannot be restored at an acceptable cost to the United States, NATO's long-term cohesion is seriously compromised. At the same time, an American policy of reducing the nuclear danger to itself by increasing it for Germany risks triggering a bitter divorce between Washington and Bonn—something from which only Moscow would benefit. Thus it is necessary to seek a diplomatic solution to West Germany's security dilemma. And because West Germany's strategic difficulties are intertwined with the geopolitical effects of Germany's partition, American policy must confront the German Question head-on.

The United States should adopt a European policy based on: (1) an *interim* solution to the German Question short of reunification that guarantees unhampered travel between the two Germanys; (2) removal of both superpowers' military forces and nuclear weapons from Central Europe (the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary); (3) asymmetrical de-

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mobilization of the Soviet and U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe; and (4) a pledge that neither superpower will be the first to reintroduce its forces into Central Europe.

In coming years, America's European interests would be served by mutual U.S.-Soviet disengagement from Central Europe or by a gradual U.S. policy of devolution/Europeanization. However, a determined American effort to secure mutual disengagement is a prerequisite for any long-range policy of Europeanizing the Alliance. Europeanization will remain a chimera as long as West Europeans view the Soviet Union as a relatively benign power and as long as West Germany believes something substantive might lurk behind Soviet hints of flexibility on the German Question. On the other hand, if the Soviets were to prove unrelenting on the German Question and cling stubbornly to their positions in Eastern Europe while America was seeking an interim solution to Germany's partition and showing a willingness to leave Western Europe, reasonable people could have no doubt as to which superpower had embraced Europe's aspirations and which was blocking them. At that point the United States would be in a strong position to negotiate a new transatlantic compact that ultimately would lead to the Alliance's Europeanization. Only if Gorbachev's overtures stood revealed as a propaganda ploy would Western Europe have reason to confront the difficult problems of West Germany's nuclear and political roles in a Europeanized Alliance and only then would Bonn be persuaded to anchor itself firmly in the Alliance.

The Promise of Disengagement

A MORE IMAGINATIVE American policy would also force the Soviet Union to confront the dilemmas posed by its own European strategy. Do the Soviets really want to take on the German Question? Do they really want to push the U.S. off the continent and thus risk the emergence of a powerful Western Europe which would not only be a magnet for Eastern Europe, but which could well include a nuclear West Germany?

Washington should not use mutual disengagement merely as a public relations gimmick. Mutual superpower disengagement is a vehicle both for shifting the political momentum in Europe and for promoting America's interests. By championing new European security arrangements the United States could put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Washington could neutralize the Soviets' German card because the advocacy of mutual superpower disengagement would cast America—not the Soviet Union—as the champion of Germany's national aspirations. Unlike current U.S. policies—which have resonance only among a narrow and shrinking spectrum of politically conservative West Germans—such an American initiative would have widespread popular appeal in West Germany. The inexorable loosening of U.S.-West German bonds would be offset by tangible improvement in Western Europe's security position that would accrue from mutual disengagement.

Far more than any attainable nuclear or conventional arms control agreement, mutual disengagement would radically reduce the chances of war in Europe by lowering the political tensions that could lead to conflict. A Soviet pullback from Eastern Europe would help ensure that that region does not become the Sarajevo of the 1990s. Both superpowers have a common interest in achieving Eastern Europe's Finlandization by reconciling legitimate Soviet security concerns with Eastern Europe's desire for greater autonomy, political pluralism, and economic reform.

Mutual disengagement would bolster Western Europe's military security by neutralizing Moscow's conventional superiority. The Soviet army's size would be reduced and it would be put back where it belongs — in the Soviet Union. Western Europe's strategic depth (currently a serious weakness) would

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be greatly enhanced by moving Soviet forces hundreds of miles to the east of their present positions, and Eastern Europe would be transformed into a protective buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

Finally, unlike current proposals for conventional arms control, mutual disengagement would not be bogged down in endless discussions about proper units of account, definitions of "offensive" versus "defensive" weapons, and the problem of reducing forces that are asymmetrical quantitatively and qualitatively. In contrast to the technical minutiae of arms control, the pristine simplicity of mutual disengagement could easily be grasped by the West German public (and other Europeans) in a way that would politically and morally strengthen the U.S. position in Europe.

NO DOUBT, danger is inherent in the process of moving toward a new political dispensation in Europe. But danger is abundantly present in the status quo, too. America's traditional Atlanticist policy seems destined to produce a bitter rupture between the United States and West Germany—NATO's keystone relationship. With its present European policy, Washington is suffering a diplomatic equivalent of the death of a thousand cuts, allowing Moscow to orchestrate the process of NATO's gradual but steadily creeping paralysis. By failing to grasp that the critical dimension of European security is political, U.S. policy-makers have left the geopolitical initiative entirely in Moscow's hands.

Moscow has developed a subtle and appealing *Westpolitik* that plays both to Western Europe's insecurities and to its pan-European aspirations. The Kremlin is able to manipulate West European perceptions of both the Soviet threat (undercutting support for new NATO defense initiatives or steps to Europeanize the Alliance) and extended deterrence's contradictions (thereby sowing discord between Bonn and Washington). Gorbachev's domestic program of openness and revitalization reinforces West European perceptions of a vastly reduced Soviet threat. Finally, by dangling the German card, the Soviets keep West Germany uneasily suspended between East and West and encourage Bonn to slide toward a de facto neutrality, notwithstanding its NATO membership.

Today, the United States stands by, helplessly bewildered by Gorbachev's dazzling diplomatic virtuosity. Lacking its own overarching European blueprint, Washington must belatedly react on an ad hoc basis to a succession of Soviet démarches. The lack of a creative U.S. policy allows the Soviets to score a lot of uncontested diplomatic points and has caused America's political standing in Western Europe to slip badly.

Recently, the Soviets have suggested that both superpowers "weigh anchor" and leave Central Europe, claimed that the Brezhnev Doctrine has been repealed, and said that they are prepared to accept political pluralism in Eastern Europe. To determine Moscow's sincerity, the U.S. must put forward its own constructive proposals. Regardless of whether Moscow accepts or refuses an American mutual disengagement proposal, the U.S. would gain diplomatically. Washington, however, should not assume that the Soviet response would be negative. The Soviets have important interests that might dispose them to agree to mutual disengagement. Whether the Soviets are merely seeking a "breathing space" to regroup for renewed conflict is much less important than asking whether—regardless of Moscow's intentions—opportunities exist to reach *mutually* beneficial political agreements that the Soviets would have difficulty in subsequently breaking. Because America's interests would be served by mutual disengagement, Washington should engage the Soviets on this issue. Although the Soviet Union and the United States are rivals, they have congruent as well as antagonistic interests. As Walter Lippmann once observed, statesmen who believe unfriendly powers cannot reach useful agreements forget what diplomacy is all about.

The next administration will take office at a delicate moment. If it stumbles, Gorbachev could capitalize on the resulting trans-

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atlantic discord. To meet Gorbachev's challenge at a time when U.S.-West European relations are evolving into a new phase, Washington must out-think the Kremlin. Unlike the current stagnation in U.S. European policy, change in Europe contains the seeds of opportunity—if American statesmen are wise enough to nurture them. Washington holds the high cards in the political struggle for Europe and needs only the boldness and imagination to play them.

Notes

1. David Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987). On the role of burden-sharing in the 1988 campaign, see "The High Cost of NATO," *Newsweek*, March 7, 1988.
2. Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1984).
3. A European war could also plausibly result from two other scenarios. First, a Soviet-American clash in the Third World could escalate horizontally to Europe. Second, if Gorbachev's reforms fail, a deteriorating internal situation could prompt a post-Gorbachev Soviet leadership to resort to war in a desperate attempt to halt the Soviet Union's decline.
4. Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 483.
5. Egon Bahr, "Peace: A State of Emergency," in Rudolph Steinke and Michael Vale, eds., *Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1983), p. 146.
6. As four prominent West German analysts wrote in 1982, it is the "tight and indissoluable coupling" of American strategic nuclear forces with NATO's conventional forces and European-based non-strategic nuclear weapons that "confronts the Soviet Union with the incalculable risk" that a superpower clash in Europe "could escalate to a nuclear war." Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz Joseph Schulze, "A German Response to No First Use," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982), p. 1162. Absent this nuclear coupling of America and West Germany, it is claimed, the Soviets could stage a conventional offensive against West Germany with the certain knowledge that as long as they refrained from using nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union homeland would be immune from retaliation. Thus, West German strategists say, if the American nuclear umbrella covering West Germany is lifted, Germany "would have to bear the destruction and devastation of war alone [because] conventional conflicts in Europe would no longer involve any existential risk for the territory of the Soviet Union and . . . would be without such risk for the territory of the United States as well."
7. This paragraph and the following two paragraphs are based on Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chapter 5.
8. Bracken points out that the very uncontrollability of events once battlefield nuclear weapons are deployed in the field could prompt the West German government to block their dispersal. The use of these weapons probably would result in Germany's devastation and at least one extremely high level former West German official has suggested that Bonn would order its forces to actively resist any American attempt to remove tactical nuclear weapons from their storage sites (many of which are guarded jointly by U.S. and German troops). Dispersal might also be inhibited by the fact that such a step could prompt Soviet nuclear preemption. See, ibid., pp. 174–175. Bracken's conclusions with respect to predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders are supported by Robert S. McNamara in *Blundering into Disaster* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), and

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McNamara's "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1983).

9. Schmidt's lecture is reprinted in *Survival* (January-February 1978).
10. The need to preserve nuclear autonomy illustrates why it would be inconsistent for the United States to promote creation of an independent West European nuclear deterrent force while simultaneously leaving its own nuclear weapons and troops in Europe. Under such conditions, America could be drawn into a nuclear conflict by West European decisions over which it exercised no control.
11. Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, *Discriminate Deterrence* [the Iklé-Wohlstetter report], Washington, D.C. (1988), p. 2.
12. For an extended analysis of the link between the INF deployments and the revival of German nationalism, see Christopher Layne, "Toward German Reunification?" *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Fall 1984). The article analyzes the implications of the German Question for U.S.-Soviet relations. See also Christopher Layne, "Deutschland Über Allies," *The New Republic,* September 28, 1987, and "Atlanticism without NATO," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1987).

The Democratic Party and the World

A PLATFORM IS NOT a contract, thank God. But its careful rhetoric is still a revealing Rorschach. The issues it broaches, the few it fixates on, the ones it shrugs off, tell you much about the inner mind of the party.

The international arena conjured up in that mind is the stuff of fantasy. The platform rehearses the discredited cliches of North–South wealth transfer, as if all that is needed, especially in "the poorest continent, Africa, which deserves special attention," is some American compassion and lots of American cash. There's no hint that it might be well to encourage free markets in those tens of poor countries where socialist planning has further immiserated their people. The platform subtly and falsely suggests that progress in arms control has been made largely because of the Soviet initiatives, which the United States is enjoined to "match." The platform specifies only the United States as undermining the peace process in Central America—not a mention of Nicaragua!—and asserts that U.S. bad faith is all that stands between that region and a future of national reconciliation and human rights.

NONETHELESS, THE PARTY seems to believe that the United States, despite its previous sins, can be decisive in righting wrongs almost everywhere. The question is: Where are the wrongs? In Ireland and Cyprus, Central America and Asia, but not in the Arab Middle East, and not in Africa either save for apartheid South Africa. So what about Marxist Ethiopia? There is another caveat: in Eastern Europe, we should encourage the forces of pluralism and democracy only "wherever possible." Such squeamish deference to circumstance would be refreshing if it weren't reserved for the Soviet bloc. Indeed, Democrats have no sense that the multiple crises of communism provide us with opportunities to probe in behalf of the national interest and of democratic values generally. The idea of pursuing American diplomatic advantage seems wholly alien to the party soul. There is no cohesive strategic world view in this platform, which only magnifies the question of whether the candidate also is without one.

Martin Peretz in *The New Republic,* August 29, 1988

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The Rights and Wrongs of Mr. Layne

Jed C. Snyder

IN APRIL, NATO will celebrate its fortieth anniversary. The academic and policy communities look forward to this event as an opportunity to dissect—yet again—the body of an Alliance whose longevity is remarkable by any contemporary standard of measurement. Some have argued that this examination (the pessimists regard it more as an autopsy) is unnecessary, that despite a succession of "crises," NATO remains alive, well and continues to perform its principal function—deterring the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies from aggressive actions in Europe. To be sure, potentially serious challenges can be seen on the horizon, but to the NATO theologians they represent only the next cycle in the continuing effort to manage a disparate confederation of allies, within a structure that appears as the only readily identifiable option.

These orthodox Atlanticists bristle at any suggestion that a change in the status quo is required and warn that tinkering with the Alliance structure or the balance of responsibilities among its sixteen members risks the unraveling of a very delicate system of guarantees and diplomatic understandings. They further assert that Europe is as vital to the protection of American strategic interests today as it was at NATO's founding, and proclaim an almost catechistic faith in the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee that has underwritten Atlantic security for the past four decades. Put simply, the guardians of the status quo fear the potential damage of change more than they fear the effect of NATO's political and military corrosion, which many observers (including this one) believe has progressively and mortally weakened the Alliance.

Those raising the alarm argue that NATO is afflicted with a serious infirmity brought about in part by a natural and inevitable evolution of the Western postwar security environment. These "enlightened Atlanticists" believe that while the eulogies being offered are premature, NATO is facing new and unprecedentedly serious internal and external pressures which the current Western leadership refuses to acknowledge and confront. These are not the arguments of an "anti-NATO" mob, but the candid assessments of observers who have become disgusted with a least common denominator approach to Western defense policy, and with those Western diplomatic operatives whose universe has revolved around empty promises to "bolster the Western deterrent" and to address NATO's pressing problems "over time."

Jed C. Snyder served as senior special assistant to the State Department's director of politico-military affairs during the first Reagan administration. He is currently senior research fellow at the Washington office of the National Strategy Information Center and a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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A growing number of these NATO critics have concluded that the political, military, and budgetary pressures facing allied leaders reflect a healthy shift in the balance of economic power among the Western democracies, away from Washington toward the European capitals. Yet, there is a growing and justifiable concern that while Europe's maturation as an economic bloc proceeds smoothly toward the goal of a truly integrated European economic structure by 1992, the development of a sense of security responsibility among the major allied powers remains stalled in an adolescent stage, illustrated by a refusal to increase their share of the Alliance defense burden. These adherents find it difficult to justify Europe's continued status as an American protectorate. We are reminded further that with the development of long-range strategic aircraft and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Europe's role as a forward base for American strategic nuclear retaliatory forces disappeared, the result being a decline in the relative value of Europe as an American strategic asset.

Quite apart from arguments that focus on the evolution of technology and strategy, the orthodox Western articulation of a Soviet military threat to Europe has come under attack as well. To many informed observers the likelihood of a Warsaw Pact military campaign designed to seize portions of NATO territory (particularly in Central Europe) has receded, and with it much of the justification for maintaining a large U.S. combat presence on European soil.

Those who viewed Europe's importance three decades ago primarily in terms of its utility as an American strategic appendage now regard the NATO allies as a potential liability and therefore doubt the contemporary strategic value of the "transatlantic bargain" for its principal patron, the United States. If the economic and political necessity to treat Europe as a vulnerable American protectorate is gone, and the military-strategic rationale for basing forces on the continent has also faded, then, it is argued, the current level of the American combat presence in Europe and perhaps even the unequivocal promise of Washington's nuclear commitment to European defense have become somewhat anachronistic.

Yet critiques of the current U.S.-European defense relationship are not limited to those analysts who doubt Europe's enduring importance in the orbit of American overseas commitments. They are also offered by those who believe that while NATO-Europe does remain a vital interest for the United States, the extent of European dependency on American generosity approaches an unjustifiably parasitic level. It is asked, reasonably, why Western governments overseeing vibrant economies (whose aggregate power exceeds that of the United States) cannot find (or create) public support for the defense needs of its publics with the same vigor exhibited during debates over domestic spending programs. The answer is usually that Western leaders find it difficult to persuade skeptical electorates of the necessity to protect the freedoms they enjoy, largely because the sense that these freedoms are in jeopardy has faded over time. Many commentators (including this one) find that response to be an indictment of contemporary European leadership, rather than an acceptable answer to the policy challenges of enlarging the constituency (at home and abroad) for prudent defense expenditures.

GENERALLY, the resentment expressed over the lack of equity in distributing the Western defense burden among the NATO nations focuses on two issues: the disproportionate share of the U.S. defense budget reserved for European-related missions (variously estimated at between 50–60 percent), and the automaticity of the American nuclear commitment to European defense. The first is often described by critics as an unacceptably high security subsidy, while the latter is characterized with varying degrees of exclamation, ranging from assertions that the nuclear promise is simply no longer as credible as it once was, to the more hyperbolic view that America cannot and

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should not enter into a pact to commit "nuclear suicide" on behalf of its allies, regardless of their prominence in the American strategic scheme. It is this aspect of the U.S. commitment to Europe that so concerns Christopher Layne.

Mr. Layne has consistently expressed his outrage over the conditions surrounding America's nuclear commitment to the European allies. Although he would probably object to this characterization, his approach can be described as "libertarian" in its insistence that absolute freedom of choice and will must override any and all considerations of public policy, including a nation's foreign affairs and defense planning. Layne's article grew from a paper initially commissioned by the Cato Institute, the leading libertarian research center in Washington D.C., where he is an adjunct scholar. While many would applaud the libertarian tenet of maximum choice for the individual, it seems ill-advised at least, and dangerous at most, to extrapolate this principle and apply it as a prescriptive guide for the behavior of superpowers, or for any nation that seeks to affect events abroad in the interest of perpetuating Western ideals. With status comes responsibility, a concept that seems to be alien to Mr. Layne. One finds little support at the Cato Institute for the notion that a superpower should be expected to maintain security commitments that extend beyond its borders. Indeed one finds little support for that concept in Layne's previous writings, where he has bemoaned the extension of American responsibility overseas.

Before turning to his current article, it will be useful to spend a moment examining a previous piece, where the roots of Mr. Layne's isolationist perspectives can be found. In a 1987 article in *Foreign Policy*, "Atlanticism without NATO," Layne concludes that "Western Europe's humiliating and anachronistic dependence on America lies at the root of the turmoil in Atlantic relations," and that transatlantic relations "will stabilize only when the United States and Western Europe are on an equal political and military footing."

Layne identifies the debilitating effect of European dependence correctly, but characteristically ignores the power and reality of the geopolitical circumstances that have forged Europe's postwar dilemma. Europe is caught in a delicate balancing act. A more assertive community of European allies acting in concert will inevitably challenge the integrity of the postwar security order. Over the last four decades, Europe's security has rested principally on a habitual reliance by the allies on the benefits of American power and influence. This dependent relationship has been supported by a rigid bipolar orientation in East-West affairs. To a great extent, the resilience of the bipolar security paradigm dictates Europe's acceptance of its status as interlocutor for the two superpowers, which in turn severely limits opportunities for the larger European states to shed the image (held by much of their publics) as American vassals. The European allies are discovering that while dependent security relationships are painful and humiliating, the alternatives are very risky. For a time, Europe was quite content to defer to the United States on matters of strategy, both within the European context and on larger issues of East-West policy as well.

That time has passed, and with it, a source of convergence that delayed any serious consideration of a drawdown of the American presence in and commitment to Europe. Layne's hand-wringing, however, blinds him to a central truth—that any division of deterrence labor among the Western nations will fall more heavily upon the United States than on its allies, that true equity of risk and burden among the NATO nations will not be achieved, regardless of how much pressure the United States exerts, either through threats of troop withdrawals or other sanctions. We should examine the wisdom of perpetuating this circumstance (as Layne attempts to do), but we ought to recognize that the pursuit of equity for its own sake is a concept foreign to contemporary international relations.

Finally, as a careful reading of the debates surrounding NATO's founding reveals, equity was never to be among its hallmarks, and even

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the most optimistic and visionary assessments of NATO Europe's future role in Western security planning did not (and should not) include the expectation that Europe and the United States can be expected to approach "an equal political and military footing."[1]

Layne's genuine intent was exposed in his *Foreign Policy* article when, after quoting (with approval) Gary Hart's declaration that "we are not Romans, we do not intend to stay in Germany for 300 years or until we are driven out," he calls for the United States to "fix an ironclad timetable for the phased withdrawal over four years of all U.S. ground, air, and nuclear forces from Europe." Leaving aside whether one can legitimately speak of a "phased" removal over as short a period as four years of more than 326,000 servicemen and the infrastructure that supports them, Layne's analysis excludes any serious discussion of either Soviet strategic interests in Europe or whether his precipitous prescription for a U.S. withdrawal could evoke an aggressive Soviet response. Layne is evidently convinced that the Soviet military threat to NATO has passed, and he approvingly cites Mikhail Gorbachev's stated desire to see Europe become more self-reliant, with its borders stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

LAYNE'S WRITINGS, however, reveal a deeper intellectual flaw, one that appears again in his latest article: A refusal to consider the consequences of proposed actions, which in turn flows from an arrogant view that the United States cannot be held responsible should his grand two-track plan of denuclearization and withdrawal actually jeopardize Europe's security. Further, since Layne does not even see the potential for a causal connection between Europe's demise and America's, the possibly disastrous consequences for U.S. policy of adopting his model of "residual deterrence" are ignored.

Mr. Layne seeks to outline an alternative American approach to European security by essentially jettisoning the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe's defense. Layne regards the INF treaty as a watershed, which in his words is "crucially important because it has forced into the open the debate about the future of NATO's strategies of extended deterrence and flexible response." The treaty has also focused attention on "the divergent political and strategic interests of the United States and West Germany" and "the intractability of NATO's risk sharing dilemma."

Layne applauds the treaty not because it represents an arms control breakthrough or might reduce U.S.-Soviet tensions, but because he believes it will begin the process of removing both American nuclear and conventional forces from Europe. Indeed, Layne argues that the INF treaty does not go far enough and advocates adoption of the "triple zero" i.e. the removal of all U.S. shorter-range nuclear systems that would remain after the longer-range INF weapons have been destroyed under the treaty's provisions. In addition, he recommends that in order for the West "to regain the diplomatic upper hand in Europe" the next U.S. president "should challenge the Soviets by unilaterally withdrawing from Europe (and demobilizing) one American division and 1000 of the shortest range U.S. tactical nuclear weapons."

The nuclear component of Layne's proposal goes to the heart of his objection to current American policy toward Europe. His central point is that "rational states do not base their strategy on a pledge to commit nuclear suicide to protect other states' security" and that as part of a new European security policy Washington must reduce "the nuclear exposure extended deterrence imposes on the United States."

Layne rejects the notion that military initiatives can bolster European security, since his analysis concludes that "the most serious threat to transatlantic cohesion is political, not military." Finally, he calls for a policy of "residual deterrence" which would form the intellectual framework for a decision by the su-

[1]See, for example, Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).

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perpowers to seek the "mutual political and military disengagement from Central and Eastern Europe."

Space does not permit an extended discussion of either the strategic context of European security or a lengthy exposition of my own views on the subject. For those interested, they can be found elsewhere.[2] The increasing currency of Mr. Layne's views, however, demand that they receive some attention.

FIRST, HIS SUPPORT for a policy of "residual deterrence" is difficult to examine, since in a very lengthy article the concept is never defined. Indeed, it appears to be a frivolous attempt to affix a veneer of intellectual respectability to a policy of unilateral retreat. He readily acknowledges, for example, that the keystone of NATO's deterrent is the Bonn-Washington axis. Yet he rejects the necessity to strengthen its military component. One suspects that Layne's fear is that American pressure on West Germany to investigate seriously the strategic benefit of a more robust conventional defense could actually *reinforce* the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. He does not acknowledge this because he believes its credibility cannot be restored, and because he treats conventional and nuclear forces in isolation from one another, revealing an ignorance of the strategic connection between conventional and nuclear strategies. This also explains his hopelessly confused discussion of deterrence, from which springs his call for a residual deterrent.

Since Mr. Layne proposes both a nuclear and conventional withdrawal from Europe, one is left wondering what will provide the basis for this "residual" deterrent. The answer is not to be found in Layne's article, as the consequences of his proposals do not seem to concern him. Should this residual deterrent fail, Layne is evidently prepared to see Europe prostrate, since his call for a superpower disengagement is made without respect for the geographic realities that would enable a prompt Soviet redeployment in a crisis.

Mr. Layne would resolve Europe's security dilemma (which he repeatedly and carelessly implies is nothing more than solving the question of German reunification) by "seeking a diplomatic solution to West Germany's security dilemma." The "solution" is not described, although Layne proposes "an interim solution to Germany's partition" which, like his grand scheme of residual deterrence, is left to the reader's imagination to construct. Returning to his libertarian approach, Layne again insists on maximum flexibility for a U.S. choice to abandon Europe, but provides us with minimum discussion of the consequences, for NATO, the U.S., or East-West relations.

Where Layne does offer answers to Europe's security dilemma (which he describes candidly and quite accurately as flowing from "the Alliance's dirty little secret" of ensuring that "America will do reflexively what it would not do deliberately," he exposes a basic contradiction in his argument. He condemns a policy of "suicidal extended deterrence" but states that "because deterrence is inherently existential, the mere fact that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and *might* use them in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe is sufficient to dissuade Moscow." Why, it must be asked, should Kremlin defense planners find a suicidal guarantee any more impressive than Layne does? Is he suggesting that strategic nuclear weapons based in the United States and aimed at targets in the Soviet Union would represent a *more* credible threat to Moscow than a combination of

[2]See, for example, Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr. "Defending Post-INF Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1988); Jed C. Snyder, "European Security, East-West Policy, and the INF Debate," *Orbis*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Winter 1984); Snyder, "Zero-Zero: The Price of Political Expedience," *Wall Street Journal* (European Edition), September 30, 1987; and Snyder, "Putting Muscle in an INF Treaty," *Wall Street Journal* (European Edition), December 22, 1987.

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intercontinental weapons and European-based systems as well? This is a most perverse variant of the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation," one that would cause even its architect, John Foster Dulles, to blush. It also ignores persistent U.S. and Soviet programs to create nuclear options below the doomsday level of the 1950s. Perhaps Mr. Layne yearns for the good old days of apocalyptic threats; perhaps he sees credibility only in apocalypse. That would explain a series of categorical, and intellectually indefensible, declarations on the inevitability of nuclear escalation, as well as his lack of support for NATO's decision to modernize its nuclear capability through the 1979 decision to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

Layne's "residual" deterrent seems to consist only of his belief in Mikhail Gorbachev's goodwill, which he obviously is prepared to gamble upon, considering his reckless faith in the prospect that "Gorbachev may soon offer to tear down the Berlin Wall in exchange for a central European nuclear-free zone and/or withdrawal of all foreign troops from East and West Germany." Layne's implicit faith that *perestroika* and *glasnost* will defang Soviet policy in Europe exceeds even the most transparent and misleading statements of the Soviet leadership.

REGARDLESS of whether one shares or disagrees with Layne's prognosis or prescriptions, the article is peppered with inaccurate statements about both the recent history of American nuclear policy and the procedures governing release of U.S. nuclear weapons.

In discussing the historical background of the INF deployments, for example, Layne declares that Helmut Schmidt, in his 1977 address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, "took the initiative to restore the credibility of America's extended deterrent, and thereby set in motion the events that culminated in the INF deployments." This is simply incorrect. While Schmidt can be credited with sounding the alarm over the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, the "initiative" to explore options to bolster the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe were taken several years earlier, by then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, as part of a larger examination designed to modernize and refine American nuclear employment policy, which led to a significant revision of targeting doctrine, announced by Schlesinger in January 1974. Schlesinger became alarmed over the lack of flexibility in American targeting options, believing that more discriminate choices should be given to an American president in the event of a crisis, rather than the exclusively massive retaliatory menu that had been in place since the early 1960s.

European contingencies became a central component of the "Schlesinger Doctrine" to reduce the blunderbuss character of U.S. nuclear policy. Concern over NATO's inability to respond to an attack at intermediate levels led to a request, initiated by Senator Sam Nunn, for a thorough examination of the Alliance's nuclear strategy to discover whether in fact "flexible response" was a misnomer. Accordingly, Schlesinger ordered an assessment of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe. That study was quite critical of the Alliance's ability to respond in kind to either a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack in Western Europe. As a result, a process was begun that led to Alliance debates in the late 1970s over the feasibility of expanding and modernizing what had been referred to as *theater* nuclear forces.

This is not a small historical point, because it is generally assumed (incorrectly) that were it not for Helmut Schmidt's 1977 speech, the INF deployment decision would never have been made.

Layne also declares confidently his intimate knowledge of NATO's nuclear war plans and weapons release procedures. He states, for example, that due to the short-warning times that would precede a Soviet attack and "the confusion and disruption of communications that would occur during combat, authority to

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use nuclear weapons would have to be predelegated to battlefield commanders" and that "battalion commanders in the field would have to make the momentous decision to initiate nuclear warfare in Europe."

Considering that Mr. Layne has never served in the U.S. government, nor conducted research in the highly classified areas of nuclear command and control or nuclear employment policy, it is difficult to take this categorical statement as authoritative. His confidence in the verity of his conclusion is traced to the work of Paul Bracken, and his assertion that Bracken's assessments are "implicitly supported" by former secretary of defense Robert McNamara's 1986 book *Blundering into Disaster.*

Considering McNamara's recent contraction of a nuclear allergy and his occasional practice of revising history to support a more favorable reading of his own policy decisions, Layne would do well to refrain from certitude based on this work. Bracken's book is solid and credible, but NATO has instituted measures (taken after Bracken's research for his book, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*, and provoked in large part by the INF deployments) to improve significantly the command-control and release problem. While NATO will never be able to remove the time-consuming process of political consultation that must precede nuclear release, the uncertainty over the process itself must surely cause some pause in the minds of Soviet planners.

I dissociate myself from those who advocate an American departure from NATO or a *precipitous* withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Nevertheless, I also believe firmly that the situation of strategic dependence discussed by Mr. Layne cannot be allowed to continue. Military prudence dictates that greater defense burdens be shifted to the Europeans, in ways that ensure a more equitable distribution of risk within the Alliance. Further, it seems probable that politically influential forces in the United States will be successful within the next decade in compelling the U.S. Congress to pass legislation mandating some reduction in the American combat presence in Europe. Because such congressional initiatives are likely to arise more from short-sighted budgetary imperatives than from a serious and longer-term strategic assessment, it is critical that action be taken to preempt such efforts.

In order for NATO to survive as an effective deterrent, some degree of American protection must be incorporated into the Alliance's framework of guarantees. Further, America's status as "superpower" would be affected negatively by a jettisoning of its principal postwar security task. Admittedly, the U.S. alliance with Europe does not, in any concrete sense, safeguard America's own *territorial* security. That, however, should not be the sole criterion for an alliance of Western nations in the nuclear age. There is in any case no potential confederation of allies that could hope to provide the U.S. with such a guarantee. Regardless, superpowers for better or worse assume a stature and commitment that transcends their borders and that must affect their actions. This is not the rationale that libertarians like Mr. Layne are likely to find compelling, but it nevertheless remains a salient variable in the equation.

Arguably, the current American responsibilities in NATO do constrain opportunities for the U.S. to explore new strategic relationships (in Asia and the Middle East, for example) that, if initiated, could require new commitments of conventional and/or nuclear forces. Such relationships would not be feasible without a trimming of existing commitments, the largest of which rests in Western Europe.

Further, there is no compelling military reason why *American* troops, whose base of operations is separated from the deployment theater by 3000 miles of ocean, are inherently better-suited to protect European soil than the Europeans themselves. If the only justification offered for their presence is the political failure of European governments to insist to their publics that Europeans take a larger role in defending Europe, then one has a legitimate basis on which to question the moral foundation of the entire enterprise.

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One is often reminded by "Atlanticists" that the presence of American servicemen on European soil serves, through a hostage relationship appreciated by the Soviets, to couple Europe's security to the promise of an automatic U.S. nuclear reaction. This is the aspect of the American commitment that so dismays Christopher Layne, and with just cause. If this is the most compelling rationale for maintaining U.S. troop deployments in Europe, or continuing to adhere to an American nuclear commitment, then it is among the most pernicious circumstances imaginable and ultimately antithetical to a relationship between "allies." Further, Mr. Layne is correct in concluding that the credibility of America's extended deterrent has been seriously eroded. This makes his support for the INF treaty all the more puzzling. Jettisoning the American nuclear commitment to Europe's defense as a protest against NATO's nuclear demise, however, or precipitously removing American troops from European soil in order to assert American independence (as Mr. Layne advocates), could confirm the suspicion of allies and adversaries alike that the United States has succumbed to the tempting allure of isolationism, while jeopardizing its own long-term security in the bargain. That prospect should cause Mr. Layne to reconsider his approach.

Kennedy Corrected

.... A FEW YEARS AGO French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac said,"Europe is vanishing." That is a bit overstated, but the thought is on target. There were about 330 million people in Western Europe in 1985. By the middle of the next century, unless rates change solidly in an upward direction, the population will be about 290 million. By the end of the next century, it will be down to about 200 million and still sinking. C'est la vie.

Meanwhile, most of the rest of the world will be growing. In 1988 there were 231 million people in the European "big four": West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. These nations today are the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th largest countries in the world (according to PRB). By 2020 those four nations will have about 210 million to 215 million people, and they will rank 24th, 25th, 28th and 29th. The total population of the big four at that time will be just about that of one Asian nation—Bangladesh!

So what? European markets will be less important relative to the rest of the world. The geopolitical power and potency for European countries and for European culture will be diminished.

That culture is also ours; we share European power. Professor Paul Kennedy, author of "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," has it wrong. Our problem is not economic competition, but demographic erosion, with West Europe first under the gun. Great nations do indeed come and go. Great cultures become less and less relevant. Things change. Europe had a good run at it. Au revoir. Auf Wiedersehen. Arrivederci. Bye bye.

Ben Wattenberg in *The Washington Times*, June 16, 1988

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The Coordination of Economies

Christopher L. Culp*

ONE OF GOD'S greatest gifts to mankind was the free price system. As I type this article on my word processor, I reflect on what a wonder of coordination and cooperation has been achieved in such an instrument. Technical experts in electronics, designers, managers, and workers in countries as disparate as Taiwan, Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and no doubt many others have cooperated to produce this marvel. Those who have so conjoined in this production do not know one another, have never met and will never meet; often they speak different languages and have different mores and beliefs. Yet they cooperate and coordinate their efforts, not through the direction of some supermanager, but through their own free choice among the teeming options offered by the free price system. Each person's effort to improve his condition is guided, as though by some divine purpose, to produce the miracles of coordination and cooperation that make our civilization.

The coordination induced among individuals and firms by the price system has been well documented. It is now widely accepted, even in the Eastern bloc countries that had hitherto condemned capitalism and poured obloquy on the price mechanism, as the only effective way of organizing production and distribution. But is it natural to inquire: Surely if the price mechanism is so successful in coordinating individuals and firms, will it not be equally successful in coordinating the economic affairs of nation states?

Christopher L. Culp is an associate policy analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., and a research associate at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

Coordination of National Policies

LET US SEE what this implies. First let us assume that the governments of each country pursue policies that are in the interests of their own inhabitants. This is the inter-governmental analogue of individuals and private firms pursuing their own ends. The inhabitants of all countries, we may assume, want to be as wealthy as possible—with perhaps some reservations about the need to ensure that there are no large fluctuations in wealth and income. So the government's role is to ensure that its inhabitants

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get free access to international markets to trade at whatever prices are available.

This is, of course, the great classical case for free trade. And free trade includes not only transactions in goods and services but also freedom to purchase and sell any foreign currency and assets. Thus will producers and consumers in the United States freely coordinate their activities with producers and consumers in other countries. The role of a benign government is to facilitate this cooperation. The most obvious way to ensure coordination is for governments to promote free trade and unrestricted capital mobility. Notwithstanding the recent eruptions of petty protectionism, there is a widespread belief in the virtues of open markets for both goods and capital.

After free trade, the most important requirement is that there be broad stability in the general level of prices of goods and services. Then people will have a stable measuring rod—money—with which to make their coordinating decisions and chart their progress. Virtually the only instrument by which governments may secure this stability is monetary and fiscal policy. The ultimate objective of domestic monetary-fiscal policies is to promote relatively stable growth in a non-inflationary environment—or at least that is what governments profess. But even among Western nations there are considerable differences about what levels of inflation may be regarded as tolerable; for example, West Germany regards an inflation rate of 4 percent as quite beyond the pale, whereas most administrations in the United States would regard that rate with equanimity. But nevertheless, West Germany and the United States can happily rub along together with stable prices and a 4 percent inflation respectively, *provided that no one succeeds in fixing the dollar-mark exchange rate.* (This is a critical condition, which, for now, I must ask the reader to accept; the reasons will be explored later in this article.)

There is no need for any explicit or overt coordination of government policies. It is true that any undue expansion of the money supply in the United States will have *some* effect in Germany. The additional demand in the United States will suck in imports from Germany, and, to pay for them, dollars will flow out of the United States into the accounts of German exporters. This will increase demand and prices in West Germany, but the pressure in Germany will be modest compared with that in the United States. Overwhelmingly the main effect of the Federal Reserve Board's expansion will be felt on inflation and activity in the United States. The Fed will have by far the greatest incentive to bring its own monetary policy into line with its 4 percent target inflation rate. Similarly, by far the main effect of an undue expansion by the Bundesbank will be on the German, rather than the American, rate of inflation. The spillovers will be relatively small. (Incidentally this result, so obvious to common sense, has been confirmed by numerous econometric studies.)

The implications are clear: *Coordination is already achieved by each government pursuing its own policy of price stability or low inflation.* Of course there may be modest benign coordination—such as the governments explaining in detail what their domestic objectives and policies are. Coming clean on policies will reduce uncertainties, misinterpretations of data and information, and all those suspicions which abound in international surveillance. Just as it may well be useful to monitor one another's economies and trade knowledge about the efficacy of policies. But the basic result—that it is best for each government simply to pursue its own self-interest—is a fortunate one. It is easy to implement. Experience suggests that it is very difficult to persuade governments to follow policies which they believe to be inimical to national interests.

Spillovers and Global Objectives

THE CHAMPIONS of international policy coordination, however, argue that surely gains can be made by joint decision-making. It will be in the interests of the whole concert of nations if each country agrees to adjust its policy to take into account

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all the side effects and spillovers. Jointly, it is argued, we can achieve much more than we can if each acts selfishly.

The first point to note about this argument is that, *on its own assumptions*, it is logically impeccable. Obviously, if West Germany and the United States knew all the effects, both domestic and international, of their policies, they could clearly get together and fashion a joint arrangement which would be, in aggregate, superior to the sum of their individual efforts. This is a species of a more general proposition widely applied to micromarkets for goods and services: *with perfect knowledge and unlimited powers, one could always improve on a free market.* Externalities, social costs, and various other effects can be taken into account by a benign knowledgeable bureaucracy in regulating markets.

I believe, however, that through reflection and experience, we are now most skeptical about the efficacy of benign bureaucratic regulation, partly because of the political temptations, but mainly because of the prevailing ignorance of the myriad of interacting processes that comprise markets. We know little about individual micromarkets, but we know even less about the macroeconomic processes and the dynamics of forces that determine the fate of national economies. Any joint-coordination of national policies would be based on pretensions which are completely unwarranted by the corpus of economic knowledge and is likely to do harm rather than good.

Secondly, even if one accepts the potentially beneficial effect of coordination, it is difficult to see how all the ships of state could be kept on course. There is unlikely to be any system of sanctions with which they could be kept in line. And if there were such sanctions—shots over the bow, such as refusal to lend support for the currency or, even, the imposition of tariff or other trade restrictions—the invocation of such sanctions would be bad per se and even their mere threat would surely scatter, if not scuttle, the convoy of cooperating nations. Coordination, therefore, will depend upon 'good will' or a 'community of interests' etc.—rather a weak reed, I fear, on which to rely. A coordinated convoy of ships travels at the speed of the slowest.

It may be asked, however, how can the concert of nations prevent a particular country, say the United States, from pursuing a policy of inflationary excess (as indeed it did from the early 1960s), in response to short term political pressures, when it is well-known that such excess is not in the abiding interests of the inhabitants of the United States? The reality is that not much can be done. It is just possible that if, in the 1960s, the Fed and a previous Treasury had entered into some multilateral understanding that they would adhere to non-inflationary policies, then the invocation of such an agreement might have had some effect in restraining the government. But, again, it would be unwise to count on such pressures being effective. If a government finds it imperative to pursue inflationary policies, it will.

Exchange Rate Coordination

HOW CAN THE other countries avoid importing the inflation of the United States (to continue with this purely hypothetical example)? Of course, one certain way actually to import the inflation is to fix the dollar exchange rate. If the dollar exchange rate of the DMark was fixed at 1.85 marks to the dollar, then Germany would indeed import the inflation of the United States. The influx of German exports to the United states would give rise to a flood of dollars into Germany, and in order to prevent this flood from depressing the dollar and revaluing the mark, the German government would have to buy the dollars with marks. Such an increase in the quantity of marks would transfer the inflation to Germany.[1]

[1] It is often claimed that there is no need for the Germans to create new marks since they can acquire all the marks they need by selling long term mark bonds. Experience has shown, however, that this so-called "sterilization" of an inflow of foreign money is effective only in

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A transmission of inflation of this kind can be largely, if not entirely, avoided by simply *not* managing the exchange rate. If neither West Germany nor the United States tried to peg the rate at 1.85, the mark would appreciate and America's imports from Germany would decline. There would be virtually no net outflow of dollars and the United States would suffer most of the inflationary effects of its unwise policies. Germany would largely escape the American inspired inflation.

A flexible exchange rate has much to recommend it. Those who misbehave substantially suffer the consequences of their folly. The fixed exchange rate system, on the other hand, operates rather like an international welfare system; the costs of the misdeeds of one are borne in some degree by every nation. To avoid misunderstanding, I must emphasize that, even with flexible exchange rates, West Germany would be better off if the United States did *not* inflate. With all the benefits of exchange rate adjustments, it is still necessary for Germany to adapt to the new international prices and exchange rates. And the transition is unlikely to be peaceful and smooth. Indeed, the appreciation of the mark is likely to overshoot the ultimate values at which it will settle.[2] Germany will have some headaches, but it will avoid the full fever of inflation.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these arguments is that, first, it is best for every country to pursue stable fiscal and monetary policies. This will ensure that there is no undue pressure on exchange rates and, apart from the normal vicissitudes occasioned by droughts, acts of God, and electoral foibles, the values of currencies should remain stable. It is the resort to inflationary finance that causes the trouble, and all the recriminations which exacerbate international relations for many years thereafter. But since one cannot guarantee that all nations will always act responsibly (in the interests of their inhabitants), a second conclusion is that it is best to leave exchange rates flexible. This will contain the damage.

the short term; ultimately, as people adjust their portfolios, the quantity of marks and the inflation rate must increase.

Deficits and Dollars in the 1980s

BROADLY SPEAKING, this was the position of the United States government and perhaps most governments of the industrialized nations in the early 1980s. The United Kingdom was the epitome of this virtuous policy; from 1980 onwards her budget deficits steadily decreased, the rate of monetary growth was substantially reduced and the exchange rate was left largely to market forces. The United States pursued a similar monetary and exchange rate policy, but, for reasons which are still the subject of controversy, the federal budget deficit increased to new highs—about 6 percent of GNP.

That persistent but declining deficit, it has been alleged, is the source of many evils and has much colored the views of Europeans and Japanese governments and central bankers. In particular, the deficits have been blamed for the high real interest rates on world markets, the high deficits on the current account of the U.S. balance of payments, and for the extraordinary appreciation of the dollar (more than 40 percent in real terms) to the

[2] The overshooting phenomena arises from the fact that the increased quantity of dollars will have an immediate effect on the market, rather like a glut of strawberries at the beginning of summer. In order to induce asset holders to absorb this new dollar glut, the price of dollars, relative to the mark, will have to fall sharply. Once this stock adjustment is over, the dollar will settle at a somewhat higher value. So rough and circuitous is the adjustment road that most authorities believe that governments should not take that route, or, if they do, that the bumps should be smoothed and the corners cut. Essentially the adjustment of the exchange rate enables the so-called *real exchange rate*, which adjusts the nominal exchange rate for changes in the prices of exports and imports, to be restored, relatively painlessly, to its market value.

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end of 1984, as well as for the fall in the dollar from February 1985 onwards. It is argued that the high dollar, in turn, fueled the protectionist movement that eventually delivered the Trade Bill of 1988.

There is little doubt that the soaring dollar, and all its consequences on both agriculture and rust-belt industries, produced a change in the United States government's laissez-faire policy on exchange rates. Secretary of the Treasury Baker thought that exchange rates should be managed to bring the dollar back to levels which he regarded as acceptable. In the Plaza agreement of September 1985, the main industrial nations agreed on concerted intervention to bring the dollar down to what they regarded as "equilibrium" levels. As usual, the joint interventions only got under way some eight or nine months *after* the dollar had started to fall rapidly. Indeed, looking at the path of the dollar over the period of the Plaza interventions, it is quite impossible to detect any effect whatsoever. The pace of the fall was the same both before and after Plaza. But this in no way inhibited the participants from admiring their own perspicacity; Plaza was reckoned a success.

The fall of the dollar, however, has a much simpler explanation, one which has virtually nothing to do with the budget deficit, the trade deficit, or the assorted Plaza interventions. The rise of the dollar was largely occasioned by the tight monetary policy pursued by the Fed during the 1980 to 1984 period (with some relaxation in 1982 and 1983). From the end of 1984, however, monetary growth virtually tripled and continued high throughout 1985 and 1986. It was simply the increase in the quantity of dollars, relative to the quantities of yen and marks, that generated the fall of the dollar.[3]

"Saving" the Dollar—Louvre, the Crash, and Inflation

THE CONTINUED FALL of the dollar at the end of 1986 caused fears in the United States of overshooting and the inflationary consequences that would follow. The Louvre agreement among the sixty-seven countries in February 1987 aimed at supporting the dollar where it was, on the presumption that exchange rates were then about at the right levels. The market however demurred. It clearly anticipated a further decline. So the world's private investors held off buying dollar bonds. Accepting their Louvre obligations, the central banks (primarily of Japan and Germany) rallied around and bought the excess offerings of dollar financial paper . . . to an amount of more than $140 billion during 1987. Interest rates on dollar paper nevertheless pushed up sharply in mid 1987 and contributed towards the crash of Wall Street. Then it was clear that the Louvre objective was unattainable. From Black Monday (October 19th) on, the dollar depreciated a further 6 to 7 percent against the G7 currencies (excluding the Canadian dollar) during 1987.

The sad effects of this Louvre fiasco will continue to haunt the Western world for some years to come. One strange consequence of the German intervention was an increase in German taxes! The Bundesbank reported nearly $4 billion in losses on its 1987 exchange rate interventions (mainly through buying depreciating U.S. dollars), which increased the budget deficit and so, according to the finance ministry, called for increased tax revenue. But much more important was the fact that there had been a great expansion of marks, pounds, yen, etc., in order to buy up these excess dollars. These large stocks of money and liquid

[3] A very similar pattern occurred in the great sterling appreciation of 1979–81. Because of a fierce monetary squeeze from 1979, sterling appreciated just about as much as the dollar did in the 1980s, that is to say by about 40 to 45 percent in real terms. The easing of monetary policy in 1981 saw a rapid depreciation of sterling—but fortunately the government abjured intervention, and Britain secured a stable monetary system and stable non-inflationary growth thereafter.

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assets hang over the economies of the West, creating many fears of inflation and recession.

The mid-1980s have been very reminiscent of the last great period of interventions to maintain fixed exchange rates—in 1969 to 1972 during the last years of Bretton Woods. Then there was a massive increase in monetary expansion which culminated in the great inflation and recession of the mid-1970s. I fear that we are about to learn these painful lessons all over again.

The Discipline of Capital Flight

TRUE, THE WORLD has changed these last twenty years. But the main change in international finance has been, first, the enormous growth of footloose capital and second, the increased speed with which this capital can be transferred between currencies and countries. As events in 1987 showed, even the coordinated efforts of the world's great central banks (which did not hesitate to reach deep into the taxpayers' pockets) could not hold the dollar; the markets won.

This has upset many people. Distinguished economists such as Nobel Laureate James Tobin have urged that governments will never be able adequately to coordinate exchange rates (I think that by that they mean regulate exchange rates in ways which they—the economists—believe are appropriate) unless this flood of "hot money," as it is pejoratively called, is controlled or at least contained. Suggestions have been made that more "friction" be introduced in the system, perhaps in the form of controls or perhaps in the form of a world-wide transactions tax on currency switches. This would put the individual's savings at the mercy of national governments—in a way similar to, but one hopes not so extreme as, the situation pertaining in the Third World and Eastern bloc countries.

Even so, the experience of the 1960s shows that it would still be impossible to sustain exchange rates different from the market's solution—and so there would be calls for yet higher barriers. A rather steep price to pay for the vanities of our rulers. Adam Smith's immortal prose reminds us of such follies:

> The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.[4]

In addition to their other manifest merits, free capital markets will remain one of the most effective means by which governments are reminded of the errors of their ways. We should honor, not excoriate, those thousands of international speculators who, with their own hot money, police so effectively the follies of governments.

But suppose, nevertheless, that governments continue to hanker after exchange rate pegging in one or another of its many forms. One might well ask whether it is even possible for governments to honor their obligations. One fundamental difficulty, which I have ignored up to now by the bland assumption that governments could deliver on any feasible economic policy, is that some central banks—in particular the Fed and the Bundesbank—are constitutionally independent of government. And in fiscal policy, the President of the United States has said that he does not control the budget. (As a matter of fact, I am not quite sure whether anybody controls the budget of the United States, but for the sake of the argument I will assume that Congress does so.) Before one plans coordination on a galactic scale, one had best do some earnest coordination at home. One must note that the

[4] R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, eds., *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 456.

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last occasion on which there was happy coordination between Congress and the president was in the Lyndon Johnson era. This ushered in the collapse of Bretton Woods and the great inflation of the 1970s. Hardly a recommendation for coordination at any level.

An Agenda for Coordination

THESE ARGUMENTS lead me to suggest a very modest agenda—with no claims for originality—which recognizes clearly both how little we know and what can realistically be achieved. *First,* each country should set its monetary and fiscal policies in accordance with domestic objectives. Countries can usefully exchange information on exactly what those measures are and how they are to be implemented. (Such information should, in any case, be in the public domain.) Likewise, friendly persuasion by one agency or another is quite tolerable, provided it does not result in a crusade by one government against the policy of another. *Second,* there should be no attempt, through internationally coordinated intervention, to move market exchange rates to what economic advisers regard as appropriate levels. If a particular government wishes to intervene to secure a rate different from the markets, then that is its prerogative. But its own taxpayers should pay for the consequences. *Third,* international coordination should not merely continue but be stepped up in the field of trade and capital movements liberalization. Although it is in the domestic interests of a country to reduce barriers, experience suggests that the political pressure of joint international undertakings, such as GATT, are useful adjuncts and may be used to offset domestic protectionist pressure groups. *Fourth,* such modest coordination is best pursued quietly but persistently in an atmosphere of negotiation and compromise. When, as in 1985 to 1987, West Germany is told, through the world media, that it is pursuing a policy that is bad for it and bad for the world, such recrimination will merely raise hackles about sovereignty and the meddling of one country in the domestic affairs of another. If the United States wishes to make its view on German economic policy known to the Germans, then it is best done quietly and in terms of friendly advice rather than impatient reproof.

Finally, however disappointing the recent attempts at exchange rate coordination have been, one suspects that many more will be essayed in the years ahead. Indeed suggestions are already being made that the United States and Japan join as members of the existing exchange rate bloc in the European Monetary System, to form one big system rather like the old Bretton Woods arrangement, but, of course, without the hegemony of the dollar. The powerful interest groups pushing the Western world along such dangerous paths should not be underestimated. Our free currency and capital markets are human and imperfect. But they are infinitely preferable to any arrangement imposed by a gathering of governments. Blessed indeed are our freedoms.

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Space, Power, and Strategy

Simon P. Worden and Bruce P. Jackson

Control of space will be decided in the next decade, and the nation which controls space can control the Earth.

John F. Kennedy
October 24, 1960

TECHNOLOGICAL change has always weighed in the balance of military power. From cavalry to machine gun to tank to nuclear submarine, new weapons have continually changed the face of battle. At the end of World War II the nuclear bomb combined with the ballistic missile brought about a stunning revolution in military strategy, and in the past forty years the nuclear weapon has remained the ultimate measure of a nation's military power. Now, quietly, the unrelenting progress of science has brought us to the threshold of a new era—one in which weapons based in space will overtake nuclear missiles as the primary measure of a nation's military strength.

Once the world's leader in space exploration, the United States no longer stands first at the frontier of the heavens. While the Soviet Union has mounted a vociferous campaign against "the militarization of space" it now has a space program with the greatest military potential of all the nations. If present trends continue, the Soviets will possess a greater capacity than the United States or any other nation to place weapons in space—and thus stand to dominate the major military technology of the future.

Firepower From Space

BEFORE NUCLEAR weapons, military experts regarded the incorporation of new technologies into national strategy as a slowly evolving process. New weapons increased military strength and shifted relative political power at a measured pace. Strategists carefully studied those factors which influenced a new weapon's power in order to estimate when and how the weapon would affect the military balance. Nuclear weapons, however, burst upon the scene so suddenly that these studied approaches were cast aside. Interestingly, our understanding of the likely impact of a future class of space-based weapons is enhanced by the method-

Lieutenant Colonel Worden is commander, Space Defense Operations Center, United States Space Command. He was a former special assistant to the director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Geneva nuclear and space arms talks.

Captain Jackson is special assistant to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear forces and arms control policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent U.S. government positions.

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ologies used by strategists who wrote before the nuclear age.

The emergence of airpower in World War I provides an excellent example of how a new capability was analyzed and then integrated into military thinking. Because aircraft operated in a new medium and had easily definable characteristics—speed, armament, range, etc.—air warfare was relatively easy to model mathematically. F.W. Lanchester's 1916 book, *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm*,[1] was the benchmark work of those years. Lanchester is best known for his "state equations"—mathematical relationships showing the relative power of two opposing forces. The state equations demonstrated that a military force's power relative to opposing forces is proportionate to the square of its firepower. This meant that a small difference in two forces' firepower could translate into a decisive battlefield advantage. For example, if a side has 70 percent the firepower of its opponent, it will be only half as powerful as the adversary. Although efforts to apply these relationships to more general military engagements have failed, they remain valid in cases like air warfare, where most features of a battle are quantifiable.

In the 1920s an obscure Italian general, Giolio Douhet, recognized the potential of air warfare to dominate the European land battle. He developed a strategy based on air technology and air warfare—the Command of the Air—that advocated crushing air attacks against the enemy's homeland and war-making potential. Douhet's ideas subsequently provided the rationale for Allied and German strategic bombing campaigns during World War II. At least in the West, Douhet's assertion of the importance of air attack against unprotected urban-industrial targets and war supporting industry has persisted through the nuclear era.

Perhaps the best work to describe the relationship between technology and strategy was J.F.C. Fuller's *Armament and History* published in 1945. Fuller, a proponent of another technological innovation, mechanized tank warfare, listed five qualitative parameters which determined a weapon's overall power: 1) Range of Action, 2) Striking Power, 3) Accuracy of Aim, 4) Volume of Fire, and 5) Portability.

While Fuller gave priority to the first, Range of Action, in the modern nuclear era accuracy has become the key parameter. Nuclear weapons release a huge amount of energy, but it is not directed. In a nuclear explosion, the energy density—that is, the destructive energy deposited per unit volume in a target—decreases at a rate which is proportional to the cubed power of the distance from the explosion. A nuclear weapon which is twice as accurate has eight times as much potential against a point target as the less accurate weapon of the same explosive yield.

IDEALLY, we would find a single quantitative parameter, valid for most types of military weapons, to measure a nation's military power. Fuller's first three parameters—range of action, striking power, accuracy of aim—can be combined into a recently emphasized parameter known as "brightness." The new measure combines range, striking power, and accuracy into a single number. The brightness of a laser beam is a measure of the amount of energy the laser directs into a cone. Laser beams spread the farther they get from the laser generator. This spreading sets the size of the cone. The more energy put out by the laser, and the narrower the cone it can direct the energy into, the higher the laser's brightness.

It is simple to calculate "brightness" for a non-laser weapon, an arrow for example. The arrow's accuracy defines the size of its cone, and its weight and velocity ("kinetic energy") give its penetrating power.[2]

Brightness alone is not a complete measure of a weapon's effectiveness. Firing rate—Fuller's "volume of fire"—is also important. To determine the firing rate two factors must be considered: how many rounds the weapon fires during battle, and how much time it takes the weapon to get into position to fire. For instance an army might have 10,000 artillery rounds, but if it takes weeks to get into po-

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sition (10^6 seconds) the average firing rate could be quite low. In the above example, the firing rate would be only 0.01 per second. The basic measure of military effectiveness for a given weapon system is thus:

Effectiveness = Brightness × Firing Rate.

With this metric it is possible to evaluate a range of weapons in terms of their overall effectiveness. We can see how new space capabilities, such as kinetic energy or directed energy weapons, might stack up against earlier weapons.

For instance kinetic energy weapons can kill a target by simply striking it. At the relative velocities involved in space operations (tens of kilometers per second), kinetic energy is much more powerful than any conventional explosive; it approaches nuclear energy levels. A ten-ton projectile dropped from the Moon would strike the Earth with almost a kiloton of kinetic energy. Kinetic energy space weapons therefore need be no more complex than an air-to-air missile mounted on a satellite. Directed energy weapons, by comparison, fire energy in the form of light (lasers) or atomic particles (particle beams). These beams travel at or near the speed of light (300,000 kilometers per second).

The calculations show some interesting results. Both kinetic energy and directed energy space weapons are at least as powerful as nuclear-armed ICBMs. The directed energy weapon has the long-term edge because it can get into position rapidly and fire at extremely high rates. It might be thought that nuclear weapons based in space would be even more potent. Nuclear weapons, however, are single shot devices. What they pick up in raw energy output, they lose in firing rate. The conclusion is significant: *Non-nuclear weapons based in space are potentially more effective militarily than nuclear weapons.*

The Gravity Well

WHAT FACTORS interact with the firepower of space weapons to determine military power in space? What are the space capabilities that really matter to great nations? The key to these questions is provided by the concept known to space scientists as the "gravity well" (Figure 1).[3] If one was far from the Earth and dropped an object, gravity would accelerate the projectile toward the Earth. The farther away the object started, the faster it would be going when it struck the Earth. Thus gravitational "potential" energy gets turned into kinetic energy of motion. As noted above, a large object dropped from lunar orbit would hit the Earth at about twenty kilometers per second, releasing many kilotons of kinetic energy.[4] Since the Earth is the source of the gravity which accelerates the object, and the farther from the Earth one gets the more potential energy an object possesses, the Earth is said to sit at the bottom of a gravity well.

The gravity well diagram is an easy way to measure space capabilities. It takes a large amount of energy to raise an object from the Earth and place it in orbit, and even more to propel it into deep space. By considering how much mass a nation can put into space, and how far a nation can place it up the gravity well, we have an excellent measure of a nation's space capabilities.

There are two gravity wells to consider. The first, of course, is the Earth's. But the Earth also sits in a much deeper gravity well—that of the Sun. To measure the total potential energy of an object in space we must consider its position in the Sun's gravity well once it is out of the Earth's. The farther from the Sun an object is, the more potential energy it has.

There are two ways to position a nation's space assets within these gravity wells. Currently, the only means we have to move mass into and around in space is to launch it from the Earth's surface on top of large chemically-powered rockets. The more mass we wish to put up, or the farther up these wells we want to go, the more powerful our launching rocket must be. However, in the future we may be able to make use of material already in space—far up the gravity wells of the Earth and Sun. As an illustration of how access to material

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already in space could become more important than that launched from Earth, consider a few long-term possibilities. For example, we might get material from the Moon—almost completely out of the Earth's gravity well, although we would need to get it out of the Moon's own very small gravity well first (see figure 1). Another way would be to use some of the numerous small "islands" in space known as asteroids. Most of these are only a kilometer or so across, and many come within easy range of the Earth. Some asteroids are made of water ice, others of almost pure iron. Some scientists think certain asteroids are made of nearly pure platinum group metals. These are all the ingredients needed by future space systems and they are ready for our use far up the gravity well.[5]

Strategic Choke Points in Space

IN ADDITION to an object's general position in the gravity well diagram, there are some special locations in space of particular interest to national strategists. These locations are analogous to Admiral Mahan's nineteenth century sea lines of communication and naval choke points. Like their naval counterparts, these positions in space could dominate military operations in space.

The first such space "line of communication" is the polar, Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Satellites which are launched due north or south pass over the poles once each orbit and are said to be in "polar" orbits. Normally, it is cheapest and easiest to launch payloads directly east into what is called an equatorial orbit. The satellite then orbits over a narrow band of latitudes centered on the equator—missing areas in the far north and south so that the Soviet Union and Western Europe are beyond the field of view. If, however, satellites are launched into polar orbits they will pass over nearly every point on the globe several times in the course of a day.

The second critical space location is geosynchronous Earth orbit, or GEO. Satellites at orbit altitudes about 40,000 kilometers above the equator take exactly twenty-four hours to orbit the globe. Thus a satellite in GEO is always directly over a single point on the ground. This is ideal for communications systems and early warning sensors, since the satellite is always available at the same point in the sky to relay data to points on the Earth up to a hemisphere away. Ground-based relay antennas, once pointed at the satellite, do not need to move to remain locked on the satellite.

The third important location in space is a set of positions where the gravitational attractions of two large celestial bodies—such as the Earth and Moon—exactly balance one another. For each set of two celestial bodies these equilibrium positions are known as the system's Lagrange points. There are five points in each system. Lagrange points are important since it takes a minimal amount of energy to move from them to any other point in the system. In a sense they represent the equivalent of high ground and have the same strategic importance. Thus by "taking and holding" the Lagrange points, an anti-satellite or other military system would have done the equivalent of gaining the high ground. As we move out into space beyond the Earth-Moon system, the Lagrange points defined by the Sun and Earth become similarly important for dominating operations within the inner solar system.

Currently, the basic space-capability measure is the ability to place mass just outside the atmosphere into LEO. This is about halfway up the Earth's gravity well. The Soviet Union has recently tested a "heavy-lift" launch vehicle that can place over 100 metric tons at a time into LEO. With an expected launch rate of at least ten of these giant "Energia" rockets per year, the Soviet Union will soon be able to place several million kilograms per year into LEO—*the equivalent of a small naval destroyer*. By comparison, the U.S. space shuttle is capable of less than twenty tons. Once the shuttle is back on line, the United States will be limited to placing only a few hundred thousand kilograms per year in LEO—a factor of ten less than the Soviets, and

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

Figure 1: To lift payloads from the Earth and place them into orbit in space takes energy. We now generate this energy as a rocket's energy of motion. As the rocket coasts upward after firing, the energy of motion (kinetic energy) converts to the energy of height (gravitational potential energy). To lift a payload free from Earth's gravitation we must expend as much energy as if we were to haul that payload against the full force of gravity we feel on the Earth's surface to a height of 4000 miles. To reach the nearer goal of low Earth orbit (LEO), where rockets and their payloads orbit just above the atmosphere requires only half as much energy—still equivalent to climbing to 2000 miles. All large objects in space—the Sun, Moon, and planets such as Mars—have these gravity wells. Smaller objects, such as the Moon and Mars, have wells much less deep. The Sun's gravity well is far deeper. See note 3.

about the size of a modest pleasure yacht. Admiral Mahan would take a dim view of the resultant imbalance in the space "fleet."

Space and Soviet Strategy

SOVIET STRATEGIC considerations differ from those applicable in the West. In Soviet doctrinal writings, the Correlation of Forces (COF) analysis is a precise calculation of relative military power. Overall military strength, force vulnerability, and strength of enemy defenses all enter the calculation. From these numerical measures of power, the Soviet strategist can calculate when and where to strike, and when to hold fast or retreat.

There is one other Soviet concept which differs significantly from its Western counterpart: "stability." In American analyses two

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types of stability matter: the first is arms race stability, which measures the tendency for one side's weapons deployments to lead to escalating countermeasures by the other; the second is crisis stability, which measures the tendency for a crisis to deteriorate into war. For the Soviets, a situation or a weapon system is stable if the military variables are known and predictable.[6] As with their military COF, by equating "stability" with "predictability" the Soviets have a different and more quantifiable strategy than the West.

In the 1960s Soviet strategists developed COF analyses for nuclear weapons. These equations, to the best of our knowledge, were first set forward in the classified Soviet general staff journal by Major General Anureyev in 1967.[7] By the 1980s, the Soviets had built a large COF advantage over the United States in nuclear forces.[8] This gives the Soviets formidable bargaining capital in arms control talks, as demonstrated by their newfound ability to make marginal "concessions" in order to lock in long-term advantage.

The Soviets have long been aware that space-capability influences the power balance. The classic 1960s book, *Soviet Military Strategy*, published by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolovskiy, emphasized the pre-eminent role of nuclear weapons in Soviet strategy. However, in its first, 1962 edition, the book incorrectly quoted President Kennedy as saying that the nation that controlled space would control the Earth, and that space supremacy was the U.S. aim. By the late 1960s, when it became clear to the Soviets that Soviet space efforts were falling behind as a result of the U.S. Apollo program, the Soviets began to use arms control as an obstacle to U.S. space activities. This tactical adjustment, however, did not banish discussions of space capabilities from Soviet writings. By the time Marshal Sokolovskiy's third edition of *Soviet Military Strategy* appeared in 1968, military space discussions had been moved totally into the realm of "foreign" and "Western" efforts.[9]

In the 1980s, strident Soviet demands for the banning of weapons in space have become commonplace. Although much Soviet political capital has been directed against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), it is by no means clear that effective anti-missile defenses are the sole or even the top Soviet concern. Recent Soviet commentaries provide important clues to the importance the Soviet Union ascribes to space capabilities. Senior Soviet officials equate space weapons with nuclear weapons in their impact on the strategic balance. This emphasis is reflected in Soviet propaganda about SDI which concentrates more generally on the danger of an arms race in space rather than on the more limited question of anti-missile defense.[10]

Soviet commentators attack U.S. military space efforts on several grounds. They often stress the possibility that space weapons will be even more destructive than nuclear weapons, or that a space-based laser system could start firestorms in cities.[11]

While this charge is technically dubious, the Soviets have professed to see yet another military "spinoff" from SDI. They have gone on to argue that space-based systems could hit key air, ground, sea, and military command and control installations in an effective surprise military attack. Since Soviet strategic thinking in the 1980s has increasingly emphasized non-nuclear capabilities,[12] it is likely that this fear, rather than worry over the potential of space weapons as instruments of mass destruction, is at the root of their opposition to U.S. military space efforts.

Space in Offense and Defense

HISTORICALLY, whenever a side planning an offensive has had free rein to use the battle space between himself and the defender, the offense has usually dominated. The ease with which the Germans avoided the French Maginot line in World War II provides a telling example. With ample, unopposed space to maneuver, the German offensive had merely to punch through the single line of defense at points and times of their own choosing. More simply, they could go around the unfinished defenses. In contrast, where the defense has operated

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throughout the battle space separating the defender from the aggressor, the defense has often dominated. In cases like the Allied North Atlantic defense in World War II, "multi-layered" defense proved highly effective. Though individual defensive layers may be weak, they can combine to blunt an offensive strike so badly that an aggressor is deterred from launching such a strike.

In the case of missile defenses, 1960s systems such as the U.S. Safeguard had two layers operating in only the final minutes of an offensive nuclear warhead's flight. As the ABM debate in the late 1960s proved, these systems could do little to alter the dominance of offensive nuclear missiles. However, future defenses could have many layers, some operating soon after an offensive missile lifts off in what is known as boost phase. The combination of layers based on differing technical approaches could make effective offensive countermeasures difficult. While the range of countermeasures to a space-based missile defense is large, including offensive decoys, boosters that burn out before they get into space, and attacks against the space-based defensive elements, each of these is effective at best against a single defensive layer. The key to effective defense is the presence of several defensive layers in space, operating during nearly the entire flight path of an attacker.

Space-based sensors which can penetrate into the atmosphere could also provide effective defenses against air-delivered nuclear weapons. The prime problem in stopping cruise missiles, for example, is locating and tracking them. Space-based sensors have considerable potential for this mission. Since attacks with air-breathing weapons take much longer than missile attacks—hours rather than minutes—many types of weapons can be effective against them once they have been located.

Emerging space capabilities—because of their ability to track surface vessels—will first have an impact on traditional naval powers such as the United States. Nations relying on sea transport of their raw materials, such as Japan, will be especially vulnerable. Space capabilities could also provide a potent and decisive counter to Soviet ground forces as did Western nuclear weapons in the decades past. Modern land armies require rail systems, tank formations, fuel depots, and assembly areas. In simplest terms, a space-based sensor could detect a mobilizing army. Space-based navigation systems could precisely fix its position, and non-nuclear munitions could destroy the attacking force almost instantly.

An example of such space-dominance is provided by U.S. concern over Soviet ocean surveillance systems. The U.S. Navy relies on its surface forces remaining undetected. Soviet ocean surveillance sensors—their Radar Ocean Surveillance Satellite (RORSAT) and Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT)—may be able to find U.S. naval forces and direct Soviet firepower against them. This is one vital reason why the United States both needs and is developing anti-satellite systems—we simply cannot allow the Soviets to have an effective gunsight in space during a conventional conflict.

These and other emerging space possibilities will have an impact similar to that of space-based strategic defenses on nuclear offensive missiles. Space-based weapons could make obsolescent the Soviets' hitherto unchallenged ability to mass conventional forces in the attack. This capability becomes all the more attractive in the aftermath of the INF Treaty which removes much of the European nuclear deterrent.

Soviet responses to the putative threat of space weapons have centered on an aggressive public relations campaign. Indeed, their campaign to link U.S. space activities to an arms race in space has almost arrested our military use of space. The U.S. Miniature Vehicle Anti-Satellite Program was an early casualty of this effort.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the Soviets are themselves rapidly developing the ability to place large objects into LEO. They are accomplishing this under the rubric of manned Mars missions, manned space stations, and scientific exploration of the universe.[13] Indeed, Soviet efforts and our own

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hesitance could actually keep the West out of space—except for some modest scientific programs. The Soviet position is that space programs other than their own should be multinational efforts. They have proposed to supply launchers so that Western nations would be spared the expense of developing their own independent launch capabilities. This virtual monopoly in space exploration would allow the Soviets to amass an enormous lead in the ability to place weapon systems in space in the decades ahead. We are now moving towards a future that can be likened to the situation which would have existed in the 1950s if the Soviets, and not the United States, had a massive aircraft industry and a large capacity to produce fissionable material.

A Strategic Watershed?

A SNAPSHOT of Soviet and U.S. strategic programs in 1988 suggests that the United States is resolutely clinging to obsolete determinants of military power, while the Soviet Union is moving confidently into the 1990s and beyond.

Soviet investment in space and space-related programs is substantial. An incomplete list of such programs would include: 1) The territorial base for an ABM system in which the Krasnoyarsk radar figures prominently. (The Soviets have argued that it is a deep-space radar while the United States has argued that it is for ABM purposes. In fact it is necessarily both.) 2) Their establishment of a near-permanent, manned military presence in space with their Soyuz and Mir space stations. 3) Their deployment of a heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Energia, which will soon support a Space Shuttle system. 4) Their deployment of a second generation system of a two-layer ABM defense around Moscow which also has significant anti-satellite potential. 5) The existence of at least two different operational anti-satellite systems and 6) Their substantial progress in developing high-powered lasers to support space-denial or ABM missions. By contrast, the United States has had few successful space launches since 1985 and has had no manned missions longer than seven days since the early 1970s.

In view of these developments, a cynic might conclude that Soviet actions in the arms control talks in Geneva are only tangentially related to their desire for the neutralization of Western Europe and less still to a sense of altruism regarding nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the Soviet posture in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva has been intransigent—perhaps because they anticipate future benefits from the space asymmetries described above.

The Soviets seem to recognize that the primary measure of national power in the decades ahead will be the ability to place large vehicles up and out of the Earth's gravity well. They are proceeding as rapidly as possible with their new heavy-lift launch vehicle. Their arms control efforts are bearing fruit by stalling most U.S. efforts in this area. The U.S. Congress has slashed Defense Department proposals to construct heavy lift launch vehicles on the grounds that these funds would be used to launch a premature strategic defense system into space. Congress is also making every effort to block military use of systems like the space station. If this continues, the United States will soon awaken to find its nuclear power irrelevant in a world where its adversaries have built a dominating lead in the military domain that really matters. The fact that this strategic turnabout would have been accomplished under the guise of "peaceful exploration of space" will provide little consolation.

If the United States is to remain a world power it must recognize the areas in which national power will be determined. After the year 2000 the amount of material we can place in space will be far more important than any nuclear or conventional force measure. If we do not at least match Soviet ability to place a few million kilograms a year into LEO, we will find ourselves reduced to the status of a second rate military power.

We have the technologies in hand to build and maintain a solid lead in space activities. The first step is immediately to construct a

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heavy lift vehicle capable of placing 100 metric tons per launch at LEO. Improvements to this system should eventually lower our launch costs up to a factor of ten from what they are today (thousands of dollars per kilogram for the Space Shuttle). We must then follow that with systems such as the "spaceplane"—capable of "flying" into orbit at costs at least ten times lower than today's.

Once the United States recognizes that military power will be increasingly measured by weapons in space, it must develop both new strategies and new military systems to support them. Two tasks lie before us. Matching the Soviet effort in space is necessary but not sufficient. We must also develop a strategy based on non-nuclear space systems. The Strategic Defense Initiative is only one element of that strategy. The United States must also develop space capabilities which can deny the Soviet Union benefits from its massive investments in conventional arms. These could take the form of improved sensors that act as "force multipliers." The faster and better we locate opposing forces, the more effective our own ground forces can be. But by the next decade, we can begin to use our emerging space power to deter conventional attacks instead of relying on the threat of nuclear weapons. As space-based systems should exceed the capabilities of nuclear weapons, there is no reason why they cannot be even more effective in deterring aggression.

In the years to come, nuclear weapons will diminish in importance. Nuclear disarmament negotiations, which have been the focus of so much of our attention, will seem to have been a quaint irrelevance. The military force that matters will be based in space. This is a development that those responsible for the national security cannot ignore.

Notes

1. The first modern quantitative "analysis" concerned World War I aircraft. It was F.W. Lanchester's *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm* (London: Constable and Company, 1916). Unfortunately, only Lanchester's state equations, developed in Chapters 5 and 6 are remembered now. The rest of the book should also be read as an example of how technology can fundamentally change strategic doctrine, while building on what has gone before. Lanchester's square law has been roundly criticized by late twentieth century analysts. It appears applicable only in cases where the sides are forced to conduct a battle without interruptions or retreat, a rare occurrence in conventional warfare. Interestingly, a space-to-space exchange may best model Lanchester's scenarios.
2. To be more quantitative, physicists measure brightness in Joules (a unit of energy about what it takes to tap your finger on the table) per Steradian (a unit of conic volume about the size of a megaphone). Suppose we can hit a circle ten meters in diameter with an artillery shell from a kilometer away. To calculate this system's brightness we first figure out how many Steradians 10 meters represents at a kilometer's distance:

   $$Steradians = (10\ meters/1000\ meters)^2 = 10^{-4}$$

   If the artillery shell released 10^8 Joules when it hits, its brightness is:

   $$Brightness = 10^8\ Joules\ /\ 10^{-4}\ Steradians = 10^{12}\ J/Sr$$

3. Figure and discussion of the "gravity well" concept have been drawn from the space exploration community. See *Report of the National Commission on Space: Pioneering the Space Frontier* (New York: Bantam, 1987), pp. 59–73.
4. The Arizona meteor crater is a result of a collision with a meteor weighing thousands of tons. Its impact released megatons of kinetic energy. For an interesting view of military applications of this phenomenon see Daniel Dudney, "Unlocking Space," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1983–84), pp. 91–113.

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5. The most useful materials in space are not metals—not even precious ones. Simple water ice may be most valuable. Solar power can be used to "crack" water into its constituent hydrogen and oxygen. These are the basic fuels for moving around in space and are used today in the Space Shuttle's main engines. Ice is probably absent on the Moon, but may exist on asteroids in large quantities.
6. The Soviets are well aware that their definition of "stability" is much different than the West's. When the Soviets deal with Western strategists they use a word for stability that seldom appears in their own military writings, *stabil'nost*. In their own writings they use *ustoychivost*, which more correctly translates into an ability to move on a predictable course. An interesting discussion of these differences, while written with an intent to influence those who attended the 1987 Pugwash conference, is by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, *Strategic Stability Under Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions* (Moscow: Abridged Report for the Pugwash Conference, April 1987).
7. Major General I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," *Voyennaya Mysl* (*Military Thought*), No. 6 (1967).
8. See, for example, Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programs and the U.S. SDI," *Survival* (November–December 1985), pp. 274–292.
9. Marshall V.D. Sokolovskiy's *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd edition, translated by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russek and Co., 1975). The final edition of this seminal book by the Soviet military leadership was published in 1968 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968). Earlier editions appeared in 1962 and 1963. President Kennedy did point out in 1960 that the nation controlling space could control the Earth. He did not, as Sokolovskiy asserted, state that such space dominance was the U.S. goal. Ibid., p. 456.
10. Recent Soviet writings refer to the present strategic situation as the "nuclear space era." Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy, in *Security in the Nuclear Space Era* (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, Nov. 1985) stresses the equivalent danger from nuclear and space arms. See also *Space Strike Arms and International Security* (Moscow: October 1985—handed out to the press prior to the November 1985 Geneva summit conference); *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security* (Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1986); and *Star Wars: Delusions and Dangers* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985), all written by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.
11. Albert L. Latter and Earnest A. Martinelli, *SDI: Defense or Retaliation* (Marina del Rey: RDA/Logicon, May 28, 1985).
12. Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, *Space Strike Arms and International Security* (abridged), p. 49.
13. The mass to LEO requirements for a vigorous NASA program in the decades ahead, including a lunar base and a manned mission to Mars, are very similar to that needed for a space-based defensive missile system deployment—several million kilograms per year. This is about what Soviet capabilities will be in the 1990s. Clearly, under the guise of "peaceful" space exploration the Soviets will have available sufficient launch capability for massive space weaponization in a short time. Data from SDIO, Department of Defense, Office of Survivability, Lethality and Key Technologies, July, 1987. See also, *The Soviet Space Challenge* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Department of Defense, November, 1987).

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International Law and the Use of Force

Abraham D. Sofaer

FEW LEGAL ISSUES are of greater significance to the interests of the United States, and of people everywhere, than the rules and the practices of nations concerning the use of force. The United States is committed to the principle that its conduct in international affairs—including the use of force—must be subject to law. The rule of law requires individual nations to subordinate their perceived needs to accepted standards of conduct based on the practice of nations.

Lawyers play many important roles in connection with determining when and under what conditions nations may lawfully resort to the use of force. Among the most important of these roles is the function of advising government leaders—often themselves lawyers—on the legal principles applicable to proposed uses of force. To be effective in this role, lawyers must provide credible and practical guidance, based on the actual practice of nations, and consistent with legitimate political interests. Legal advisers in the United States have, since the adoption of the UN Charter, in general provided such advice, taking a "common-law" lawyer's approach that rests on a case-by-case application of widely accepted principles of international law to the particular facts of each situation. This approach has worked well to the extent lawyers have in fact been consulted for their advice.

The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in *Nicaragua v. United States* casts considerable doubt on this approach to the law relating to the use of force, particularly with regard to the right of collective self-defense. The ICJ has formulated and applied impractical and counterproductive rules, which have little or no basis in accepted international practices. These rules may be intended to reduce the worldwide use of force, but in fact they reduce only the right to defend—collectively and effectively—against uses of force short of conventional warfare, which are in fact the most pernicious and widespread forms of aggression in the world today. Furthermore, the rules created by the ICJ for this purpose are so artificial, impractical, and counterintuitive that they threaten accepted principles of international law, as well as the stature of the ICJ itself.

The Lawyer's Role in Use of Force Decisions

LAWYERS PLAY important roles in the development and application of the law relating to the use of force. In addition to the judges and advocates that handle specific cases, scholars and the bar take a

Abraham D. Sofaer is legal adviser at the U.S. Department of State. This article is based on an address to the American Society of International Law on April 22, 1988. The author is grateful for the able assistance of Steven Ratner and Peter Spiro.

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deep interest in this subject. We write, lecture, and lobby to advance our points of view. Legislators, many of whom are also attorneys, express their views through laws, resolutions, in hearings, or as influential individuals. Government lawyers have special responsibilities. We are sworn to uphold the law, and that includes international law, which is the law of the land. We have the duty to alert our leaders to applicable international rules of conduct, and to argue that the proper rules be respected. In doing so, however, we must rely on our ability to convince our clients to consult us, and to accept our advice. We can issue no writs; we can only seek to persuade.

Political leaders are not always eager to talk to lawyers—even their own lawyers—about planned uses of force, and legal advisers through the years have occasionally been bypassed, or consulted inadequately, in such situations. Even when we are fully involved in the decision-making process, our advice is sometimes rejected in whole or in part.

To have any hope of influencing the political and military leadership, the lawyers in a government—any government—must have both a coherent and a convincing message. We must be able to explain why nations are bound by certain rules, and to demonstrate that the rules we propose as authoritative are reasonable, commonly accepted, consistent with prior practice, and fair in terms of the strategic challenges our leaders face. As Lawrence Hargrove recently put it, the "primary rules [governing the use of force], in order to work, must therefore be readily perceivable, by people bearing the actual responsibilities of government, to reflect the practical requirements of the world in which states must survive and conduct their affairs." The rules we advance as authoritative will fail to convince if they offend "the rough intuitions of responsible politicians" concerned with the safety of their citizens.[1]

The principles which the United States believes govern the use of force are in fact straightforward, sensible, and enlightened. The UN Charter contemplates an end to the threat or use of force by states against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states, unless the Security Council has authorized such action.[2] This represents a bold step toward peaceful relations among states by bringing, as Louis Henkin put it, "within the realm of law those ultimate political tensions and interests that had long been deemed beyond the control of law."[3]

The United States Position

THE CHARTER expressly reserves in Article 51, however, the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense." That provision is written in terms of defense against "armed attack" but the right of self-defense is termed "inherent," thus conveying the sense that it includes the right to defend those fundamental interests customarily protected. The United States has tried repeatedly to gain approval for collective UN action in using force, but that option became unavailable as a practical matter after the Korean War. Nevertheless, the United States has always assumed that Charter principles provide a workable set of rules to deal with the array of needs that potentially require the use of force, including such threats as state-supported terrorism and insurgencies, even if they are deemed not to amount to an "armed attack." General Assembly interpretive declarations make clear that "force" means physical violence, not other forms of coercion. But they also indicate that aggression includes both direct and indirect complicity in all forms of violence, not just conventional hostilities.[4] Our position has been that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force, and to the extent the term "armed attack" is relevant in use-of-force issues that it should be defined to include forms of aggression historically regarded as justifying resort to defensive measures. Furthermore, the U.S. has assumed that it may lawfully engage in collective self-defense in any situation in which the nation assisted is entitled to act, and to the same extent. On the other hand, we recognize that force may be used only to deter

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or prevent aggression, and only to the extent it is necessary and proportionate.

From Truman to Carter

THE ACTIONS OF presidents of the United States, and the positions taken by their lawyers, have consistently demonstrated this principled but practical approach to use-of-force rules. In his message to Congress requesting aid for Greece, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, which recognized the importance of the peaceful development of nations under the UN system, but called for the protection of free nations from "aggressive movements" seeking to impose totalitarian regimes. "This is no more than a frank recognition," he said, "that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

When President Eisenhower sent U.S. forces into Lebanon in 1958 at President Chamoun's request, both the United States and Lebanon asserted a realistic definition of "armed attack." Secretary of State Dulles said: "[W]e do not think that the words 'armed attack' preclude treating as such an armed revolution which is fomented from abroad, aided and assisted from abroad."

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle, which apparently went forward without legal screening of any kind, President Kennedy was careful to consult government lawyers during the Cuban Missile crisis. Then Legal Adviser Abram Chayes argued successfully for an approach that treated the matter as a threat warranting a quarantine, but not amounting to an armed attack. Professors Wright and Henkin criticized Chayes for his reliance on the Rio Treaty, but Chayes's response reflected an approach to use-of-force decisions that aptly describes what U.S. practice has been, when the lawyers have been consulted.[5] Chayes rejected the notion that law relating to the use of force was "a set of fixed, self-defining categories of permissible and prohibited conduct." He proposed instead what he called a "common-lawyer" approach in which international law is left open to a broad range of interpretation and emphasis, with terms that do not dictate conduct so much as orient deliberation, order priorities, and guide within broad limits. Using this practical and flexible common-law approach, Chayes argued the quarantine was a justified response.

This flexible but principled approach to the use of force had strong support among leading scholars of the day. Professor Julius Stone had criticized efforts to determine a "mechanical test of aggression, insulated from the merits of the situation in which States act . . . , [a] juristic push-button device."[6] McDougal and Feliciano in fact explained the issue in terms strikingly similar to those used by Chayes:

> It is no more desirable to attempt to define aggression "once and for all" than it is so to define any other legal term or concept of international or municipal law. For observers with full awareness of the factors realistically affecting decision, the task of "defining aggression" is not appropriately conceived as one of searching for a precise, certain, and final verbal formula that would abolish the discretion of decision-makers and dictate specific decisions. It is rather, in broad outline, that of presenting to the focus of attention of the various officials who must reach a decision about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of coercion, the different variable factors and policies that, in differing contexts and under community perspectives, rationally bear upon their decisions; of indicating the interrelations of these factors and policies in context; and, perhaps, of making some lower-order generalizations about the relative weighting of pertinent factors and policies in different contexts. The task, again, is not so much to abolish, with quasi-magical arrangements of words, conflicts of national interests (more or less myopically perceived) as it is to clarify common, long-term interests in the maintenance of minimum public order.[7]

When President Johnson intervened in the Dominican Republic, no attack of any kind had occurred on the U.S. or its citizens.

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The danger to Americans there was serious, however, and a communist takeover was seen as a real possibility. Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker defended the intervention as justified to protect Americans "in imminent danger of life and limb from rioting mobs," and he argued that a continued U.S. presence was necessary to prevent anarchy. He rejected criticisms based on what he called "fundamentalist views about the nature of international law," as such views were "not very useful as a means to achieving practical and just solutions of difficult political, economic, and social problems." He called for a "practical idealism," in which international law could be read as consistent with efforts to prevent bloodshed and communist takeovers. He said that "an international law which cannot deal with facts such as these, and in a way that has some hope of setting a troubled nation on the path of peace and reconstruction, is not the kind of law I believe in." President Johnson added explicitly the justification of intervening to prevent revolutions by "evil persons who had been trained in overthrowing governments and establishing communist control."

The Vietnam conflict generated a great deal of legal debate about the use of force, and the legal adviser's office found the U.S. intervention to assist South Vietnam legally justified under the doctrine of collective self-defense. Further debate was prompted by the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. By this time, Chayes had changed his point of view. While purporting still to believe that "absolute" judgments about "legality" should be avoided in international law, his analysis became highly technical and much less oriented to the specific facts. He properly criticized the government for failing to consider the incursion's legality prior to its implementation. But his judgment on legality was controlled by what had become in his view "the essential guiding principle of world law and world order: to confine within the narrowest limits the situations in which we are prepared to condone or legitimate unilateral decisions to resort to force."[8] This guiding principle radically altered the practical approach and deliberative process Chayes considered proper as legal adviser, and which served the nation and world order so well at that critical time.

President Ford relied on Article 51 in ordering U.S. forces to attack Cambodian naval assets to secure release of the vessel *Mayaguez* and its crew. The seizure of a U.S. merchant vessel was deemed "a clear-cut illegal use of force" which UN Ambassador Scali asserted justified appropriate measures in self-defense. Similarly, President Carter used force in an attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran, arguing that the United States is entitled to seek to protect its citizens abroad "where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them." Carter received the support of Professor Reisman,[9] and the limited use of force to rescue citizens has strong support in customary practice and scholarship.[10] Nonetheless, the President was condemned by some international law experts, who argued that by no stretch of the imagination was the seizure of Americans as hostages an armed attack, and therefore that the U.S. was precluded from using force to secure their release.[11]

The Reagan Years

THE REAGAN administration has continued to adhere to the practical but principled approach to use-of-force rules which has in general characterized United States policy since the UN Charter's adoption. The President has repeatedly made clear, moreover, that he will continue the policy of assisting nations in preventing nondemocratic takeovers conducted by outside forces (as in Afghanistan) or fomented and aided by them.[12] The Grenada operation involved no armed attack on the U.S. but was justified as necessary to protect U.S. lives and to respond to invitations of the governor general and of members of the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States. Chayes suggested that this action could not be distinguished from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,[13] and others also criticized it, including

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the American Bar Association Section on International Law. Legal Adviser Davis Robinson's defense, resting on the combined effect of all the unique circumstances supporting intervention, is an exemplary illustration of the U.S. common-law tradition.[14] As Edwin Yoder commented at the time:

> All the Grenadian operation has in common with recent Soviet enforcements of the Brezhnev doctrine, so-called, is the unpleasant use of military force. If force per se is to be condemned, if the legitimacy of its use under international law has nothing to do with intent or result, then it is anarchy merely disguised as law.[15]

We relied on the same approach in exercising our rights of self-defense by attacking facilities in Libya used to support terrorists. Before December 1985, we had exhausted virtually every measure short of force to convince Libya to stop supporting terrorists in attacks on Americans. Then came the mindlessly cruel attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports in which seven Americans were killed, including 11-year old Natasha Simpson. Tunisian passports were found on the killers that were traced to Libyan officials, and Qadhafi praised the terrorists as heroes. Nevertheless, the President decided not to use force at that point, but instead to exhaust all remaining economic sanctions and to warn Libya one more time, explicitly invoking our view of the governing law. He said:

> By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if it had used its own armed forces.

Secretary Shultz explained our position in greater detail in January 1986, at the National Defense University:

> A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available. The law requires that such actions be necessary and proportionate. But this nation has consistently affirmed the rights of states to use force in exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defense. The UN Charter is not a suicide pact.

Despite these warnings, Libya organized and supported additional attacks, including the bombing of a Berlin disco in which two Americans were killed and over 100 people injured. We reliably knew that Libya was planning several more attacks. The purpose of the limited air strike was to convince Libya to halt this support for terrorist operations.

Most recently, we have used force in defensive actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran repeatedly engaged in placing mines in sea lanes with the intention of attacking U.S. public and flag vessels. We warned Iran that we regarded such mining as an armed attack that justified the necessary and proportionate use of force in self-defense. They persisted, openly asserting that they would make us suffer. For what? For exercising our right to navigate in international waters. We caught Iran laying mines and sank the vessel involved. Again Iran acted, this time firing a missile at a U.S. vessel. We destroyed a platform used for these military operations. Iran persisted in laying new mines, and one seriously damaged a Navy frigate, the *U.S.S. Roberts*, injuring ten crewmen. We destroyed two platforms, and then responded to Iranian attacks by sinking vessels of Iran's navy. If we deferred to such threats, we would have no end of Khomeinis and Qadhafis ordering us to give up exercising our rights. President Carter adopted the principle that we would exercise and defend our rights in international waters, including the Persian Gulf. President Reagan is determined to uphold that bipartisan policy. The limited scope of our actions, at each point, was wholly consistent with the legal advice the President received.

Nicaragua v. United States

THE RULES AND expectations on which the United States has consistently relied in making use-of-force decisions have been cast into grave doubt by the

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International Court of Justice in *Nicaragua v. United States.*[16] The background of this case is well known. El Salvador, unable to defend itself effectively against Nicaraguan-supported guerrillas, asked the U.S. to help in its defense. We assumed that Nicaragua's support of guerrillas for the purpose of destroying the government of El Salvador was a form of aggression against El Salvador, and that necessary and proportional responses, including force, could be taken collectively against such actions. This was precisely the position taken by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in defending the legality of our actions against North Vietnam before the American Society of International Law in 1965. He said:

> In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Vietnam is exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other nations are providing such assistance.
>
> The American policy of assisting South Vietnam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Our assistance has been increased because the aggression from the North has been augmented. Our assistance now encompasses the bombing of North Vietnam. The bombing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be necessary, continued aggression against the Republic of Vietnam.

Significantly, Nicaragua did not disagree with us in these legal assumptions. Rather, it claimed it was innocent of having aided the insurgents in El Salvador, and therefore that our actions in aiding the *contras* had no justification.

The ICJ's opinion articulated a significantly different view of international law. While refusing unequivocally to determine that Nicaragua's conduct amounted to aggression, the court nonetheless found or assumed that Nicaragua had indeed supplied arms to communist rebels in El Salvador at least through early 1981. President Singh was willing to assume that Nicaragua's flow of arms to the rebels in El Salvador had "been both regular and substantial, as well as spread over a number of years and thus amounting to intervention." The court concluded, however, that a limited intervention cannot justify resort to self-defense. According to the court, customary law only allows the use of force in self-defense against an "armed attack," and an armed attack does not include "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support." This ruling was without support in customary international law, or the practice of nations, which could not rationally be read to deprive a state of the right to defend itself against so serious a form of aggression. Recognizing this, the ICJ came up with the following solution: A state is not permitted to resort to "self-defense" against aggression short of armed attack,[17] but it may be able to take what the court called "proportionate countermeasures."

This ruling arguably should not alone cause great concern. So long as a nation's inherent right to protect itself is recognized, whether one calls the actions "self-defense" or "countermeasures" need make no real difference. But the verbal play in which the court engaged had a purpose, egregiously transparent. Had the court called the defensive actions it allowed "self-defense," then Article 51 would explicitly have allowed such actions to be taken collectively as well as individually.[18] But by characterizing permissible defensive actions as "countermeasures," the court created a tautological rationale that enabled it to deny the right of joint action. "Countermeasures," the court found, can only be undertaken by the victim state, not by any other state, because such measures do *not* constitute self-defense.

The court went further in narrowing the right to collective self-defense. To be entitled to exercise collective self-defense, the court suggested, the victim must openly declare that it is under armed attack at the time of the attack, and must formally request assistance from the state seeking to justify its actions. The facts showed that the government of El

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Salvador had repeatedly and openly complained of Nicaragua's support for the rebels in that country. Furthermore, the uncontroverted Declaration of Intervention of El Salvador, filed with the court, confirmed that its president had asked the United States to come to his country's defense. But the court nonetheless ruled that El Salvador had failed to meet these new procedural requirements, and that this failure deprived U.S. actions of their potential justification as defensive measures.

Whether actions of the United States were necessary and proportional was treated by the court in a single paragraph. American actions were pronounced unnecessary because they were undertaken "several months after the major offensive of the armed opposition against the Government of El Salvador had been completely repulsed (January 1981), and the actions of the opposition considerably reduced in consequence." Thus, the court said, "it was possible to eliminate the main danger of the Salvadoran Government without the United States embarking on activities in and against Nicaragua."

The court's treatment of proportionality was similarly curt. Interestingly, the court made no finding that aid to the *contras* failed this test; in fact, United States aid to the *contras* was the same sort of aid the evidence demonstrated was extended by Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador. Rather, the court said it could not regard the actions relating to the mining of Nicaraguan ports, and attacks on port and oil installations, as satisfying proportionality, and that United States help to the *contras* continued long after any aggression by Nicaragua could reasonably have been presumed to have continued. Judge Schwebel detailed in his opinion, however, the similar measures of depredation engaged in by the insurgents in El Salvador, and he explained that an action is proportional when it is needed to halt and repulse an attack, not just when it corresponds exactly to the acts sought to be defended against. The mining of harbors could be expected to restrict the flow of arms from Nicaragua's suppliers, which were being passed on to the rebels in El Salvador, and the attacks on oil installations could similarly be expected to diminish Nicaragua's capacity to continue its aggression.

The decision, in short, ignored actual custom and practice, and relied on rules that were seemingly derived for the purpose of depriving the United States and El Salvador of inherent rights. Aggression, though undeniably present, was deemed irrelevant because it did not amount to an "armed attack." Defensive measures, though undeniably justified, were deemed "countermeasures" so they would not be jointly exercisable. Collective self-defense, though undeniably intended, was found imperfect for lack of unprecedented procedural requirements. Necessity and proportionality, though demonstrated by the desperate situation in which El Salvador found itself, were found lacking for reasons that might have reflected nothing more than the success of El Salvador and the United States at preventing, through the acts condemned, further and more serious aggression.

Effects of the ICJ's Decision

MANY INTERNATIONAL law academics and practitioners strongly believe that lethal support of the *contras* by the United States was inconsistent with our international obligations. Even those who take such a view, however, should consider whether the ICJ's conclusions are properly based, or seem likely to be effective in reducing resort to force in the world. In my view, the ICJ's rulings concerning the use of force create artificial distinctions and mechanical rules that are fundamentally inconsistent with the principled but flexible approach followed by the United States since the Charter's adoption.

The court's restrictive approach in defining "armed attack" could deprive states of the right of self-defense against the most common and dangerous forms of aggression in the world today. Our political leaders and military strategists cannot reasonably be expected to and will not accept the notion that self-defense applies only to armed attacks across

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borders in the formal sense, when the principal vehicles for competition against the democratic West through violence are state-supported terrorism and insurgencies. That the court might allow "countermeasures" even where self-defense is inapplicable may well demonstrate that the ICJ has not completely lost its grip on reality. But the distinction is artificial and creates undesirable uncertainty in an area of grave importance. Lawyers are unlikely to impress their political and military clients by assuring them that, although they may not be able to regard essential national security activities as "self-defense," they may nonetheless be allowed to engage in such activities as "necessary countermeasures."

The puzzlement that such an assurance is likely to cause will turn to disbelief as these clients learn the new rules of collective self-defense. While an ally may assist the victim state within the victim's territory, we lawyers must now explain, the ally may not act according to the ICJ against the aggressor state in the latter's territory. Furthermore, before acting to assist an ally in collective self-defense the ICJ would have the lawyer insist that his clients obtain from the victim state a public declaration that it is under attack, and a public invitation for the ally's assistance. At this point the client's eyes would assume that glazed expression associated with polite disregard.

But the lawyer would have even more to say. The court also expressed artificial and unrealistic standards in applying the accepted principles of necessity and proportionality. Rather than asking what in fact appears militarily necessary to deter the illegal conduct involved, the ally is supposed to do only that which seems sufficient to make it possible to preserve the victim state's independence. Furthermore, acts which are not strictly similar to those of the aggressor state will run a high risk of being condemned as disproportionate, even though they might be reasonably related to the threat involved. These are not the sort of standards that are likely to convince, and at this point the lawyer is likely to have lost his case, or even worse to have lost his influence. Government lawyers do not get fired for failing to convince. But they get ignored, thereby losing their capacity to help ensure that traditional and accepted use-of-force standards are maintained.

THE COURT'S proposed rules, therefore, though undoubtedly well motivated, could reduce the effectiveness of traditional and accepted standards of law. This is not because political leaders are slow witted, or averse to technical analysis, but rather because they would see through the court's rules as efforts to change the law rather than as guidance on the application of accepted rules of conduct.

Once the issue becomes the desirability of one set of rules over another, rather than their legitimacy, political leaders will feel free to challenge the court's premise that intervention and force would be minimized by its approach. They could reasonably conclude, in fact, that the court's rules are more likely to encourage conflict, intervention, and the unlawful use of force than are the rules and practices which reflect accepted norms of conduct. To construe restrictively the meaning of "armed attack," for example, would do wonders for the world if as a result unconventional forms of aggression became less frequent or more benign in their consequences. The court's ruling could have no such effect; rather, it can only limit—and is designed to limit—the use of force in *responding* to such forms of aggression. To the extent it succeeds in this objective, states which now sponsor terrorism and insurgencies will feel less pressure to stop.

The court's limits on collective self-defense are likely to have the same adverse effects. Refusing to allow an ally to join in "countermeasures" in the territory of an aggressor would not reduce the tendency of aggressors to sponsor internal subversion; rather such a rule would only diminish the capacity of relatively weak states to defend against aggression by relatively strong states. Where the victim state is not strong enough to use "proportional countermeasures"

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against the aggressor on the latter's territory, conflict would be limited to the territory of the victim state. If anything, the interests of peace would seem most clearly served by rules having a measured, deterrent effect on such aggression. Similarly, one is at a loss to understand what interest is served by the formalistic requirements that a state declare it is under attack and openly invite assistance from its ally. Apparently the court seeks to promote the goal of limiting the number of actors in a conflict. Once a state is forced to declare itself as under armed attack, however, and openly to invite an ally's assistance, the chances for diplomatic resolution may be reduced.

The problem of controlling conflict in this contentious world is not so easily dealt with as the court, and some international lawyers, assume. Political and military strategists intensely dispute which sets of rules and forms of conduct are most likely to preserve peace. The use of force is a central element in these calculations, and respected thinkers have cautioned against a world in which force can only be used in conventional war. Henry Kissinger has suggested, for example, that "in the missile age, the side which can add another increment of power without resorting to all-out war—or which can threaten to do so—will gain a perhaps decisive advantage over an opponent who does not have this ability." Ronald Reagan and George Shultz have made a similar point: "Diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual." We must adapt power to political circumstances to compete effectively with opponents who treat force as a continuation of politics by other means. Once it is established that state-sponsored terrorism and insurgencies can achieve their political objectives, their practitioners will get bolder, and the threat to our interests greater. The court's severe and artificial limitations on the right of self-defense would serve to encourage aggression by diminishing the capacity lawfully to deter.

The concepts of "armed attack" and "self-defense" are limitations which world leaders have accepted, and they provide a sufficient basis if reasonably construed to satisfy legitimate national security planning. But the right to self-defense is too fundamental for leaders to allow it to be subordinated to any scheme of world order based on theory and wishful thinking, however enlightened. Self-defense is not a production of lawyers to be modified as we please, but a concept lawyers have used to describe the situations and manner in which civilized nations have traditionally used force. It is a reflection of the fact that, despite the UN Charter, we still live in a world in which states are controlled by leaders who claim to get their marching orders directly from God; whose tolerance for pointless destruction is so monumental it can be explained only in pathological terms; or who are outright criminals—murderers, drug dealers, thieves. In dealing with the actions of such states, our leaders will continue to insist upon use-of-force rules that offer them, in clear and comprehensible terms, a sufficient degree of latitude to plan and act effectively to deter aggressors who would physically harm Americans or America's allies.

THE MOST PREDICTABLE result of the decision in *Nicaragua v. United States* will be a diminution in respect for the ICJ's pronouncements, and in its future potential as an instrument of reason in the cause of peace. At one point in his opinion, President Singh explained that the court could not allow itself "to miss a major opportunity to state the law so as to serve the best interests of the community." Yet, the ICJ's place in history will depend not upon its seizing opportunities to issue rulings attempting to narrow the inherent right of self-defense, but rather upon its development of a jurisprudence that retains the flexibility of the Charter's design, and leaves to statesmen the task of achieving the Charter's goals within the bounds of principles based on the actual practice of nations.

The case against the ICJ's involvement in *Nicaragua v. United States* was cogently expressed by Chayes in his earlier days. He wrote:

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> I suggest that most great disputes between states, even when they involve important legal elements, are not justiciable—and for much the same reason that most disputes between organs of our government not involving invasions of private rights are not justiciable. Courts do not exist to answer legal questions just for the sake of having an answer. They are specialized institutions. Acceptance of their judgments depends on a subtle complex of factors. Institutional characteristics limit the range in which they can effectively exercise authority. If judges go beyond those limits, the result is likely to be not vindication of the law, but erosion of judicial authority.[19]

Chayes likes to say that he has "already made a meal of those words in the Hague," where as counsel for Nicaragua he successfully persuaded the ICJ to risk the erosion of judicial authority he had predicted. Presumably, Chayes at some point also decided to eat his words about the common lawyer approach to use-of-force decisions. But the reasons he gave for the ICJ to decline jurisdiction remain valid. They go beyond separation of powers objections, and in the final analysis relate to the kind of international law the ICJ seems inclined to produce when it becomes involved in such issues, a law that this nation's leaders—of both parties and in both branches—will refuse to accept as the final word on protecting essential national security interests.

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this point was Congress' action after the court had issued its judgment on the merits. While some legislators criticized the U.S. on the basis of the ICJ's ruling, Congress provided $75 million in lethal aid for the *contras.* The reaction of the international bar—consisting on the whole of lawyers devoted to the rule of law—is also instructive. It has produced a range of commentary that is as divergent as it is impassioned.[20] The decision has been hailed as "a positive model of judicial style," whose "quality of legal reasoning is admirable";[21] and it has been denounced as "a tragedy for world order."[22] The judgment has been said both to misunderstand, and to uphold, international law. It has been characterized as "authoritative,"[23] "extremely persuasive,"[24] and "a misfortune of some magnitude" in its impact on the vitality of the law of the UN Charter governing force and self-defense.[25] Policy makers are particularly unlikely to defer to rules which are not only inconsistent with prior behavior, but also evoke such intense differences among persons expert in the field.

Continuity in American Policy

THE UNITED STATES properly refused to participate in the merits stage of the *Nicaragua* case, because the President had decided this nation could not allow its right to exercise self-defense to be regulated by the ICJ without its consent. This nation remains committed to the rule of law, however, and to the appropriate use of the ICJ. Our continuing support for the court is demonstrated by our willingness to take to chambers within it a maritime boundary dispute with Canada. We also continue to have over sixty treaties vesting the court with jurisdiction over disputes; and we are presently before a chamber of the court in a commercial dispute with Italy arising under one such treaty. We welcome the idea, moreover, of attempting to work out agreed areas of jurisdiction for the court, to which all permanent members of the Security Council would adhere. We are, in short, despite our rejection of the court's jurisdiction in the *Nicaragua* case, determined to work to preserve the court's role in the areas we believe it functions with authority and effectiveness.

Meanwhile, with respect to the use of force, the United States will continue to follow a principled but flexible approach: one that requires policymakers to grapple with and be guided by the traditional limitations on the use of force, while recognizing the legitimacy of protecting, effectively, not only American territory, but American citizens, interests, and allies. Lawyers must play an active role in the decision-making process, not by attempting to force policy to particular results

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through the assertion of artificial rules, but by insisting on the thorough evaluation of and respect for limitations based on accepted community practice.

Notes

1. John Lawrence Hargrove, "The *Nicaragua* Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 137.
2. Article 2(4) of the Charter obligates all members "to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Articles 39, 41, and 42 provide for collective action under Security Council auspices in response to unlawful uses of force.
3. Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 131.
4. See, e.g., *Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, United Nations General Assembly Res. 2625 (1970).
5. Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 57 (1963), p. 546; Louis Henkin, "Comment," in Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 149–54.
6. Julius Stone, *Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 10–11.
7. Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 151–53.
8. Hammarskjold Forum, "Expansion of the Viet Nam War into Cambodia—The Legal Issues," *New York University Law Review*, vol. 45 (1970), p. 664 (comments of A. Chayes).
9. Michael Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention," *The Nation*, May 24, 1980, p. 612.
10. The use of force for rescue, and perhaps for other purposes is widely approved. "It is increasingly accepted that a state may take steps to rescue victims or potential victims in an action strictly limited to that purpose and not likely to involve disproportional destruction of life or property in the state where the rescue takes place." American Law Institute, *Restatement of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: ALI Publishers, 1987), p. 177. The U.S. and others strongly defended Israel's use of force in rescuing its citizens at Entebbe in 1976.
11. See Joseph H. Crown and John H.E. Fried, "A Legal Disaster," *The Nation*, May 24, 1980, p. 613; Benjamin B. Ferencz, "Rescue Mission Violated the U.N. Charter," *New York Times*, May 5, 1980 (letter to the editor).
12. President Reagan said, for example, that the U.S. would prevent another Iran in Saudi Arabia, and he hailed the U.S. action in Grenada as a first step in the repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Professor Reisman has pointed out that:

    > Rhetorical idiosyncracies aside, it could have been Kennedy or Johnson: Ronald Reagan could claim no innovation here. U.S. actions in [the Caribbean and Central America] are consistent with the United States' conception of its interests and its behavior for decades. If one sought a specific declaration by a U.S. president that expressed Ronald Reagan's conception of present U.S. regional objectives and rights, it could certainly be Kennedy's manifesto of April 1961.

    W. Michael Reisman, "Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary International Law and Practice," *Yale Journal of International Law*, vol. 13 (1988), p. 180.
13. Abram Chayes, "Grenada Was Illegally Invaded," *New York Times*, November 15, 1983.

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14. See Letter from State Department Legal Adviser Davis R. Robinson to Prof. Edward Gordon, reprinted in "Contemporary Practice of the United States," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 78 (1984), p. 661.
15. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., "The Legality of It All," *Washington Post*, October 28, 1983.
16. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ Reports, p. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27) (hereinafter *Nicaragua v. U.S.*).
17. *Nicaragua v. U.S.*, pp. 93–94, 100–101. In these few sentences, the court resolved a forty-year-old debate about the meaning of Article 51 with absolutely no analysis. The majority view, backed by such scholars as Myres McDougal, Philip Jessup, Julius Stone, D.K. Bowett, Sir Humphrey Waldock, and James Brierly, has examined the *travaux preparatoires* of the United Nations Charter. They concluded that Article 51 was inserted to ensure that regional self-defense organizations, such as the then-recently concluded Inter-American alliance created by the Act of Chapultepec, would not be paralyzed by a requirement that all collective responses to force be taken by the Security Council. The Article was meant to reaffirm, not constrain, the right of individual and collective self-defense under customary international law.

    The minority school, led by Professor Ian Brownlie of Cambridge University, insists that Article 51 was inserted in order to create only the smallest exception to the ban on the use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4. That exception was to apply to self-defensive measures taken in reponse to an armed attack and to such an attack alone. The court adopts the minority view.
18. State practice and publicists support the view that a victim state's allies may assert the right of self-defense in those circumstances in which the victim state asserts it, presuming the consent of the victim state. Mutual defense agreements enshrining this principle include among others the Rio, North Atlantic, and Warsaw treaties.
19. Abram Chayes, "A Common Lawyer Looks at International Law," *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 78 (1965), p. 1409.
20. The international legal community is indebted to *The American Journal of International Law* for soliciting and publishing the views of 16 leading international law scholars of the ICJ's decision. See Harold G. Maier, ed., "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits)," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 77.
21. Richard Falk, "The World Court's Achievement," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 106.
22. John Norton Moore, "The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 152.
23. Herbert W. Briggs, "The International Court of Justice Lives Up to Its Name," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 85.
24. Tom J. Farer, "Drawing the Right Line," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 113.
25. John Lawrence Hargrove, "The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 135. At least one commentator has decried the court for not going far enough in its denunciation of United States activities in Central America. See Francis A. Boyle, "Determining U.S. Responsibility for Contra Operations Under International Law," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81 (1987), p. 86 (arguing that U.S. should have been held responsible for *contra* violations of laws of war).

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Sanctions '86

How the State Department Prevailed

Constantine C. Menges

THE AUTUMN of 1988 will almost certainly witness a major national debate about U.S. policy toward South Africa. The Democratic party's platform for the 1988 presidential campaign has labelled South Africa a "terrorist state." In June 1988, the Democratic-controlled House Foreign Affairs committee reported favorably on legislation intended to add economic sanctions aimed at the complete isolation of South Africa. This is likely to be passed by the House and the Senate will hold hearings on the legislation, perhaps with a final vote in the fall.

All this bears a remarkable similarity to the South Africa debate that unfolded in the United States in 1986. That year, following intense public discussion, the House passed sanctions legislation in June, and the Republican-controlled Senate went along in September. The President then vetoed the bill, the Senate overrode his veto, and the Republicans lost control of the Senate in the November congressional elections.

The effect of these various moves on South Africa itself during the last two years is an important story in its own right and one that deserves to be treated elsewhere at greater length. Yet the significance of the 1986 American debate over South Africa does not rest only on its consequences for South Africa. The debate also illustrates one of the most difficult challenges that an American president confronts: assuring that the Executive branch actually carries out his policy decisions.

My own involvement in the South African issue had come about for reasons both official and personal. In 1983, following two years as the national intelligence officer for Latin America for the CIA, I went to work at the National Security Council as a special assistant to the President. In July 1985, I was "moved up" to broader responsibilities including public diplomacy for all key foreign policy issues. From that date until my resignation a year later, my work included the issue of American policy toward South Africa in particular.

I had as well a strong personal interest in that work. Like the President, I believed that apartheid was morally wrong and should be succeeded by a peaceful transition to multiracial democracy with equal rights for all. I had also, as a volunteer in the civil rights movement many years earlier, seen first-hand the importance of distinguishing between violent and non-violent approaches to the problem of racial discrimination.

My commitment to equal civil rights took me to Mississippi during the hot August of 1963. There, as a young Republican volunteer from New York, I was a small part of the campaign to help black citizens register and vote. I recall vividly the drive to Mississippi through several southern states with a young, courageous black minister, John Lewis, now a member of the U.S. Congress. I remember the evening meetings in the churches as we

Constantine Menges is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

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all prayed, sang, and organized, while outside *two* violent extremist groups jeered and threatened.

The day came when the black adults of this Mississippi town had to decide whether to take the physical, economic, and social risks of going to the courthouse to vote in the primary. Most of those who did were the older men and women. They were inspired by their deep religious faith, their belief in the values of America, and by the hope the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. expressed so eloquently—that the end of segregation by state and local laws would free both blacks and whites, and, over time, lead to civic reconciliation and the new South that has indeed emerged.

But as they came to the courthouse, these brave and vulnerable black citizens had to walk through a gauntlet of angry, shouting people. On one side were the "White Citizens Councils" and the Ku Klux Klan extremists, and on the other—also shaking fists and shouting threats and curses—were the racist black extremists, the Black Muslims.

With this experience in mind, it seemed to me that President Reagan's policy caught the essence of the situation in South Africa. He made it clear that America's view of apartheid is simple and straightforward:

> We believe it is wrong. We condemn it. And we are united in hoping for the day when apartheid will be no more . . . . Our aim cannot be to punish South Africa with economic sanctions that would injure the very people we are trying to help. I believe we must help all those who peacefully oppose apartheid; and we must recognize that the opponents of apartheid using terrorism and violence will bring not freedom and salvation but greater suffering (September 9, 1985).

In part, this stance was in keeping with long-standing American policy; virtually every American administration has expressed its opposition to the racist system of apartheid. Opposition, however, has taken distinctly different forms. The Carter administration chose a highly visible policy of "diplomatic distance" from the South African government, in the hope of pressuring it into ending the apartheid system. The Reagan administration decided instead on a policy of "constructive engagement." The idea was to have normal economic relations while quietly using the important American economic presence—specifically in American-owned companies—to apply the principles of equal rights for all workers as an example and incentive for positive actions by South African business and government.

In practice, "constructive engagement" was to earn more than the usual share of mixed reviews. The more positive notes, interestingly enough, tended to issue from nonviolent opponents of apartheid within South Africa itself. In 1985, for example, Gavin Relly, an outspoken foe of apartheid and one of South Africa's leading businessmen, argued that the Reagan administration's approach was working well. He argued that American firms had been "good corporate citizens, not only contributing to general economic growth and development, but also actively promoting equal opportunities for all races, both in the workplace, and in society at large . . . . they can [thus] claim some credit for the important erosion of apartheid that has taken place." Relly also noted that American corporations operating in South Africa had "launched innovative efforts, placing considerable development capital in . . . education, training, and housing," and that the firms were "living out their nonracial faith, not just in words, but in deeds . . . ."

Others saw the matter differently. In early 1985, a number of American black leaders, including a few who had participated in the civil rights movement, decided to demand tougher administration action against apartheid. They began daily demonstrations at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C., and one result was a great deal of media coverage.

Parallel protests were mounted by groups in Western Europe and the United Kingdom. Then in June of 1985, the African National Congress (ANC) announced, from a major conclave in Zambia, that it would extend its vi-

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olence and terrorism against South Africa to include "soft targets" (meaning civilians). The ANC declared its purpose was to make South Africa "ungovernable." Month-by-month in 1985, ANC violence increased and so did media coverage. The Western media had decided South Africa was a "story."

As a result, public attention was drawn to two very different ideas about the American role in helping to end apartheid. One of these, as we have seen, was the constructive engagement advocated by the administration. The preferred approach of the President's opponents was to pass laws to compel the economic isolation of South Africa by all U.S. entities and citizens. This view seemed not to recognize or understand the important distinction between pro-democratic, moderate anti-apartheid groups and violent, pro-Soviet anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC. Indeed, the critics of constructive engagement began to speak of the ANC as the legitimate leader of the anti-apartheid movement. The power this view came to have within the Reagan administration itself is one of the least understood aspects of the current American policy toward South Africa.

The McFarlane-Shultz Plan

FROM 1981 TO the summer of 1985, the Reagan administration pursued the policy Reagan described in his September 1985 speech. But then the combination of public protests and actions by a small group of Democratic congressmen sparked a policy battle between officials who agreed with President Reagan's policy and officials who instead shifted step-by-step toward the position of the congressional Democrats. In time, this led to a near total reversal of President Reagan's stated policy, symbolized by Secretary Shultz's receiving the head of the ANC as an honored guest in his office.

This shift in 1985-86 happened in several stages. In August 1985, National Security Council adviser McFarlane and Assistant Secretary of State Crocker met with the foreign minister of South Africa in Vienna. In September, Congress would return from its summer vacation, and, according to the press, the Senate liberals were determined to join the House in passing an economic sanctions bill. McFarlane's meeting was intended to elicit a South African commitment to an end of apartheid. Indeed, it did just that. Nevertheless, only a few days after the president of South Africa publicly announced his approach to ending apartheid, the Western media reacted by saying that McFarlane's mission had "failed."

At this stage Crocker still agreed with the President's policy. He argued on August 16, 1985, that "we Americans are builders and not destroyers. . . . Damaging [South Africa's] economy now will not only stunt economic growth but will also ultimately stunt the lives of this and coming generations of young South Africans. . . . A growing economy will help the reform process there."

Only a few weeks later, however, the one-two punch of congressmen who were talking about sanctions, and the media coverage of violence in South Africa, resulted in a new State Department approach to South Africa.

In early September 1985 there was a most revealing article by *Washington Post* columnist Lou Cannon (September 3, 1985).[1] It was particularly interesting because, as a number of us on the NSC staff had learned, Lou Cannon's stories usually provided a clue to the policy direction favored by Shultz, Deaver, and McFarlane.

Cannon's column said that Reagan was in one of his inflexible positions about South Africa policy, but that Shultz and McFarlane had a very good idea, and would probably be

[1]Cannon, who had followed Ronald Reagan's public career from its beginnings in California, had written a best-selling biography of Reagan. In that book he described a technique that Reagan's aides had found useful in overcoming some of their boss's conservative positions. They merely redefined a compromise they wanted Reagan to accept in such a way that it would seem to be ideologically compatible, but would in fact shift his position.

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able once again to save the President from himself. Their idea was to reduce congressional pressures for sanctions by preempting them, and urging Reagan to issue an Executive Order to bring about partial sanctions.

THIS LOU CANNON column correctly described the policy maneuver which the State Department, apparently with McFarlane's full endorsement, had clearly prepared. As an experienced Washington official, I guessed that this inside column meant McFarlane and Shultz had made their decision and were now going to try maneuvering the administration into some form of sanctions.

Following my "move up" at the NSC I was no longer attending the senior staff meetings. Therefore, I could not know how quickly this maneuver would occur. But I observed that if McFarlane and Shultz could get away with it, they would try to persuade the President of their proposal without having a full meeting of the NSC in which Weinberger and Casey most likely would have argued against taking this step.

Meanwhile, another important "player" was signalling his position. By press statements and actions, Senator Richard Lugar (then the Republican Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee) was showing his own support for the idea of limited economic sanctions against South Africa.

It seemed to me that the only person who could alert the President to these various maneuvers was CIA Director William Casey. I met with him, gave him a copy of the Lou Cannon column, and urged him to talk with Chief of Staff Don Regan and the President to assure that no decision on a new policy toward South Africa would be made without a full discussion in an NSC meeting. Casey was clearly concerned, but he did not indicate what he would do.

Both Director Casey and I had read "The Race For South Africa," an article on South Africa by Paul Johnson in the September 1985 *Commentary*. I suggested that Don Regan and the President might also want to read this, and offered to make copies immediately, so he could give one to each man.

"Good idea," Casey said and told me he would be going to the West Wing in a few minutes.

Then an amusing thing happened. After a mad dash to make the copies, I ran down the three flights of stairs in the Old Executive Office Building with the envelope and was waiting for Casey right at the entrance to the West Wing. As I was handing Casey the envelope just before his scheduled meeting with Don Regan (and, I believe, with the President), McFarlane and his media liaison person came out of the West Wing.

McFarlane gave Casey a friendly greeting; he gave me a searching look. I realized McFarlane would know that Casey was on Don Regan's appointment schedule and would wonder what was in the envelope I was giving Casey.

Now, as far as I knew, in the first days of September 1985 there was no meeting of the full National Security Council that would have allowed the President to hear what Weinberger and Casey thought about the reported McFarlane-Shultz plan for limited sanctions against South Africa. In the absence of a full NSC discussion the backdoor maneuvering began to pay off. Only six days after the Lou Cannon column was published, the President issued an Executive Order which stated, "I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."

This "finding" of a threat is required by the law which gives the President the authority to issue an Executive Order imposing economic sanctions. In May 1985, President Reagan had used the same terminology to cut off economic relations with communist Nicaragua. The Sandinista regime was then in its sixth year of aggression through armed sub-

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version against U.S. allies. South Africa, however, was undertaking no hostile international action and had been friendly to the United States for many decades. How, then, had Reagan been convinced to take this step? Most likely Shultz, McFarlane, perhaps Deaver and Senator Lugar, had persuaded him it was the only way to head off more complete sanctions being imposed by Congress.

The President was also persuaded that the sanctions were not sanctions but rather were what he described to the nation in his speech of September 9, 1985 as " . . . a set of measures designed and aimed against the machinery of apartheid, without indiscriminately punishing the people who are victims of that system—measures that will disassociate the United States from apartheid but associate us positively with peaceful change."

Not everyone had felt the same as the Shultz-McFarlane faction did. A small group of Reagan officials—of which I was one—had argued that this was a mistake. We believed it would set a precedent, and that the liberal Democrats would promptly demand additional sanctions, since whatever degree of progress South Africa made within the next months would be deemed insufficient. We contended that the proper course was the one Reagan himself had originally set: a vigorous pro-democratic strategy aimed at identifying and helping moderate anti-apartheid groups and providing incentives for additional Western economic investment to improve the living conditions of blacks and enhance their economic power, thereby increasing their political role and influence.

At the White House, proponents of this view were led by the chief of communications Pat Buchanan. Buchanan, a former columnist, worked for Chief of Staff Donald Regan; his duties included public liaison and supervision of the presidential speech writers. Buchanan was aided by his White House colleague, Phillip Nicolaides, a former reporter, editor, public relations executive and Voice of America official. Both Buchanan and Nicolaides felt the State Department was maneuvering President Reagan into a course they believed would have tragic and destructive results.

Leading the charge at the State Department were the assistant secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker, and Undersecretary Michael Armacost, both of whom seemed to act with Shultz's blessing. I was told that Chief of Staff Don Regan had an instinctive feeling that Shultz was wrong.

There was one potentially important presidential ally at State: Alan Keyes, a Harvard PhD, and former career foreign service officer who resigned in 1983 in order to accept a presidential appointment as ambassador at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. In early 1985, Keyes was promoted to assistant secretary of state for international organizations, where he became the only black Republican political appointee in a senior policy position at State. Like the President and others at the White House, Keyes believed that economic sanctions would undercut, rather than advance, President Reagan's strategy.

Keyes, however, was mostly excluded from any direct participation on these issues except as they arose in the United Nations and other international organizations. But in public speeches and published articles—all of which were submitted for clearance at State—Keyes argued that additional economic sanctions would hurt poor people the most, a majority of whom were black South Africans. He also contended that sanctions would strengthen the position of both white and black extremists by causing a decline in the economy and increased polarization.

Unfortunately, that term—"increased polarization"—also described the opposing views regarding South African sanctions within the Reagan administration.

The Sanctions Debate

AS AUTUMN turned to winter in 1985, I worked on several other major issues. But I knew that the question of southern Africa was going to return, and that this would become a major foreign policy cri-

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sis over the next several years. I began to bring together information from public sources on the groups and leaders in South Africa that were genuinely pro-democratic, opposed to apartheid, and committed to nonviolent methods. I believed that a major goal of administration public diplomacy vis-à-vis South Africa should have been to identify these leaders and to bring them to Western Europe, Japan, and the United States where they could make the case for nonviolent transition to multi-racial democracy. The State Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) which administered a multimillion dollar fund to help "opponents of apartheid," did not seem to use this information.

My list of such pro-democratic anti-apartheid groups included, within the black community: the Reform Churches Association; United Christian Action; Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha; the African Church of Zion; the Black Chamber of Commerce; and various black pro-democratic labor unions. All together, these organizations represented about 17 million among the 25 million black residents of South Africa. Yet they were virtually unknown in the U.S. and Europe, because they received no attention in the major Western media.

I also compiled published information about the close links between the South African Communist party and the ANC. Just as this information revealed the ANC to be a political front or affiliate of the Communist party, so too the ANC was the guiding force behind a broader coalition called the United Democratic Front (UDF). My guess was that 1986-90 would see the stepping up of a major effort to deceive the Western media, and through it Western political leaders, into accepting the ANC-UDF as "the sole legitimate representative" of those opposing apartheid.

In January 1986, one of my White House colleagues, Douglas Holladay, accepted an offer to join the State Department, with the rank of ambassador, and take charge of the "South Africa Working Group." This interagency effort was to be the public diplomacy arm of the State Department on this issue. Holladay had both a deep commitment to democracy and a capacity to make things happen. Also, he had long understood that religious faith was an important, and sometimes the only, bridge capable of bringing a divided society together nonviolently.

Since the well-meaning Christian churches in the West were a major target for the communist disinformation and propaganda campaign to legitimize the ANC, I thought that Holladay's contacts with American religious leaders would open doors here for the majority of the black Christian leaders who firmly opposed violence and the ANC.[2]

After Doug Holladay joined the State Department and became familiar with the thinking there, he drafted a memo proposing a new, affirmative strategy towards South Africa. He suggested there should be continuing diplomatic and economic contacts to encourage the government to end apartheid. Holladay argued that the South African government had committed itself to a number of specific anti-apartheid steps and the U.S. should encourage it and provide help for implementation. (This was precisely what Buchanan and Nicolaides were saying at the White House.) The idea was to hold Botha to his anti-apartheid promises and to take him seriously by offering help in carrying them out. Second, Holladay recommended that the U.S. should be helping to build institutions and skills within the black community for the post-apartheid era—for example, a major program of scholarships for South African blacks.

[2]The only black South African religious leaders whom most Americans know about are Desmond Tutu and Alan Boesak, who have received constant media attention. Yet they represent less than 10 percent of the black population and are among those most friendly toward the ANC. For example, while there are 780,000 black Anglicans, there are seven to eight million members of the Zion and Reform Churches Association of Christian churches.

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In February 1986, Holladay predicted that the next round of Congressional pressure for sanctions would probably occur on June 16, 1986, the tenth anniversary of the Soweto disturbances. He believed that the African policy officials at State and the NSC agreed that this was a plausible scenario, since it was a symbolic event that would likely trigger disturbances within South Africa. Those disturbances would, in turn, fuel the U.S. domestic pro-sanction movements.

Holladay and others tried to get action, but he found "no one was willing to take the lead," until June 1986 when an imminent negative congressional vote was being discussed in the newspapers a few days before the event. He felt that the NSC staff—now led by Admiral John Poindexter—failed to urge Don Regan to make this a priority for the White House legislative, public liaison, and communication staffs.

During the spring of 1986 Holladay assembled a staff of about twenty people. They frequently briefed members of Congress and their staffs and provided them with materials intended to increase their understanding of the issues involved in South Africa.

Meanwhile, pressure was mounting within Congress and other quarters to make political use of the South African issue. One prominent Democratic congressman said publicly that the Democratic party was planning to use the South Africa issue in the 1988 presidential campaign, and some Democrats clearly hoped to use the South African issue against the Republican party and President Reagan in the 1986 elections. They developed the line, and repeated it often, that to be against sanctions was to be "for" apartheid.

APPARENTLY this slogan was having an impact in Congress. Holladay was surprised and disappointed by the number of Democratic congressmen who were fearful that overt opposition to sanctions would be construed as embracing apartheid. Holladay and his staff were also surprised by the number of Republican senators and congressmen who agreed with the President privately in opposing both apartheid and sanctions, but who voted for sanctions to avoid being labelled "racist."

By the spring of 1986, the congressional Democrats in the House were acting just as Holladay had predicted. They were moving to pass a bill imposing virtually complete economic sanctions on South Africa. They used the September 9, 1985 Executive Order to argue that only far stiffer sanctions could make a difference. They ignored a number of positive actions that had been taken by the South African government such as allowing interracial marriage, the ownership of property, and the formation of labor unions by blacks. (Interestingly, when in the same year Mikhail Gorbachev merely indicated an *intention* to undertake reforms of a comparable scope in the Soviet Union, it was greeted in the West as a major act of liberalization.)

From its bases in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, the ANC announced that it would launch a massive wave of violence on June 16, 1986 to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. This led the government of South Africa to declare a state of emergency. On the same day, the House Democrats passed their bill calling for major economic sanctions.

Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN), a member of the African Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs committee who had long favored a pro-democratic anti-apartheid policy, was concerned by the growing legitimation of the ANC and by reports that millions of dollars in U.S. aid to black groups in South Africa were being used by ANC-controlled organizations. Burton perceived that the tide of misinformation regarding the ANC was starting to have the effect of legitimating it.

During the sanctions debate, Congressman Burton offered an amendment which said that none of the $50 million in proposed aid to South African organizations could go to the ANC, unless its "controlling body . . . no longer includes members of the South African Communist party." The House democratic

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leadership tried to prevent a vote on this amendment, but the Rules Committee mistakenly blocked another amendment so there had to be a vote on this issue.

Evans and Novak published a column on what happened next. They quoted Congressman Wolpe (D-MI), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of Africa, who said that his acceptance of the Burton amendment did not "indicate any endorsement of the view that the ANC is dominated by communists." Congressman Solarz (D-NY) said he would vote for the amendment, but added, "That does not mean it is not obnoxious or ludicrous or otherwise ridiculous." Evans and Novak wrote, "Solarz's adjectives were scrubbed from the permanent record as was the amendment itself once the tough sanction substitute erased everything previously adopted, but the 365 to 49 [anti-ANC] vote stands as a marker."

The President's Speech

THE JUNE 1986 House vote for full sanctions against South Africa initiated weeks of intense debate within the administration. As often happened, the focal point of debate was a planned presidential speech. Those who agreed with President Reagan's policy, including Regan, Buchanan, Nicolaides, and Keyes, wanted a national presidential speech to affirm a pro-democratic anti-apartheid policy and argue against sanctions.

But the State Department leadership had other ideas. In early July, State prepared a draft of the speech which reflected several major departures from presidential policy: it put the U.S. on the side of such states as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe; ignored the violence promoted by the ANC; and maintained that apartheid is the "only destabilizing" factor in southern Africa. The proposed draft further said the ANC must play a major role in the resolution of this problem, and that the U.S. was making every effort to enter into dialogue with the leaders of ANC. Finally, the draft speech would have had President Reagan pledge $200 million to upgrade roads, pipelines, and rail facilities running from Zimbabwe to communist Mozambique. Since it supposedly would free those countries from their need to do business through and with South Africa, the President was to name this project "the liberty corridor."

As I was now a private citizen — my last day with the Reagan administration having been July 4, 1986, five days before the date of the State Department draft — I observed the rest of this drama from the outside. Unfortunately, it was not a brand new production.

Poindexter, like McFarlane before him, often seemed to go along with the State Department on international political issues. It was unclear whether he realized that the State Department's approach represented a break with the policy that the President had pursued since entering office. After Poindexter, as the new NSC adviser, gave a background briefing to the media, ABC-TV interpreted his remarks as meaning that the Reagan administration believed the present government of South Africa could not last much longer, and that the U.S. had better reach out to a "successor regime"—one led by the ANC. Then the *Washington Post* published a leaked story that President Reagan was considering a major speech. That increased the expectation of a major shift in U.S. policy.

Secretary Shultz was scheduled to testify on South Africa before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 23, 1986. The State Department wanted this testimony to occur *before* the President gave his speech; that way, State could preempt the President with its *own* new South Africa policy. To help their case along, the *Washington Post* published the following from unnamed "sources" at State:

> [These]. . .sources said the new U.S. ambassador [to South Africa]—whether white or black—will be under instructions to expand greatly the embassy's outreach activities and begin closer public consultation with black South African leaders such as Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the outlawed African National Congress—and Bishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel peace laureate. The sources said a draft of

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a speech emphasizing this aim has been prepared for possible delivery by Reagan prior to hearings on South Africa to be held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. . . . However, the sources said a decision has not been made about whether the administration can dramatize its case most effectively by having Reagan deliver the speech or by allowing. . .Shultz to outline the new policy when he testifies.

One potential source of support for Reagan's policy was the Republican-controlled Senate. But Senator Lugar, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was going along with State. Many Republican congressmen were reluctant to take a position against sanctions for fear that they would be accused of being pro-apartheid and indifferent to the plight of South African blacks. Such a perception could hurt the nineteen Republican senators—including Dole—who would be up for reelection in only a few months. Another reason given was that neither the White House nor the State Department had articulated a pro-democratic, anti-apartheid policy.

Over a weekend in July 1986, Phil Nicolaides wrote a draft speech. He gave it to Buchanan, who reworked it and sent it to President Reagan. Reagan liked it, and rejected the State Department draft. (I am told Don Regan agreed with Buchanan, and made certain that President Reagan had a chance to compare both drafts.) When Shultz found out about this, he stormed over to the White House, and reportedly told Buchanan to "stay out of foreign policy." Next, Shultz demanded from Poindexter and Don Regan that there be no presidential speech if the President insisted on giving the Buchanan draft.

It was a tense time. My guess was that Tony Dolan, the chief presidential speech writer who knew Casey well, was keeping the CIA chief briefed. As a private citizen, I had made a decision not to call anyone in the government, though if they called me for advice or opinion I would naturally respond.

I remembered sitting in my backyard on a hot July day and typing my first post-Reagan administration article: "South Africa—Encouraging a Peaceful Transition to Multiracial Democracy." (I was pleased that the *Washington Post* published it on Sunday, July 20, 1986, two days before the President's speech.)

Thanks to Pat Buchanan, Phil Nicolaides, Tony Dolan, and his own judgment, President Reagan gave a speech on July 22, 1986, which left no doubts as to his policy. It is a speech worth re-reading in full in light of what happened subsequently. Some crucial excerpts follow:

America's view of apartheid has been, and remains, clear. Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable. The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people, based upon race . . . Apartheid must be dismantled . . . .

We do not believe the way to help the people of South Africa is to cripple the economy upon which they and their families depend for survival . . . . Our own experience teaches us that racial progress comes swiftest and easiest, not during economic depression, but in times of prosperity and growth . . . .

Night after night, week after week, television has brought us reports of violence by South African security forces, bringing injury and death to peaceful demonstrators and innocent bystanders. More recently, we read of violent attacks by blacks against blacks. Then, there is the calculated terror by elements of the African National Congress: the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, designed to bring about further repression, the imposition of martial law, eventually creating the conditions for racial war.

. . . . In defending their society and people, the South African government has a right and responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists. But by its tactics, the government is only accelerating the descent into bloodletting.

. . . . In recent years, there has been dramatic change. Black workers have been permitted to unionize, bargain collectively, and build the strongest free trade union movement in all Africa. The infamous pass laws have been ended, as have many of the laws denying blacks the right to live, work, and own property in South Africa's

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cities. Citizenship, wrongly stripped away, has been restored to nearly six million blacks.

Segregation in universities and public facilities is being set aside. Social apartheid laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage have been stuck down. Indeed, it is because State President Botha has presided over these reforms that extremists have denounced him as a traitor.

Black churches, black unions, and indeed, genuine black nationalists have a legitimate role to play in the future of their country. But the South African government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state—and uses terrorist tactics to achieve it. . . .

. . .But let me outline what we believe are necessary components of progress toward political peace. . .a timetable for elimination of apartheid laws should be set. . .all political prisoners should be released. . .Nelson Mandela should be released—to participate in the country's political process. . .black political movements should be unbanned. . .both the government and its opponents should begin a dialogue about constructing a political system that rests upon the consent of the governed—where the rights of majorities, minorities, and individuals are protected by law. And the dialogue should be initiated by those with power and authority: the South African government itself. . .if post-apartheid South Africa is to remain the economic locomotive of southern Africa, its strong and developed economy must not be crippled. Therefore, I urge the Congress—and the countries of Western Europe—to resist this emotional clamor for punitive sanctions.

The day after this major speech in which the President clearly and comprehensively defined *his* policy towards South Africa, Secretary of State George Shultz testified in highly publicized hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to his prepared statement, he agreed with the policy of his President in opposing additional economic sanctions. But there the resemblance ended.

Unlike the President, Shultz did not distinguish explicitly between the moderate pro-democratic and the pro-Soviet terrorist opponents of apartheid. Also, unlike the President, Shultz failed to affirm that a government has the right to maintain order, and need not be *compelled* to negotiate with violent groups like the ANC. And where President Reagan had decided not to endorse the $200 million for the "liberty corridor," Shultz proposed $500 million for the same purpose, renaming it the "Beiera corridor." The State Department proposed to allocate this $500 million to an entity called the South Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), in effect wholly controlled by and principally benefitting the far left dictatorships of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, where the Port of Beiera is located.

In sum, while Shultz paid lip service to Presidential policy by opposing additional sanctions, his testimony could be read as a message to Congress that the State Department had shifted sharply toward the view of the President's opponents in Congress.

Poindexter and Friends

DID RONALD REAGAN view all this as cause for alarm? Probably not—though that answer does not speak well for his subordinates, either. A President, whether Democrat or Republican, will assume that his Secretary of State is carrying out his policy unless the NSC adviser or another member of the cabinet gives him evidence to the contrary. The press reports of Shultz's testimony were not enough to raise questions because every public official comes to understand that no matter what he or she actually says, the major media will emphasize and interpret as it thinks best. Therefore, media coverage and allegations about internal administrative politics published in the media will not in themselves raise a warning flag for most presidents, and certainly not one with the trusting temperament of Ronald Reagan.

Where, then, was Poindexter on this major foreign policy dispute between the President and the State Department? He seemed to be doing what Shultz was doing—giving

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lip service to the President's policy while doing nothing to prevent the State Department's African bureau from changing it. On July 17, in the middle of the administration's policy battle over the forthcoming presidential speech, Congressman Dan Burton had sent Poindexter a letter documenting the pro-Soviet objectives, communist control, and violent methods of the ANC. Burton included a photocopy of the cover of the ANC's February 1986 edition of *Sechaba* (published in East Germany) described as the "official organ of the ANC." It showed the burning tire which ANC "comrades" used when they burned alive blacks considered opposed to the ANC. The *Sechaba* cover also included the exhortation "forward to people's war." Burton's letter asked Poindexter to assure that the State Department not tilt U.S. policy toward dealing with the ANC as a legitimate or, worse, as the preeminent, anti-apartheid group.

Poindexter did not answer Congressman Burton until September 5, 1986. And then his reply reflected the rhetorical technique adopted by the State Department with the President and Republicans in Congress. On the one hand, Poindexter's letter said, "We have no illusions about the ANC. The number and influence of communists in its membership, as well as its ties to the USSR, concern us deeply. Its violent tactics repel all who hope for a peaceful outcome in South Africa."

Despite this bow to realism, Poindexter's letter went on to repeat the premises that were now emerging as the real policy of the State Department:

> As you know, the administration conducts publicly acknowledged meetings with ANC officials as part of its effort to promote negotiations among all the parties concerned with a peaceful outcome in South Africa. Such contact is a critical part of the U.S. effort to pursue precisely the approach you have suggested in your letter. It is time that we test the proposition that the ANC leadership can be weaned from its Soviet communist entanglement and from forces opposing a democratic nonracial future of South Africa.

By the time of Poindexter's belated reply to the senior Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the State Department, ignoring President Reagan's July 22, 1986 policy speech, had publicly announced that its representatives were meeting with leaders of the ANC in Africa. On September 20, 1986, Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Oliver Tambo, the leader of the ANC. State Department officials were telling the press that in his planned October 1986 trip to Africa, Shultz would also be willing to meet with the ANC leader.

On September 5, 1986, the Senate Democrats joined with a number of Republicans (including Senators Lugar, Kassebaum, Dole) to enact a tough economic sanctions bill. The State Department was supposed to persuade the Senate not to do this. But close observers told me that the State Department's African bureau was only going through the motions.

Pat Buchanan, almost a lone voice on the President's side, published an article in the *New York Times* right after this Senate vote called "Destroy South Africa to Save It?" (September 18, 1986).

MEANWHILE, the next debate within the administration was about whether President Reagan should or should not veto the sanctions bill passed by the Democratic House in June and the Republican Senate in September. President Reagan acted on his principles and vetoed the sanctions bill. Now it was up to Senator Dole, the Republican majority leader, to work with the administration in preventing an override of the President's veto.

If Republican Majority Leader Dole had really wanted to take a firm stand *with* the President on this issue, he could have delayed calling the bill up in the Senate, thereby giving the administration more time to win votes. Obviously some Republican Senators had voted for sanctions because they had been politically stampeded by the false equation that opposition to sanctions equalled support for apartheid. Dole might have increased the chances of the President preventing an over-

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ride of his veto by two-thirds of the Senators present and voting by encouraging those Republicans unable to stand with the President to be absent. This was not done.

But Senator Dole had not been an ally of the President in 1985 when South Africa became a major issue. Then, Dole had followed Lugar and voted for the sanctions bill; he did so again in September 1986. Dole also had opposed resolutions to identify the ANC as a communist-led group, and to withhold U.S. funds from the ANC. It did not look as though he was going to help President Reagan unless the administration decided to make a major political effort to sustain the President's veto.

Inside the White House, Don Regan, Pat Buchanan, Phil Nicolaides, and a few others *were* making that argument. At the State Department, Alan Keyes made proposals for an affirmative, pro-democratic argument for sustaining the veto.

But I learned that the "pro-sanctions clique" at the State Department aborted a planned trip to Washington by the black leader of the independent country of Lesotho, who had *publicly* supported the President's anti-sanction policy. It also seemed clear that the State Department had a hand in postponing a planned visit to Washington by Gatsha Buthelezi, the pro-democratic leader of seven million South African Zulus, who also opposed sanctions. Both black leaders would have been in Washington at just the right time to help the President sustain his veto.

On Monday, September 30, 1986, Senators Kassebaum and Lugar (respectively Republican chairmen of the subcommittee on African Affairs and of the Foreign Relations Committee) published an article in the *Washington Post* entitled "Override the President's Veto—and Get On With Peaceful Change in South Africa." This was a blunt, public repudiation of Reagan's viewpoint. Insiders wondered if this article stemmed from the close Lugar-Shultz relationship and reflected implicit cooperation between these senators and the State Department against their President. In support of Reagan, Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD) wrote a letter to his colleagues detailing the ruinous effect of sanctions. Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) also was active.

The lukewarm support provided the President by the State Department is illustrated by the inexplicable reluctance to have Assistant Secretary of State Alan Keyes do one-on-one lobbying with "wavering" Senators. Keyes did brief members of Congress and argued the President's case against sanctions. But then, in the midst of Keyes' efforts to sustain the President's policy, senior foreign service officers at the State Department began leaking stories to the effect that Assistant Secretary Keyes no longer had the confidence of Shultz, and that as a result his duties were being transferred to Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead and a staffer of the State policy planning group.

As Evans and Novak reported in the *Washington Post* on September 29, 1986: "In a department where Reagan's positions on Africa regularly are undercut, Keyes is assailed by senior officials for not being a 'team player.'" Thus, instead of working with an articulate black assistant secretary who supported the President's policy, senior State Department officials tried to demoralize him with denigrating leaks and to get rid of him.

ON OCTOBER 2, 1986, the Senate overrode President Reagan's veto, thereby imposing economic sanctions. The *Wall Street Journal* wrote, ". . .Senator Lugar now joins the list of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen who have succeeded in seizing control of American foreign policy from a president. U.S. policy toward South Africa, and by extension toward southern Africa, now becomes the Lugar policy. We hope he will be willing at some future date to take whatever further responsibilities fall upon him as the southern African drama unfolds."

However, Shultz's planned October 1986 visit to southern Africa was postponed by urgent U.S.-Soviet issues. The Soviet Union had seized a U.S. journalist, and traded him for the release of a Soviet official whom the U.S. had charged with espionage. Then this was

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followed by the U.S. agreement for a "pre-summit" meeting in Iceland. Thus, further visible State Department motion toward the ANC had to wait until Tambo visited Shultz in February 1987.

Since the events of 1986, the State Department has continued to push its policy of improving relations with communist Angola, communist Mozambique, the leftist dictatorship of Zimbabwe, and the ANC.

Few of the individuals who had been trying to support the President in his southern African policy are in office today. William Casey became seriously ill in December 1986, and died on May 6, 1987; Chief of Staff Regan resigned in the aftermath of the Iran scandal; Pat Buchanan left the White House in April 1987; Philip Nicolaides left the White House to head a private organization called the Fund for Africa's Future; and Douglas Holladay decided, after eighteen months at State, to accept a private job in New York. Alan Keyes resigned his post in October 1987. Secretary of Defense Weinberger left the administration the next month.

Iconology

WHAT WILL FUTURE generations make of our current obsession with Nelson Mandela? Of local councils that, unable to collect the rubbish in their streets, rename them after him? Of birthday concerts that are broadcast to hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, who feel the warm glow of righteousness merely by watching? Of bookshops that contain more books about him than about India and China combined, half of humanity? Of innumerable demonstrations for his release by people who would be hard-pressed to find another African country on a map, to describe conditions there, or to name its dictator?

Nelson Mandela is a brave man who has long struggled for his ideals. For many years he spoke up in defence of sweetness and light in a country where they were banned as subversive. But he is not a prisoner of conscience in the Amnesty International sense since he espoused, and espouses still, violence as a means of bringing about change in South Africa. He is a founder of *Umkhonto we Sizwe,* the Spear of the Nation, the sabotage and terrorism wing of the African National Congress; and he himself underwent military training as a guerrilla, on his own admission. None of this is, of course, surprising, since for decades all other avenues to black political advancement were contemptuously and definitively closed.

NEVERTHELESS, the widespread use of violent tactics in the townships has led to precisely the situation that Mandela himself described in his statement at the Rivonia trial:

> It [violence] was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the government—though this is what prompted it—but of civil strife amongst [Africans], conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness . . .

And if those who like to think of South Africa as a Manichaean contest between Good and Evil were a little more attentive to reality than to their own mental state, the recent burning down of one of Mrs. Mandela's houses, not by white but by black youths, together with her construction of an ostentatious mansion and the internecine battles of her American legal and public relations advisers over the franchise of the family name, might alert them to the complexity of the situation.

The Spectator, August 6, 1988

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What Price 'Differentiation'?

Stephen Miller

MANY FOREIGN policy observers have argued that American policy suffers from knee-jerk anti-communism. As Ronald Steel, for example, put it in a recent issue of *The New Republic*, "we [U.S. policy-makers] assume any regime calling itself Marxist must by definition be a supine instrument of Soviet power." The reality of postwar American policy, however, has been otherwise. In Eastern Europe, the U.S. has consistently tried to cultivate good relations with selected communist regimes. This policy, which came to be called "differentiation" in the early 1970s, actually began in the early 1950s, when the U.S. rewarded Tito with aid, trade credits, and arms because of his break with Stalin. In 1968, Romania was also treated favorably following its refusal to participate in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. And, of course, in the early 1970s, the U.S. began to cultivate better relations with communist China.

Having an independent foreign policy has only been one criterion for differentiation. Since 1957, when the U.S. gave economic assistance to Poland because the new leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka appeared to promise substantial political and economic liberalization, U.S. policy-makers have also rewarded communist regimes in Eastern Europe for showing signs of internal liberalization. Differentiation, then, has been based on two very different criteria. Speaking in Vienna after visiting Romania and Hungary, Vice President George Bush said in 1983: "Our policy is one of differentiation—that is, we look to what degree countries [in Eastern Europe] pursue autonomous foreign policies, independent of Moscow's direction, and to what degree they foster domestic liberalization." En route to Romania and Hungary in 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz said much the same thing. "We differentiate among them [Soviet bloc countries] and between them and the Soviet Union, to encourage more independent foreign policies, greater respect for human rights, and economic and social reforms." The reward for meeting either criterion has been Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, which means lower trade barriers and access to U.S. government-supported export credits. Romania was granted MFN status in 1975, Hungary in 1978.

Although the policy of differentiation has been in place for a long time and professed by Republican as well as Democratic administrations, in recent years that policy has been under attack. This is especially evident in the case of Romania. In July 1987, an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* argued that "differentiation has a noble purpose . . . but the gains in Romania have been drudging and minor, while in important ways the country has grown worse. In Romania the policy has failed." Nevertheless, most Western observers who write on Eastern Europe would probably disagree with the *Journal*'s conclusion. In *East-*

Stephen Miller is the editor of *Soviet East European Report*, a newsletter published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The views expressed here are his own.

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ern Europe Under Communist Rule (1988), James Brown argues that "if the West were to withdraw its support [from Romania] . . . its position in Eastern Europe as a whole might suffer." And Charles Gati, in *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (1986), maintains that it is important to continue to reward Romania for its "semi-independent" foreign policy.

FEW OBSERVERS, I imagine, would quarrel with the idea of differentiation itself, since it makes sense to treat different countries differently. Rather, the debate centers on differentiation in practice—a policy that has been in place for roughly thirty years, probably dating back to a top secret National Security Council paper of December 1949. That report, which focused on American policy toward "the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe," stressed that while America's "ultimate aim" was the establishment of noncommunist states, the more immediate objective was to foster "a heretical drifting away process" leading to "schismatic communist regimes."

In the 1950s, however, the public stance of American policy-makers was one of encouraging the "rollback" of communism—more specifically, the "liberation" of the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe. This position was disavowed in the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, when the many Hungarians who thought the United States would come to their aid proved tragically mistaken. Since 1956, liberation has never been even suggested. Instead, American policy has sought to encourage change by peaceful means—calling for "peaceful engagement" or "bridge-building" (terms used by Zbigniew Brzezinski in an influential article on the subject during the Johnson administration). In the 1970s, "differentiation" became the standard term for this policy, whose implications reportedly were systematized in a formal national security decision memorandum which remains classified.

It was not until the late 1960s that the policy came of age, because it was then that Hungary began to institute reforms that would come to be called market socialism and Romania began to disagree strongly with some aspects of Soviet foreign policy. (That was not their first gesture of semi-independence. In 1958 the Romanians persuaded Moscow to remove Soviet troops from Romanian soil.) The refusal to take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was naturally seen as a positive development in Washington, and in 1969 Richard Nixon travelled to Romania in the first visit ever made by a U.S. president to an East European country. In the 1970s, when relations with the United States remained warm, Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu visited Washington four times (1970, 1973, 1975, and 1978). President Ford went to Romania in 1975.

In the 1980s, however, Romanian-American relations cooled considerably. Ceausescu's disastrous economic policies, coupled with his desire to pay back Romania's hard currency debt to the West as quickly as possible, resulted in a steep fall in the country's standard of living. The shortages of food, fuel, and electricity resulted in the lowest standard of living in Europe. Congressional criticism of the Reagan administration's policy toward Romania increased, and in the spring of 1987 both the House and the Senate voted to suspend MFN status for a six-month period. The Reagan administration, however, continued to support MFN status for Romania, although it did voice its concern about the worsening human rights situation there. Strangely enough, the quarrel over Romania's MFN status was resolved by the Romanians themselves, for on February 26 Romania decided to renounce its MFN status.

The move was puzzling, since the Romanians had lobbied intensively for MFN status in the early 1970s. Perhaps the renunciation was meant to express Ceausescu's irritation with increasing American criticism of his internal policies. Or perhaps it was a ploy on Romania's part to maintain good trade relations with the U.S. without having to endure an annual review of its internal policies. In any event, soon after the break the official Romanian news agency, Agerpres, hoped the

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U.S. would show a "constructive spirit" in surmounting impediments to the growth of "traditional ties" between the two countries and peoples.

If the reasons for Romania's action remain a matter of speculation, the reasons for the United States' continued support of MFN status for Romania have been very clear. Testifying before Congress on August 1, 1986, Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway regretted Bucharest's human rights record, but said it was in the interest of the U.S. to support Romania because of its independent foreign policy. Ridgway singled out three areas in which Romania has taken "distinctive and significant steps": the continued recognition of Israel; limited participation in Warsaw Pact activities; and opposition to the full integration of the CMEA economies. In short, the State Department remained convinced that Romania was still pursuing a foreign policy that was in some respects semi-independent.

Not all who served in the State Department during the Reagan presidency have agreed with this point of view. A notable exception is David Funderburk, a former college professor who served as ambassador to Romania from 1981 to 1985. According to a recent memoir by Funderburk, during his years in office he was continually at odds with high State Department officials over policy towards Romania.[1] Unfortunately, Funderburk's memoir, which has virtually been ignored by book reviewers, is weak on analysis and strong on invective. But it does spell out the basic quarrel between himself and State Department officials.

Funderburk's disagreement centers on two main points. He argues that Romania is in fact one of the most repressive regimes in the world, and that the regime is not nearly as semi-independent as State Department officials claim. On the first point, there is little quarrel. Even State Department officials acknowledge that Romania is one of the most repressive communist states in the world—on a par with North Korea and Albania. In recent years repression has increased. A 1983 decree required citizens to register their typewriters with the police; a 1985 decree made failing to report a conversation with a foreigner a criminal offense. Even the leftist West German Green party called last April for the international isolation of Ceausescu, a man who lets his people "freeze and starve."

While the State Department does not deny that Romania is harshly repressive, Reagan administration officials often have argued that the American support for Romania has made the country less repressive than it might have been. Testifying before Congress in 1985, one State Department official, Gary Matthews, said that "good relations have enabled us to make a difference in the Romanian internal scene." Matthews claimed that "the government of Romania remains relatively tolerant of the fourteen major recognized religious groups . . . ." Most accounts, however, paint a different picture of religion in Romania. Reports by dissidents say that the Ceausescu regime has persecuted clergymen who dare to question the Ceausescu cult. Many priests have died in mysterious circumstances—such as car accidents. Moreover, the Romanian government has leveled many Romanian churches. In Bucharest alone, according to a recent report by a dissenting Romanian Orthodox priest who lives abroad, twenty-five churches have been razed already, and sixty or seventy are apparently awaiting the same fate. Moreover, last summer Ceausescu announced that he planned to raze approximately half of Romania's villages in order to establish urban "agro-industrial centers."

Of course, it is impossible to refute the claim that America's close ties with Romania enabled it to influence the Ceausescu regime, since it is possible that the human rights situation could deteriorate even further if Romanian-American relations became more strained. Charles Gati, for example, criticizes human rights activists for trying to "remove the only leverage the United States has to help realize their goals. . . ." In recent years, as

[1] *Pinstripes and Reds* (Washington, D.C.: Selous Foundation Press), 1988.

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Funderburk notes, State Department officials have made much of the notion of leverage, but it should be kept in mind that approximately twenty years of U.S. leverage vis-à-vis Romania have borne a bitter fruit for the average Romanian. Moreover, one could just as easily say that American leverage indirectly abetted repression. That is, the Romanian government believed that its special relationship with the United States, based as it was on American approval for its semi-independent foreign policy, would enable it to put into effect a severely repressive domestic policy without too many complaints from Washington.

State Department officials have also pointed out that if Romanian-American relations cool, emigration would drop dramatically. On this point, their argument has some merit, since the Romanian government has been relatively liberal on the question of emigration. In recent years thousands of ethnic Germans and Jews have been allowed to leave for a fee paid in hard currency by the governments of West Germany and Israel. (Still, the Romanian government has stopped emigration since the fall of 1987.)

But, as we have seen, State Department officials' chief argument on behalf of special treatment for Romania has been the country's foreign policy. Has Romania been as semi-independent as the State Department claims? Funderburk says no. According to him, Romania does "nothing to threaten Moscow's fundamental interests." Moreover, he argues, Romania helps the Soviet Union by acting as a conduit for high technology items that the Soviet Union is prohibited from buying, and the Romanian secret police work closely with the KGB.

Funderburk's assessment has been bolstered by the recent memoirs of a Romanian who was the acting director of the country's intelligence service when he defected in 1978.[2] According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, Romania's foreign policy was essentially an exercise in disinformation. Its centerpiece was Operation Horizon, which was designed, Pacepa says, "to give the West the illusion that his [Ceausescu's] Romania was a new kind of Communist country, independent of everyone else, including Moscow, which deserved to be supported by the West, so as to create cracks in the walls around the Soviet bloc. Ceausescu's 'Horizon' had everything: overt and covert propaganda in the West; hints dropped into concealed microphones discovered in Romanian embassies in the West and kept in place for sending misleading messages ... Swiss bank accounts rewarding high-ranking, corrupt Westerners who agreed to present Romania as a 'maverick'."

SINCE PACEPA was well-placed in the Romanian government, his analysis of Ceausescu's foreign policy would seem to carry more weight than the assessments of American academics such as William Zimmerman, who said in 1983 that Romania's foreign policy "differs in substantial ways from that of the Soviet Union." But we should be wary of accepting at face value the revelations of a former head of an Internal Security Agency, since it is in his interest to provide his Western readership with dramatic material. Despite Pacepa's revelations, it seems likely that some of Romania's actions truly did betoken a semi-independent foreign policy—especially Romania's condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its refusal to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its soil. As Zimmerman writes: "The re-entry of Soviet troops—even the reestablishment of the practice of sending Soviet troops in Romania for field exercises—would greatly facilitate Soviet capacity to exert pressure on Yugoslavia."

If we grant that Romania has been semi-independent, however, it does not mean that it has remained so. Most observers acknowledge that Romania's semi-independence has diminished. Even James Brown, who favors MFN status for Romania, has said that in recent years "often the anti-Soviet stance, though still genuine, has seemed mere pos-

[2] *Red Horizons* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway), 1988.

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turing." The Romania of the 1980s is not the Romania of the late 1960s. As Vlad Georgescu, who heads Radio Free Europe's Romanian Service, wrote recently: "Romanian-Soviet rapprochement seems to be the dominant trend of the 1980s, just as rapprochement with the West had been in the 1960s." If in the 1960s Romania was semi-independent and not very repressive, in the 1980s it is less semi-independent, so to speak, and harshly repressive.

Is U.S. policy partly to blame for this turn of events? Some observers think so, including a noted Romanian dissident, Mihai Botez, who has charged that "instead of promoting an economy which works or socialism with a human face, you [the U.S.] have helped legitimize a corrupt communist regime which has ruined our country." Botez may be right, but it is more likely that U.S. foreign policy had little effect on Romania. Although Ceausescu clearly wooed the U.S. in the late 1960s and early 1970s, his disastrous economic policies forced him to become more dependent on the Soviet Union. One could argue that MFN status, which enabled Romania to obtain cheap credits from the West, made it easier for Ceausescu to indulge in crazy industrial schemes such as building a Danube-Black Sea canal that will never repay the investment put into it. Still, it is probably true that Ceausescu would have pursued his pet projects no matter what American policy towards Romania was. The more Ceausescu seemed to prefer idolatry over mere praise, the less leverage the U.S.—and even the USSR—had on him. The main result of American policy was the bewilderment and demoralization of the Romanian people. According to Funderburk, "most Romanians could not understand why the U.S. wasted its reputation on this hated tyrant."

No doubt the United States has derived some benefits from its special relationship with Romania, but in the last ten years the costs clearly have outweighed the benefits. Would having cooler relations with Romania, as James Brown warns, "lead to a general loss of Western credibility . . ."? Credibility with whom, one wants to know. Cooler relations with Romania would increase U.S. credibility with the people of Eastern Europe, who heard fine sentiments from American leaders about human rights while seeing the U.S. government pay court to Ceausescu.

Since a concern for human rights is central to the American political tradition, there must be very good geostrategic reasons for putting such questions aside. (After all, the State Department has a bureau that issues an annual report on human rights, and American policy-makers often attack anti-communist right-wing regimes for their human rights abuses.) Was Romania a good geostrategic reason? It hardly seems so. Most observers regard Romania as relatively unimportant strategically when compared with Yugoslavia or even Albania. Thus with Romania, it seems, the U.S. sold human rights considerations at too low a price.

MOREOVER, since human rights considerations are so important to Congress and the American public, U.S. policy-makers can never completely dismiss them. As a result, differentiation has led to a subtle corruption in human rights "presentations" by the State Department. Department officials not only try to make the human rights records of certain "good"—i.e. anti-Soviet—communist countries such as Yugoslavia and China look better than they are, but they also warn that human rights conditions in a favored country will worsen dramatically if MFN status is withdrawn. In short, they look aside at human rights violations in the interest of realpolitik, yet at the same time invoke human rights considerations to justify a policy that was based on a different criterion.

Would cooler relations, as Brown also warns, "discourage other Eastern European regimes wishing to loosen Soviet ties"? Perhaps, but warm relations with Hungary have not resulted in Hungary's loosening *its* ties with the Soviet Union. Looser Soviet ties will probably not come from above—that is, from the Party—but as a result of pressure from below, from groups that, among other things, insist on a public airing of the Soviet role in

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their recent history. In Hungary, for example, a new citizen's group, called the Committee for Historical Justice, has dared to raise what was formerly a taboo subject; they call for the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy and for an accurate account of what happened in 1956. Faced with the rise of so-called "informal groups," East bloc governments may find it difficult to contain popular pressure for looser Soviet ties. In any case, Romanian-U.S. relations have become cooler, the State Department notwithstanding, and are likely to remain that way as long as Ceausescu remains in power.

THE PRACTICE of differentiation in Eastern Europe has been deeply flawed for another reason. It has been based on the mistaken assumption that U.S. support for reform or for "market-oriented communism" would lead countries that embarked upon such programs to loosen their ties with the Soviet Union and to initiate political reform. It was also assumed that such support would improve the standard of living. Lincoln Gordon speaks of the "transformation school" whose main argument is that "assistance for economic modernization may widen the differences within the Eastern bloc and help to loosen imperial ties. In any event, such assistance should improve conditions of life for the peoples concerned . . . ." But differentiation has had no such effect: the standard of living in Poland, Romania, and Hungary—all recipients of MFN status—has gone downhill (rapidly downhill in the cases of Poland and Romania). Nor has MFN status resulted in looser imperial ties. Poland and Hungary do not differ from the Soviet Union on foreign policy questions.

Of course, there is greater diversity in Eastern Europe now than there was, say, in 1960. Certainly, the Polish and Hungarian governments tolerate a degree of dissent that they never would have tolerated before. But generally American influence has been marginal with regard to these changes. It has been pressure from *indigenous* forces—workers, the Church, intellectuals—that has brought about these changes, not pressure from abroad. True, Hungary has long courted public opinion in the West by allowing some measure of dissent, even quite outspoken dissent, so long as talk doesn't lead to political action. But despite years of absorbing loans from the West and enjoying MFN status, the Party refuses to allow any diminution of its authority. Karoly Grosz, the new Party leader, said last June that the Party would not tolerate opposition groups who are opposed to socialism.

Perhaps differentiation would have been more effective if its proponents had driven a harder bargain on MFN status. If the price for lower trade barriers and cheap credits had been higher, it may have forced these regimes to move more quickly towards reform. Dissidents who called for serious economic and political reforms generally objected to MFN status on the grounds that cheap credits from the West enabled their governments to postpone instituting such reforms. Those who argue against tougher conditions for MFN status say that such a policy would have driven these countries closer to the Soviet Union. But with the exception of Romania, they have always been faithful adherents of Soviet foreign policy—faithful even if they benefited from differentiation. And since Gorbachev came to power, they have in some respects been yoked even more closely to the Soviet Union on trade matters.

Looking at thirty years of an American policy, one wonders: Who influenced whom? Did differentiation increase U.S. influence with East bloc regimes or, rather, did East bloc regimes play upon U.S. fears of their drawing closer to Moscow in order to soften the terms of differentiation? Or, to put it another way: The U.S. formulated a carrot-and-stick policy towards Eastern Europe, but in practice the policy was one of carrots only, since policy-makers feared that using the stick would be counterproductive. Despite U.S. talk about stimulating "a heretical drifting away process," U.S. policy-makers were mostly concerned with stability rather than change.

Ironically, the situation in much of East-

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ern Europe now is far from stable. Zbigniew Brzezinski recently wrote that "Eastern Europe is rapidly emerging as Europe's region of potentially explosive instability, with five countries already in a classic pre-revolutionary situation." Strangely enough, the situation is most unstable in those countries the U.S. has cultivated: Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania. In the first three countries the very word "reform" is discredited, since a skeptical citizenry no longer believes government-imposed reforms will be effective. In Romania, people simply want an end to Ceausescu's megalomaniac rule. Insofar as differentiation made it easier for East bloc regimes to avoid making serious reforms, the policy actually may have increased the prospects for a violent uprising in Eastern Europe. Still, it would be wrong to make too much of American policy-towards Eastern Europe. Its effect on the conduct of East European regimes has been marginal, at most pushing them in the direction of tolerating more dissent than they would have preferred.

American policy-makers have always regarded differentiation as a realistic way of promoting change in Eastern Europe, but a look at the current state of that part of the world suggests that the policy has been guided more by wishful thinking than by a realistic assessment of what role the U.S. could play there.

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Estonia, A Place to Watch

Walter C. Clemens Jr.

NATIONALISM outweighs class consciousness. It resists the unifying forces of education, technology, and trade. It tears apart Lebanon and Sri Lanka—suicide triumphing over enlightened self-interest. What will be its impact on the multinational Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

Modernization, both Marxist and liberal theorists have speculated, would reduce ethnic identification. The opposite has occurred in the Baltic. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the most Westernized and "modern" of the Soviet republics, but they also show mounting resentment against orders from Moscow and the presence of ethnic Russians in their midst. Despite earlier predictions of cultural (if not physical) annihilation, the three Baltic republics have experienced a cultural renaissance since the mid-1960s.

Estonia is the "Rhode Island" of the Soviet Union. Armenia and Moldavia have less land mass, but Estonia's population is by far the smallest of the fifteen Union Republics. Its population numbers about 1.5 million, of which presently about two-thirds are Estonian-speaking natives. Most of the other third are Russians, some having long roots in Estonia, but most of them migrants since World War II. This migration could make Estonians a minority in their native land. In the capital, Tallinn, Estonian nationals make up no more than half the population. Many Estonians fear for their survival and do what they can to resist russification and sovietization.

My first taste of Estonian nationalism came in 1969 when I joined two Estonian tourists for breakfast at a hotel in Yalta (located in the Ukrainian Republic but peopled heavily by Russians). Seeing that we had only knives and spoons, I asked the Russian waitress to please bring us forks. As she went her way, the Estonians commented: "If we asked for a fork, the Russians would call us 'fascists.'" Why? Memories run deep; Russians resent the close ties of the Baltic peoples with the West and their claim to be the most Western of Soviet peoples. Russians resent that Estonians—with the aid of Germany and then Britain—overthrew a "people's commune" in 1918–19 and established instead a "bourgeois democracy" that lasted until 1940, when the Red Army occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania along with other lands bordering the USSR. Russians resent that Estonia, again aided by Germany, pulled away from the Soviet orbit until it was re-"liberated" in 1944.

Mutual resentments accumulated during two generations of Soviet rule now reverberate throughout the Baltic as they do in other minority republics of the USSR. Animosities that once seethed beneath the surface are now erupting more openly thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* campaign. The Kremlin's "new thinking," as seen in Gorbachev's 1987 book, holds that "the sooner we confront and liquidate the 'blank spots' of history, the bet-

Walter C. Clemens Jr., is professor of political science at Boston University and adjunct research fellow at the Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs.

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ter we can proceed with *perestroika*—restructuring our economic and social life."

Frank recognition of past and present conflicts between national minorities and Great Russians is a prerequisite for understanding and resolving these conflicts. Before things get better, however, they are likely to get worse. And there is no ready solution for dealing with the threat that russification and sovietization pose to the culture and continued existence of the Estonian people.

THE SOVIET PRESS is attempting to come to terms with these problems. On December 9, 1987, *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, the organ of the Estonian Communist party and government, initiated a series of articles and printed many letters to the editor on the national question. *Sovetskaya Estoniya* has endeavored to help its Russian-speaking clientele vent their views about Estonians and to help them understand how Estonians feel about Russians. Such candor regarding nationality issues is without precedent in the Party press. *Glasnost* means new freedom, as the editors of *Sovetskaya Estoniya* assured me during two days of meetings last January. But it could open the floodgates to surges of mounting discontent, which would be difficult to control.

Party leaders realized that they could no longer ignore the problem when, on August 23 and November 7, 1987, anti-Russian, anti-Soviet feelings were manifested with a new virulence. Large demonstrations took place in all three Baltic republics on August 23—anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact whose secret protocols consigned then-independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the Soviet sphere. In Tallinn, protesters convened in front of the town hall but were ordered by police to move elsewhere. Thousands of Estonians then marched to a hilltop with a monument to Linda, wife of folk hero Kalev, whose own monuments were destroyed long ago by Soviet authorities. From Linda Hill the demonstrators moved to Deer Park where speakers called for an examination of Stalin's crimes against the Estonian people and for publication of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet accords. Authorities did not break up the assemblies but these demonstrations were heavily censured in the official press of all three Baltic republics.

Two thousand or more demonstrators gathered in the Estonian city of Parnu last November 7—the seventieth anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. They demanded the restoration of a monument to Estonians killed in the 1918–20 War of Independence against Soviet Russia. The monument had been razed by the Red Army in 1946 and Estonian soldiers' graves destroyed in 1956. The demonstrators were invited to discuss their grievances with local Party officials in two days of crowded meetings. Instead of condemning the demonstrators, *Rahva Haal* (November 11), an Estonian-language paper published by the Estonian party and government, called the event an experiment in "democracy," describing the exchanges between protestors and Party leaders in virtually the same language already used in *samizdat* accounts.

Nineteen eighty-seven also saw an escalation of violence between Russian immigrants and Estonian youths. Samizdat reports tell of big gang fights between Estonians and Russians in Keila. Apparently, Russians beat up an Estonian; Estonians then beat up Russians, killing one, leading some Russians to adopt the slogan "Kill seventy Estonians by the 70th Anniversary of the October [1917] Revolution." Though details of these encounters have not appeared in the official press, the Russian-language Komsomol paper *Molodozh Estonii* (November 20, 1987) noted that Russian youths had been told not to congregate at school after hours "in order to avoid conflicts."

Concurrent with these events, the graves of Soviet soldiers in Tartu were destroyed. The Estonian-language paper *Edasi* (November 22) then complained that some of its critics were blaming the anti-Soviet vandalism on its editorial policies. "In the event that the destruction of tombstones allows the halting of

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democratization under the aegis of vigilance, then it will clearly be the conservatives . . . fearing reform who will benefit from what took place." *Edasi* also noted that no one had bothered about the destruction of other graves not belonging to Soviet soldiers.

The shocker came when a special commission from Moscow probing this apparent "nationalist provocation" discovered that the vandals were not Estonian "nationalist hooligans" but the sons of Soviet officers at the local garrison and students at the Russian-language trade school. This discovery, reported in two samizdat accounts, was not announced in the official press, perhaps because it would embarrass opponents of *glasnost*.

The Russification of Estonia

OUTRIGHT russification of Estonia commenced after World War II, when a migration of Russians and other Soviet nationalities into Estonia created a demographic transformation that continues apace. "Migration" has since become a codename for russification. Estonia was systematically depopulated between 1939 and 1949 so that only 775,900 persons remained from a prewar population of 1,133,900. Of the total losses, about 2,000 represent Soviet executions during 1940–41; 129,000, deportations in 1940–41, 1944–45, and 1949; 6,000, executions by German authorities in 1941–44; 117,000, politically motivated flight westward, mostly in 1944; 71,500, people residing in territory transferred in 1945 from the Estonian to the Russian republic; and 33,000, men mobilized into the Red Army in 1941 who can fairly surely be shown to have become fatalities. Others died fighting with German units or as partisans.

Moscow's drive to industrialize the Baltic countries and its likely desire to russify them prompted the Kremlin after 1945 to sponsor large migrations of Russian and other Soviet citizens into Estonia, Latvia and, to a lesser extent, Lithuania. Some newly industrialized areas are almost entirely Russian. The rate of migration into Estonia is rising, with migrants accounting for about 61 percent of the total population increase in the last few years.[1]

After World War II Soviet authorities launched what one official now calls a "cavalry attack" to force Estonians to learn Russian. Estonians today are virtually compelled to learn Russian, while few Russians learn to speak Estonian or even bother to try. Estonians are not happy that street names are posted in Russian as well as Estonian, but they complain more deeply that names have been changed: thus, Cathedral Boulevard is now Gagarin Boulevard. The situation is not so extreme in Tallinn, however, as in Kharkov, where certain Ukrainian-language information signs have been taken down, leaving only signs in Russian.

As one contributor to a *Sovetskaya Estoniya* roundtable lamented, "Most of us Russians care little about the Estonians or what they think, even though we share the same habitat with them." Indeed, one letter to the newspaper put the matter starkly: "I do not know Estonian. I am not interested in Estonian culture, dances, or films. Estonians—they are basically Westernized." His letter and some others conveyed a basic disdain for Estonians, even on the part of Russians who have lived in Estonia for decades. A similar situation prevails throughout the Baltic and probably in most outlying areas where Russians feel that the locals must learn their tongue while there is no pressing reason for them to learn the local language.

The editors of *Sovetskaya Estoniya* and of *Pravda* publish such views but chide them, calling on Russian-speaking residents of outlying republics to learn more about the local people and their way of life. "No wonder you do not appreciate their culture," the editors of *Pravda* rebuffed Russian chauvinists in August 1987, "if you do not bother to learn their language."

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[1]See Ann Sheehy, "Migration to RSFSR and Baltic Republics Continues," *Radio Liberty Research RL* 478/87, November 30, 1987, pp. 3–5.

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Some Russians complain that they want to learn Estonian or the language of other minorities, but that good texts or suitable classes are not available, and that television programs on the local culture appear in the late afternoon when they are still at work or commuting. The other side of the story is what locals think of Russians. "This tram works so poorly because the Russians can't do anything right." This was the comment overheard by the chief editor of the Estonian Telegraph Agency as he rode to work one morning. "In fact," he observed, "the tram was made in Czechoslovakia and operated mainly by native Estonians, so the complaint was wide of the mark. Still, where such feelings exist, there must be a reason." He therefore urged Russian-speakers to search out the reasons for Estonian hostility toward Russians.

This editor, Lavy Sher, happens to be Jewish, one of the few Jews who remain in Estonia. His article, "Culture and Internationalism," argues that Estonian culture has long been influenced by many cultures—Germanic, Polish, Scandinavian, and others, as well as Russian. He suggests that Estonians and Russians alike should drop their chauvinism and see Estonia as part of world culture. This message brings cold comfort, however, to Estonians who see their race and culture threatened by extinction.

OF FOUR editors and journalists I met at *Sovetskaya Estoniya* in January 1987, all carry "Russian" nationality in their passports, even though one is half-Estonian and others have weighty Ukrainian or Belorussian origins. An Estonian scientist, interviewed by *Sovetskaya Estoniya* the same day that the roundtable on national issues appeared (December 9, 1987), reported on his impressions from a recent trip to the United States. Americans, Professor U.K. Nigul declared, "understand that Russians, like all other peoples, want only peace, and the [INF] treaty between our two countries" is a step toward peace. When even a distinguished Estonian scientist refers to the people of his "country" as "Russians," how can Estonians meditate philosophically on "world culture"?

Meanwhile, communications between Estonians and Russians living in Estonia tend to be neither intimate nor cordial. Each group clings to its own. Inter-marriage is rare. Russians and Estonians generally inhabit separate parts of Tallinn, while some industrial centers elsewhere in Estonia are populated almost exclusively by Russians. Most Estonians go to Estonian-language schools and Russians to Russian-language, which usually have poor facilities for teaching Estonian as a second language. Young Estonians can talk to Russians but often prefer not to; few Russians can manage anything beyond the most primitive Estonian. Estonians take pride in staging folk festivals where their renowned choruses fill city squares with Estonian melodies whose lyrics are incomprehensible to most Russians.

Estonians complain that Russians get most of the new housing while they languish in substandard hostels and crumbling apartment buildings. Russians reply that they get the new housing because they are the newcomers and because they do the hard work in construction jobs and factories while Estonians stick to white collar jobs and farming. Illustrating that there are two sides to nationality issues, one Russian educator-propagandist observes that years go by when no Estonians apply to the Tallinn Police Academy and that few Estonians volunteer to become officers in the Soviet Armed Forces—while virtually all the students in local music conservatories and art schools are Estonian-speaking. Meanwhile *Pravda* (September 27, 1987) complains that in the Central Asian republics and in certain other republics the "most prestigious" jobs are being reserved for locals—a "national conceit" and "deformation" that has impelled much of the "non-indigenous population" in recent decades to give up and move elsewhere.

"Do Estonians appear oppressed, as Radio Liberty charges?" a Soviet editor asks. No, Tallinn *looks* more prosperous than Leningrad

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or Moscow. Located halfway between Stockholm and Leningrad, it is even closer to Helsinki, whence Western television programs bounce across the Gulf of Finland to Estonian viewers. Old Tallinn still looks like a medieval city with gothic architecture and guild halls. One even finds several Russian Orthodox and Protestant churches as well as a Catholic church functioning. Last Christmas marked the first time under Soviet rule that a Protestant and an Orthodox leader were permitted to give Christmas homilies on the state-controlled radio; also the first time in memory that a yule tree was placed in Tallinn's main square before December 25 rather than after, as had been the previous, anti-Christian custom.

Under the Surface

STILL, SCRATCH an Estonian and you find an anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. Baltic dissidents and émigrés have since the mid-1970s petitioned the nations participating in the Helsinki security conferences not to recognize Soviet annexation of the three Baltic republics. More specifically, they have drawn attention to the extreme militarization of the region; the militaristic education of Soviet children; nuclear accidents in the Baltic area and adjoining regions of the USSR, and inadequate measures taken to prevent them. They have called for revocation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Dated Christmas Day, 1983, a *samizdat* document entitled "A Declaration from Estonia to All Those Taking Part in the Stockholm Conference on Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and to Peace Organizations in All Countries on the Baltic Sea" enumerated the various treaties with Estonia broken by the USSR and summarized the steps by which Moscow had incorporated the three Baltic republics. The document called for the release by Soviet authorities of human rights advocates including four signers of a 1981 Baltic appeal urging creation of nuclear-free zones along the Baltic Sea. The document also called for acceptance of the European Parliament's 1983 recommendation that decolonization of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania be discussed at follow-up sessions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[2]

In January 1984 the Soviet media launched a campaign against such appeals and other manifestations of Baltic nationalism. Soviet propaganda had ignored Balts' attempts to bring their views to the attention of the Helsinki conference in 1975 and to follow-up meetings in Belgrade in 1978 and Madrid in 1980. The convocation of a "Baltic World Conference" in Stockholm on January 16, 1984, may have helped spur the Kremlin to mount a counteroffensive.

The Brezhnev regime had hoped that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act would finalize recognition of Soviet borders and those of Moscow's East European allies. The United States and other Western governments, however, understood the Final Act to mean only that there should be no violent "assault" on Europe's borders. The Final Act read: "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

"Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State" (Final Act 31–32). The Western governments also achieved inclusion of a reference to "peaceful change" that would keep the door open to future alterations: ". . . frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement." President Gerald

[2]Z.A., "Baltic Lobbying at Stockholm," in Vojtech Mastny, ed., *Soviet/East European Survey, 1984–1985: Selected Research and Analysis from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 342–343.

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Ford, responding in part to criticism from Baltic groups in the United States, made clear that his signing the Final Act did not alter U.S. non-recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic.

Since 1982 the U.S. president each year has proclaimed "Baltic Freedom Day" which, by congressional resolution, has observed the anniversary of the first mass deportations of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to the Soviet Union on June 14, 1940. In November 1987 the U.S. Congress approved a joint resolution endorsing the right of the Latvian people to assemble peaceably "to commemorate important dates in their history" such as the proclamation of Latvian independence on November 18, 1918. In addition, President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz were asked to raise the issues of Baltic human rights and self-determination at the May summit meeting. Responding to these challenges, the Supreme Soviet of each Baltic republic passed resolutions in mid-November 1987—concurrent with the gang fights, grave vandalism, and demonstrations described above—protesting U.S. interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and violation of the Helsinki accords. Representatives of the Latvian Supreme Soviet traveled to Moscow in mid-November to present their resolution to Ambassador Jack Matlock; they were told that U.S. diplomats would be willing to see them as private citizens but not as deputies of a parliament that the U.S. government did not recognize.[3]

Neither *perestroika* nor *glasnost* is likely to diminish anti-Soviet feelings in the region. Living standards have fallen in Estonia over the last two years, as they have in most parts of the USSR. Economic and other reforms will be difficult to implement anywhere in the Soviet Union, but they may be even more problematic where complicated by local national rivalries. What if living standards rose? I asked several Russians in Tallinn "Might there be a 'revolution of rising expectations' here as there was among American blacks in the 1960s?" "This is not likely to be our problem," they replied. "Our material conditions will remain difficult during the first years of *perestroika*." Russians—only half the population of the entire USSR and about half in Tallinn—cannot readily afford affirmative action for the locals. Meanwhile, Estonians look at Finnish television and compare their life style with those of the West, ways of life they would probably share were it not for Estonia's integration in the Soviet system. Perhaps this is a recipe for a revolution based upon *falling* expectations—fanned by the new freedom of expression.

The Kremlin is caught in a bind. Not only must it cope with the accumulated grievances of the minority peoples; it also confronts a rising tide of Great Russian nationalism that resents a real or imagined special treatment extended to the "little brothers" around the Russian periphery.

The central press admits that nationality problems have not received the attention they deserve from officials, from scholars, or from the media. The issues are "delicate and ticklish" so that some officials have failed to "anticipate or quench" nationalist passions. *Pravda* (September 1, 1987) even admitted that the very problems broadcast by foreign "voices" and egged on by Baltic "chauvinists" do exist. They include a decline in birth rates among the indigenous Baltic peoples, a worsening of living conditions, and environmental degradation. The refusal of the Soviet media to discuss these issues forthrightly has created a vacuum that foreign propaganda exploits. Now, *Pravda* declares, it is time to emphasize that Soviet power and democracy are taking positive steps to deal with these very issues. In Latvia, for example, birth rates are rising—probably in response to material assistance for larger families.

THE ETHNIC problems facing the USSR are much more severe and complex than those facing any Western country. They are more like India's with the im-

[3]Dzintra Bungs, "Baltic Area," *Radio Free Europe Research*, XII, No. 50, December 18, 1987, pp. 3–4.

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portant difference that the central government there has been and remains much weaker in relation to the regions than in the Soviet Union. The demographic and political structure of the multinational USSR, the differentials in living standards and growth rates among the various republics, the conflict between resurgent religious feelings and official atheism—all this would provide what Khrushchev once called a "full plate" even if things had been handled fairly well in the past. But Soviet history contains many a case—not just of nationalistic discrimination or random abuse but systematic depopulation and even genocide. *Glasnost* now makes it possible to discuss the past and the present more openly, but the imperatives of power lead the Kremlin to manipulate and guide these discussions within bounds. Attempts to channel debate, in turn, may lead some Russians and non-Russians to take more extreme stands.

The seriousness of Soviet "inter-ethnic" problems, as Gorbachev told the 19th Party Conference on June 28, 1988, has led the CPSU Central Committee to plan a special plenary session on this subject. Since "this subject is extremely important and topical," however, he also wanted to discuss it immediately (*Pravda,* June 29, 1988).

Gorbachev conceded that *glasnost* has thrown a spotlight on "issues of language, culture, literature, art, historic heritage, and environmental protection." But he urged more *glasnost* on the economic and other conditions within each republic and its neighbors and their place in the total Soviet economy—necessary because "sometimes the views voiced with regard to relations between republics are based on incomplete or even biased information."

If a republic has met its obligations to the Union budget, Gorbachev went on, it could build up production for its own needs. It is "natural for the development of our multiethnic state to be accompanied by a growth of ethnic self-awareness." Still, to "sow mistrust and hostility" between ethnic groups "is a grave offense against one's own people and socialist society, let alone against the law."

Legal reforms might be needed, Gorbachev suggested, to define "the status, rights and duties of Union and Autonomous Republics and other ethnic entitites." Questions also have arisen about the rights of peoples living outside their territorial ethnic entitites and those without "territorial autonomy." Owing to these complications, "collisions may occur, and they can only be settled one way—by ensuring, within the existing state structure of our Union, the greatest possible accommodation of the interests of each nation and nationality and of the entire community of the Soviet Union's peoples."

Though obviously aware of the multifaceted grievances of the country's ethnic minorities, Gorbachev tilted toward preserving things as they are, with an implication of continued russification. In his words: "Internationalization of the economy and of the entire social fabric is something we cannot steer clear of. And so, any obsession with national isolation can only lead to economic and cultural impoverishment." His proposals for strengthening the bicameral Soviet of Peoples' Deputies would provide continued representation on a "permanent basis" for the many peoples living in "our common home."

Too Little, Too Late

THE AWAKENING of ethnic consciousness, however, is likely to outpace the too little, too late adaptations suggested so far by the new thinkers. Thus, Estonian delegates to the Party Conference in late June brought with them proposals calling for the republic's virtual economic independence from Moscow. They suggested that individual republics be allowed to have their own representation in international organizations, neighboring countries, and states with a "significant population" originally coming from the republic in question—an idea that would permit most Union Republics to have legations in Washington and many in Ottawa! These proposals amounted to a watered-down version of appeals circulating in Estonia for years calling for some kind of

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independent representation at the United Nations and elsewhere and for Estonian conscripts to perform their military service only in Estonia.

Responding to the Party Conference endorsement of multi-candidate elections for a new and expanded parliament in April 1989, informal groups in the Baltic countries announced plans for an active campaign. In Estonia a non-formal umbrella group, the Popular Front, claimed already in July 1988 to have attracted some 50,000 members based in over 1,000 chapters. The Estonian front drew from official organizations such as the Republican Writers' Union and, unlike non-formal groups in many other parts of the USSR, it seemed to enjoy the blessing of some senior Communist officials in the Republic. An official of the Estonian Popular Front told the *Christian Science Monitor* (July 7, 1988) that the group's initial thrust would be work for new legislation guaranteeing the group's right to present candidates in 1989.

In numbers and union there is some strength and protection. In June 1988 Lithuanian activists addressed a large popular front meeting in Tallinn. Non-formal groups in Leningrad were also planning a broad-based campaign along Estonian lines. Soviet pluralism seems likely to include ethnic groups (communist and non-communist) and other non-formal groups without any Party tag.

Both *glasnost* and *perestroika* could gore the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. The situation embodies both danger and opportunity.

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Margaret and Mikhail

The Odyssey of an Odd Couple

Gerald Frost

IF IT TRANSPIRES that Mr. Gorbachev's central objective is indeed, as he insists, to preserve and reinvigorate socialism, future historians may be puzzled that his most ardent champion in the West should have been the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Not content to have won three elections, to have changed profoundly the philosophy and fortunes of her party and to have reversed dramatically Britain's postwar economic and political decline, Mrs. Thatcher has insisted that one of her most important remaining ambitions is to destroy socialism.

Indeed, according to Peter Jenkins, the author of the most authoritative study of the Thatcher phenomenon, *Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of Socialism*, the British prime minister regards socialism as "an unmitigated evil, a perversion of human nature and a blight on the land." In this respect she is most unlike the exponents of the Conservative "middle way" who argue that while socialism is noble in theory it does not work in practice. She has consistently argued that while the practical consequences of socialism are indeed appalling, it is also a morally and intellectually flawed doctrine, resting on a false view of man and of society. She has therefore lost no opportunity to discredit it as a set of beliefs upon which practical action may reasonably be based. Moreover, since she regards socialism as having been the primary cause of Britain's postwar economic, political and moral decline, she wishes to ensure that the corrective effects of the proper antidote—'Thatcherism'—are irreversible, thus permitting socialism no chance of a comeback.

Such ambitions cast a richly ironic light on her increasingly warm relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev. Mrs. Thatcher has heaped more praise upon the general secretary of the CPSU than she has upon any Western leader, including Ronald Reagan. She has urged other Western leaders to help him consolidate his position in the Politburo and tried to shield him from criticism. On the eve of the Moscow summit, Mrs. Thatcher told U.S. reporters that one of the U.S. President's purposes in the meeting must be to strengthen Mr. Gorbachev's position. She testily urged members of the U.S. Senate to "get a move on" in ratifying the INF treaty (about which she may herself have harbored some misgivings) so as not to increase the Soviet general secretary's apparent vulnerability.

Her most effusive demonstration of support, however, came in a phone-in program on the BBC Russian service during which she answered questions from Soviet listeners. During the broadcast, Mrs. Thatcher variously described the Soviet leader as "bold," "dynamic," "honest," "determined," "courageous," and possessing "a tremendous personality." *Perestroika* and *glasnost* were characterized as "exciting" and "really extraordinary." She declared herself to be "delighted" with the special party conference, displaying a pro-

Gerald Frost is the director of the Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies in London. He was previously the secretary of the Center for Policy Studies, founded by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher.

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prietorial tone more suitable for discussing a regional meeting of Conservative ladies in the English Home Counties. She continued:

> I have met politicians the world over; I recognize someone who is bold and courageous when I see them, someone with vision for the future, and who believes in it so strongly that they go on and on until their goal is obtained.[sic] In a way I felt like that when I became prime minister.

When asked about the problems of Armenian unrest, Mrs. Thatcher replied that if Gorbachev persisted with his reforms, such problems were sure to recede. History might suggest that revolutions occur when the fetters are removed and expectations race ahead, but not to Mrs. Thatcher. Taking no account of any distinction between a federal system imposed by force and one arrived at through voluntary association, she pointed out that the United States too contained many cultures and peoples, "yet all are loyal to the federal government." She continued, "When you get freedom of culture and you are more confident of them, I think it will strengthen (your sense of being part of) the Soviet Union." And she insisted that the policies of the present leadership were in the interests not merely of the Soviet Union and the West, "but of the whole world." After taking part in the broadcast in the Moscow studio, the Russian dissident Valery Senderov remarked that he felt he had been listening to a member of the Politburo.

WHY SHOULD the prime minister express such sentiments and how did she come to believe them? As leader of the Conservative opposition from 1975 to 1979, Mrs. Thatcher was more uncompromisingly anti-Soviet than any other Western party leader. She earned the *Pravda* epithet "Iron Lady" as a result of a speech calling for stronger Western defenses as a bulwark against the unabated expansionist urges of Soviet communism:

> A huge, largely landlocked country like Russia does not need to build the most powerful navy in the world just to guard its own frontiers. No. The Russians are bent on world dominance, and they are rapidly acquiring the means to become the most powerful imperial nation the world has seen. The men in the Soviet Politburo do not have to worry about the ebb and flow of public opinion. They put guns before butter, while we put just about everything before guns .... The Russians calculate that their military strength will more than make up for their economic and social weakness. They are determined to use it in order to get what they want from us."

The speech was immediately criticized by the then Labour Defense Minister Roy Mason who said Mrs. Thatcher "wanted war" with the Soviet Union. Mrs. Thatcher also received a rebuke from her colleague the shadow foreign affairs spokesman, Reginald Maudling, who argued that the speech would irritate Britain's American allies, since the Carter administration did not share her stark views. Unperturbed, Mrs. Thatcher chose to include the speech without change in her first collection of published writings a few months later, while Mr. Maudling was returned to the backbenches soon afterwards.

Economic issues and trade union reform dominated the agenda of the first Thatcher administration from 1979 to 1983; except for the issue of Rhodesia's return to constitutional government and the brief but dramatic Falklands war, foreign affairs did not figure prominently in its concerns. Her government's endorsement of the NATO decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles, and its choice of Trident as the successor to the aging Polaris nuclear submarines were, however, the cause of fierce controversy. She robustly defended both decisions with references to the expansionist nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the oppressive nature of the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire, and its continuing military buildup. Her response to the destruction of the KAL 007 airliner by Soviet jets in 1984 was a sharp and comprehensive denunciation of the Soviet regime. Indeed, she seemed to imply that the Soviet leadership—of which by then Gorbachev was a prominent

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member—was so deeply immersed in evil as to be incapable of redemption:

> They do not share our aspirations; they are not constrained by our ethics; they have always considered themselves exempt from the rules that bind other states .... Presenting themselves to the world as the fount of progress and revolution, they preside over a modern version of the early tyrannies of history .... Its governing principles are force and dictatorship. The lesson for us is that our policies should recognize that system for what it is .... Some may recoil at the thought of negotiating with men whose theories and actions have been responsible for so much suffering .... Their creed is barren of conscience, immune to the promptings of good and evil."

In the same speech Mrs. Thatcher warned of the great danger of projecting our own morality onto the Soviet leadership, an error made over and again in the West's dealings with the Soviets. Then an uncompromising critic of the "moral equivalence" theory, Mrs. Thatcher today compares her own government to that of Mr. Gorbachev, and still more frequently her own leadership to that of the Communist party leader. Is the trap no longer set? Have the Soviets truly become like us? Or is it that the trap is harder to detect when it is laid by a Soviet leader who is intelligent, personable, and acutely aware of how to evoke positive responses from among Western elites? As George Urban has written, "Not since the days of Lenin has the Soviet system produced a man with antennae so keenly attuned to many signals; and not since Trotsky has it produced so fine a communicator. He has read the books; knows how to connect, how to simplify the impenetrable, and how to turn disaster into a show of victory."

In the year which followed the shooting down of the airliner, some detected signs that Mrs. Thatcher's views were modifying and that she was coming to see that better relations with the Soviet Union would strengthen Britain's role in the world without damaging Britain's essential security interests or the 'special relationship' with the U.S. According to Peter Jenkins, the change was due to "occasional little seminars" arranged for her by the British Foreign Office as soon as it had become apparent that her interest in foreign affairs was awakened. At the same time, Lord Carrington "continued to work on her from the sidelines," even after his resignation as foreign secretary during the Falklands war. It might be thought that the Falklands war demonstrated both Carrington's excessive faith in 'quiet diplomacy' (as opposed to the 'megaphone' variety practiced by Britain's vulgar U.S. allies) and his inability to understand the crucial relationship between the capacity to deploy armed force and the effective conduct of foreign policy. Perhaps, therefore, he was not an apt tutor. According to Jenkins, Carrington continued to have an influence "not least because he lived near Chequers and was easily available for Sunday morning drinks."

Whatever the influence of the "little seminars," there was no obvious sign of a major shift in the prime minister's attitudes until the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Britain in April 1984, the most senior Soviet visitor since Prime Minister Kosygin's appearance seventeen years earlier. The visit appears to have coincided with a Soviet decision to acknowledge the sea change which had taken place in Western European politics by trying harder to influence Conservative leaders rather than unpopular and unelectable socialist ones. During three hours of private talks, Mrs. Thatcher is said to have "monopolized" Mr. Gorbachev, leaving the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to talk to Dr. Alex Yakvelov in a different part of the room.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Gorbachev encouraged British firms to compete harder for contracts in the Soviet Union, while Mrs. Thatcher declared Mr. Gorbachev to be "a man we can do business with." The Prime Minister did not specify the nature of such business, but coming from Mrs. Thatcher, such an accolade plainly reinforced the belief that negotiations would generally be more productive under his leadership than under Mr. Brezhnev's or that of the ailing Mr. Chernenko. For if the Iron Maiden found

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business with Mr. Gorbachev such an evident pleasure, who would not?

Their subsequent Moscow meeting in April 1987, during which time she had thirteen hours of talks with her host, was remarkable in several respects, not least for the importance attached to the visit of the leader of a medium-size power. Mrs. Thatcher's performance—polished, firm, confident in its affirmation of Western values and the need to defend them robustly by means of nuclear deterrence—impressed even critical observers. It also appeared to impress the British electorate, although it would be fanciful to suggest that it had any major impact on the result of the General Election two months later when Mrs. Thatcher was swept back to power.

ONE OF THE MOST unexpected aspects of the trip was the Soviet leader's willingness to invite her to appear in a fifty-minute television program. When one of her interviewers implicitly criticized her interpretation of *glasnost*—"which," he said, "simply means that we want to use all the advantages of our socialist system"—Mrs. Thatcher retorted in characteristic style: "You've tossed out quite a provocative statement. What do you think the advantages of a socialist system are?" She also told viewers: "I think Mr. Gorbachev's proposals are the most exciting I have heard for a long time: a more open society, incentives, restructuring. Look! This is a challenge which I think is fantastic, and we most earnestly wish you well." Except for her comments about socialism, the program went out unchanged.

Human interest in the meetings was sparked by the warm, if combative, personal relations between the West's foremost anti-communist and the general secretary of the CPSU. Several observers detected an element of courtship in their relations—an impression much strengthened by the fact that most of their conversations involved heated argument and took little account of others present. The ongoing debate continued even during a trip to the ballet, causing the swans to be kept waiting in the wings of the Bolshoi while the off-stage drama abated.

The prime minister returned from Moscow in a triumphant mood, in marked contrast to the woebegone retreat of the Labour leader from a humiliating visit to Washington a few weeks earlier. According to Mrs. Thatcher, her talks were the most valuable she had ever undertaken as prime minister. Their conversations had made the world a safer place. Of Mr. Gorbachev she remarked, "I like him and admire him—every molecule was involved," although she admitted to being nervous before the talks began. The Soviet press responded by praising Mrs. Thatcher's praise of Mr. Gorbachev and *perestroika*. Warmer relations did not, however, discourage Soviet spokesmen from promoting a long-standing objective: the denuclearization of Europe. Soviet expressions of respect for Mrs. Thatcher were almost invariably combined with criticisms of her "nuclear obsession," or what the witty press spokesman Mr. Gerasimov described as her "nuclearphilia."

For Mikhail Bruk of Novosti Press, writing in the *Times* of London, the implications of the explicit trust which Mrs. Thatcher said she felt for the Soviet leader were obvious: "After Mrs. Thatcher returned to London, she spoke of Mr. Gorbachev's tremendous courage in carrying out *perestroika* .... True enough! But it takes still greater courage to tell the world: let us disarm and trust each other."

Weighing up the achievements of her visit, Mrs. Thatcher recalled her prediction that Mr. Gorbachev was a man with whom business might be done: "Well, we did a lot of business." In fact, apart from receiving some welcome pre-election publicity, very little business was done. The Soviets gave assurances (subsequently honored) about a small number of human rights cases; the foundation was laid for a modest growth in Soviet-British trade; and Sir Geoffrey Howe received a written pledge that the jamming of BBC external services to the Soviet Union would cease. That was all.

A more unpredictable consequence was

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the impact the visit had upon the prime minister's career plans. Earlier she had been reportedly thinking of retirement once the election had been won. Invigorated by the molecule-involving encounters in which she had engaged the Soviet leader as an apparent equal, Mrs. Thatcher now felt she had been given a new lease on political life. Indeed, she made it clear on her return that she was contemplating not merely a third, but even a fourth term of office: "I do think we have started a new chapter and a whole new part of a continuing saga . . . I would like to carry on with for a very long time."

The benefits for Mr. Gorbachev were less tangible but perhaps more significant. If his policies—foreign policy *perestroika* as well as domestic *perestroika*—are to succeed he must count on Western credits and a full-scale return to the conditions of detente. Fulsome testimonials to his trustworthiness, honesty, and democratic instincts from a respected Western democratic leader with impeccable anti-communist credentials are more valuable than a million column inches of favorable comment in the U.S. media.

ONE REASON for the rapport between these two figures is that she clearly believes that they are alike in temperament and personality and that his problems resemble closely those that she confronted on becoming prime minister. She, too, faced widespread bureaucratic opposition to her reforms, especially at the local level. She, too, was obstructed by her own party colleagues at almost every stage. She, too, faced resistance from vested interests and producer groups unwilling to recognize the urgent need for change. Like Gorbachev she found that her attempts to revive a sluggish economy and to motivate an unenthusiastic work-force were also hampered by outdated practices and petty regulations. Like him she felt obliged gradually and systematically to remold the upper echelons of her party in her own image, sending obstructive or disloyal colleagues to the Northern Ireland office, or that other British equivalent of Siberia, the House of Lords.

In both leaders there is a remarkable combination of boldness and prudence, as well as total conviction in the soundness of their own remedies. It was this latter quality of Mrs. Thatcher's which led British parliamentary reporters to shorten one of her most common assertions—as to the utter incredibility of any course of action other than her own—with the acronym TINA (There Is No Alternative). Mr. Gorbachev's own claims to the possession of a monopoly on political wisdom (which *Pravda* respectfully publishes in full), is almost identical: "There is simply no other way of moving forward . . . ."

While it is a similarity to which neither is likely to draw attention, both are more popular abroad than at home. Although now generally respected in the U.K., Mrs. Thatcher has never been widely liked, as countless opinion polls have demonstrated. In North America, she is frequently compared with Winston Churchill. The former U.S. secretary of state, Alexander Haig, went so far as to describe her as the greatest British prime minister this century. In rather similar fashion, Gorbomania has broken out in many Western countries. In West Germany the general secretary's popularity rating is consistently higher than President Reagan's. In the Soviet Union, however, there seems little evidence of this phenomenon. Ordinary people appear largely unmoved by the leadership's appeals to industry, thrift, sobriety, and a range of civic virtues with which they are not historically associated. Seasoned Moscow hands report that unlike Stalin, for whom millions wept real tears of grief, Gorbachev would be mourned by a relatively small group, comprised mainly of intellectuals.

It seems that there is even a similarity in their hands-on style of running government. Substitute the female pronoun for the male and the following description of Mr. Gorbachev's performance, revealed in the lengthy television coverage of the Presidium debate on Nagorny Karabakh, could easily form part of the reminiscenses of any sacked Conservative "wet":

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He treats senior colleagues in much the same way as he treats the crowds he meets on walkabouts. He lectures and hectors them, he interrupts and often refuses to let them answer back; he confounds 'experts' by having more facts at his fingertips than they do, and publicly humiliates them if he disagrees.

There is one further feature which may explain the protective attitude the prime minister displays towards Gorbachev: his apparent vulnerability. This may well recall in Mrs. Thatcher's mind her own fragile political position at the mid-way point of her first administration, at which time some of her colleagues forecast, privately and gleefully, a Tory defeat in the approaching general election and her rapid political demise.

It will probably be some time before we know whether Mr. Gorbachev's own position has been as much at risk as some observers have suggested, or whether there has been a measure of contrivance or political theatre. What is evident is that Gorbachev has said nothing during the many hours of private talks to convince her that such speculation is ill-founded. On the contrary, she plainly fears for his political life, which explains why Attila the Hen (a phrase once much favored by *Pravda*) now behaves to Mr. Gorbachev rather more like Mother Hen.

To the extent that Mrs. Thatcher sees herself in the Soviet leader, it is understandable that she should underestimate the differences between them and between their respective political cultures. The Gorbachev reforms obviously owe much to Lenin and, of course, nothing whatsoever to the gentler intellectual influences which led Mrs. Thatcher on her anti-socialist mission: Frederick von Hayek and the kindly, courteous figures in tweeds at the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, who politely explained that her collectivist economic panaceas were destroying the traditional liberties of Englishmen. Nevertheless, the slogans of *perestroika* and *glasnost*—pluralism, economic decentralization, and free speech—are sufficiently similar to evoke rallying cries from a very different campaign. As she has frequently made clear, she believes that her government's election in 1979 was a decisive turning point; had she not prevailed, collectivist trends would have overwhelmed British political structures and proved irreversible. She thinks of Mr. Gorbachev's coming to power as constituting at a similar turning point.

THESE FACTORS have produced Mrs. Thatcher, a strong emotional propensity to will Mr. Gorbachev's success, and a conviction that any alternative Soviet regime would be a bad thing. She also assumes, perhaps instinctively, that Gorbachev's downfall and replacement would produce conditions of instability in the Soviet Empire of a kind that would be dangerous to the West. It was presumably this anxiety which led her to urge the speedy ratification of the INF treaty and a satisfactory summit outcome for the Soviet leader.

Yet the present indications of instability within the Soviet camp—ethnic unrest in Nagorny Karabakh, the growth of non-party organizations within the Soviet heartland, the continuing growth of opposition parties in some parts of Eastern Europe—appear to be very largely the result of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms and the expectations that they have aroused. The Brezhnev years may have offered little hope for the peoples of the Soviet Union, but they were superficially stable. The Gorbachev reforms may be desirable from the point of view of the Soviet citizen, but for now and the foreseeable future they are destabilizing. Moreover, Mrs. Gorbachev's popularity and the success of his arms control initiatives have produced considerable divergences of opinion and some indications of instability in the West, especially in West Germany. If the principle goal of Western policy was to achieve stability then the appropriate policy might be to bury Gorbachev, not to praise him.

Perhaps Mrs. Thatcher's response to Mr. Gorbachev's reforms would be more qualified if, in one of those little seminars organized by the Foreign Office, its experts had dealt with

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the long-standing Soviet practice of exploiting Western belief in Kremlin power struggles between hawks and doves, moderates and extremists, pragmatists and ideologues. Some of these conflicts exist only in the minds of Western observers. (It might be recalled that during the debate over SALT II, it was argued that Mr. Brezhnev might be overthrown by hardliners if the West did not adopt a more accommodating negotiating posture.)

On the other hand, if Mrs. Thatcher is right that Mr. Gorbachev is battling to achieve fundamental advances that would take the Soviet Union away from Marxist-Leninism in the direction of authentic political pluralism, gushing Western praise of the Thatcher variety could, quite literally, be the kiss of death. The very fact that Soviet propagandists seize upon examples of Western adulation of their leader may well suggest that Gorbachev's colleagues do not accept the Thatcher assessment of Mr. Gorbachev's policies, and of where they will lead. Rather, there is every reason to suppose that his popularity in the West is regarded as vital to the task of obtaining the credits necessary not merely to the success of the *perestroika*, but to the future modernization of the Soviet military machine. Some Western commentators have argued that if the economic and political reforms fail, Gorbachev will be saved by his Western popularity, because Western assistance will be vital to mitigate the consequences of failure.

However, the most compelling reason for calling a halt to the flattery of Gorbachev is that if *perestroika* is simply intended as a 'breathing space,' the Soviet Union may be more of a threat at the end of the process than it is now. The flowering of a mutual admiration among the flashbulbs makes it harder to maintain the spending necessary to support even a half-credible Western defense strategy. What was true of earlier periods of detente—that military vigilance and avowals of trust and friendship are difficult to combine—is even more true now that we are moving to a fluid stage in the cycle of East-West relations. For indeed, if Mr. Gorbachev's intentions are as he describes them, why should Britain hang on so grimly to its independent deterrent? Why argue the case for new weapons to "compensate" for the triumph of the INF treaty? Or harangue the "singularized" West Germans for their failure to fulfill the modernization clauses of the 1983 Montebello agreement? All of which Mrs. Thatcher has recently been doing. She answers these questions by saying that Mr. Gorbachev may not survive, and that we may have to deal with some less desirable figure, thereby furthering the incentive to deal with the Soviet leader on his terms. Can Mr. Gorbachev be that indispensable to Western security?

To build so many hopes on one man—or, to be more accurate, upon a necessarily imperfect perception of him—is not merely to personalize and trivialize politics in a way which politicians sometimes blame the press for doing; it is dangerous. The obsession with Gorbachev is also distracting. For all her political intelligence, courage, and sense of national interest, it has distracted the British prime minister from the urgent task of seeking to create a credible structure of European defense in the post-Reykjavik world. To be sure, that is not as exciting a task as assisting an heroic Soviet leader to reverse the Bolshevik Revolution, but it happens to be one which needs to be done.

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The Solvency Boys

Paul Seabury

YEARS AGO THE Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt in his *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* wrote:

> We must leave those who find pleasure in passing sweeping censures on whole nations, to do so as they like ... A great nation, interwoven by its civilization, its achievements, and its fortunes with the whole life of the modern world, can afford to ignore both its advocates and its accusers. It lives on with or without the approval of theorists.

During the French Revolution, Edmund Burke put the matter in quainter and more telling language, in a put-down aimed at critics of British power:

> Because half-a-dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate chinks, whilst thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew their cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field, that of course they are many in number, or that, after all, they are other than the little shrivelled, meagre, hopping, though loud and troublesome insects of the hours.

Such thoughts are a valuable reminder that a great nation can afford some indifference to euphoric or despondent swings of transitory opinion. Today it is a necessary one, as "sweeping censures of whole nations" have emerged as the stock-in-trade of U.S. publishing houses, which cater to an expanding class of foreign policy intellectuals eager to pass judgment on America's fate.

I

PAUL KENNEDY's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,** with its tale of the decline of all over-extended powers, and its prophecy of the imminent, inevitable decline of America, is the leading work of the genre. Within weeks of its appearance, *Rise and Fall* rose to second place in the non-fiction column of the *New York Times* best seller list, before commencing its equally rapid fall to thirteenth place, a few weeks later.

It is one thing to judge a book on its merits; another to judge the nature of its reception by the reading public; still another to assess the reaction of informed commentators. As for the second category, Kennedy's book bears resemblance to another recent blockbuster, Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind.* As for the third, *Rise and Fall* has roused the whole forest of foreign policy intellectuals—from grasshoppers to old lions—

Paul Seabury is professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley.

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in a great din of disputation. Perhaps not since Senator J. William Fulbright's *Arrogance of Power*—a bitter polemic of the 1960s about the overwhelming force of American power in world politics—has one work stirred such quarrels. (Paradoxically, despite the contradictory underlying assumptions of these two books, the acclaim accorded both has come from the same circles in the foreign policy establishment.) Both seem to have hit the same vital nerve in the American consciousness.

To judge *Rise and Fall* on its merits, it would be best first to restate its now-familiar theme—a tale of the sad fate of those nations which unwisely extended themselves and their commitments beyond what their resources would allow, or which unwisely tried to keep up pretenses of greatness when their shrinking resources proved inadequate to the maintenance of empire. (Kennedy calls this "imperial overstretch".) The cast of characters in this sorry tale, until it comes to America, are all familiar figures in European history: Spain, the Hapsburg Empire, France, the Netherlands, Britain—all victims of overextension. Bit players, those unfortunate actors which perished without benefit of imperial glory, do not figure prominently in these pages.

The bedrock of Kennedy's thesis is the interlock of national economic resources—measurable ones—and military-strategic strength: you can't have one without the other. When administrators of imperial power defy the logic of this combination, out of stupidity or hubris or both, disaster and decline ensue. (Disaster and decline, however, are two different categories: nations *can* gracefully decline without disaster. Britain, for example, sensibly accomplished this transition after the rash wartime Churchill left the scene, followed by the sensible Attlee and a train of epigones.)

Actually, Kennedy's thesis is a bit more refined than this: economic power is *the* basis of national power, including military strength, both sequentially and logically. It provides the wherewithal to the creation and maintenance of empires. At all times statecraft must pay homage to the dictates of limited resources. The balance is struck accordingly. Those statesmen who undertake great adventures (or allow them to occur), or who preside over great establishments, should first consult not the stars but shrewd cost-accountants. What material assets have we to launch or sustain bold undertakings?

Oddly, Kennedy's tales pay scant account to other historical experiences with other lessons. Riches and resources *can* be seized and then exploited by indigent if bold, determined, and skilled entrepreneurs. A long-forgotten fact is that rich and affluent powers in the past have succumbed to onslaughts of attackers indifferent to calculating their own gross national product but all too aware of that of their victims. The indigent, scruffy Turkish marauders who finally captured rich Byzantium came upon Constantinople on tiny flea-bitten horses. Montezuma's prosperous Aztec Empire proved no match for Cortez's band of tough conquistadores. Adam Smith, strange to say, devoted a lengthy section of his *Wealth of Nations* to the historical vulnerability of commercial and wealth-producing nations to the depredations of warlike barbarians; the sedentary life of the pursuit of wealth rarely engendered martial qualities. Only the new miracles of modern technology, he argued, had recently reversed this traditional imbalance. By Smith's time, capital-intensive war establishments of wealthy societies finally had proved more than a match for labor-intensive, indigent marauders, such as those which destroyed both wings of the Roman Empire.

So it has been in military encounters of the twentieth century. As things turned out, Hitler's adventures ultimately proved disastrous, but this was after he had dealt a near-death blow to the Western democracies—the great British and French Empires, which in 1939 had productive resources far superior to those of the Third Reich.

Kennedy's chief thesis suffers, as some commentators suggest, from its indifference to other critical ingredients of national power and influence: the vigor or attractiveness of a

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nation's culture; its prestige as an effective actor in world politics; and, of course, the nature of the ideas and wills which underlie its conduct and give it meaning. Finally, a manifest flaw in it is the absence of concern with an obvious aspect of international life: necessity—the presence or the intrusion of unpleasant events, which diminish the range of national choice and compel response.

The bane of Kennedy's concerns is not the nightmare of coalitions but the nightmare of insolvency. His ear is keenly attuned to warnings of chancellors-of-the-exchequer, finance ministers, statisticians, and professional economists. Yet paymasters rarely become rulers. Neville Chamberlain was an exceptional exception.

II

PROFESSOR KENNEDY has gained status of *primus inter pares* in a new 'school' of foreign policy intellectuals, self-styled the Solvency School. Numbered in its ranks are such theoreticians as James Chace and David Calleo, who have been warning for some years now of the imminent decline of America, and the need to acknowledge it. In Calleo's recent book, *Beyond American Hegemony*, he uses stronger words than Kennedy's, but the bottom line is similar: "The United States has become a hegemony in decay, set on a course that points to an ignominious end." Chace, in his recent *America Invulnerable*, has mocked the straw man he set up for himself: "the quixotic search for absolute security," a search "which perversely has fostered insecurity and programs that cannot attain their ends"—such as the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The paterfamilias of the Solvency School for some time has been the late Walter Lippmann—at least, the Lippmann who in one of several incarnations wrote a classic book, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (1944). It behooves us to consult this *Urtext*.

The key commandment of that book, which echoes down the decades among foreign policy theorists, is Lippmann's formula:

> Foreign policy consists in bringing into balance . . . the nation's commitments and the nation's power . . . The statesman of a strong country may balance its commitments at a high level or a low. But . . . if he does not he will follow a course that will lead to disaster.

A truism if there ever was one.

The formulation derives from a powerful Lippmannesque indictment of U.S. foreign policy from the time of the Spanish-American War to Pearl Harbor—four decades of what he regarded as foreign policy bankruptcy. America's blundering emergence as a world power, he there argued, lay in its acquisition of vast West Pacific responsibilities and commitments (after the conquest of the Philippines had led to active U.S. intervention in the Far East). The particular message of the book was that, in gaining these responsibilities, America had not backed them up with the requisite resources necessary to defend them. The imbalance ultimately became clear in the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor.

The emptiness of the balance recipe may be seen both in Lippmann's formulation of it and in the assumptions of the Solvency School. *The abstract formula offers no standard by which to decide at what level and for what reason, a nation's balance between resources and commitments should be established.* In the abstract, a balance can be established at a very low level—then for sure you have a foreign policy! But then, it can be established at a very high level—then too, you have a foreign policy!

III

KENNEDY'S BOOK, as I observed earlier, bears resemblance to the equally popular best seller, Allan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind*, in that both have struck a nerve in the American consciousness. As one commentator, Amos Perlmutter, has sagely noticed, "[D]ecline and decay are faddish ideas today just as they were when Ibsen depicted a sick society in his play *Ghosts* a century ago." Obviously, the theme of decline and fall is no monopoly of either the Right

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or the Left. But a comparison of Bloom and Kennedy is arresting: *Closing* is a Jeremiad, a chastisement about reparable decadence; *Rise and Fall* is a Cassandra-like prophecy: from now on, live within your means. To Bloom ignorance is corrigible; to Kennedy, decline is irreversible.

Within the cacaphony of commentators, there are three discernable ranks: Those who accept Kennedy's diagnoses of contemporary America *and* Kennedy's prescriptions; those, who at least in part accept his diagnoses while recoiling from his prescriptions; and those who find his diagnosis to be wrong and even foolish. Some of the latter, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, in her testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, have dismissed Kennedy *tout court*: "the power of nations does not really depend on a calibration of military and economic strength." Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, has warned that if these "defeatist ideas should prevail, the decline of American power really would become irreversible."

Some have received Kennedy's message as joyous confirmation of their own policy preferences, in ways even Kennedy might take exception to. Clark Clifford, Lyndon Johnson's one-time secretary of defense, has said, "There's been a false psychology that all we were doing was 'standing tall' . . . But each year our country was weakening." Then George Kennan: "We are mired in the fixations of the period of thirty-five years ago, whereas life has moved on . . . The dangers of the Cold War are the dangers of the past." George Ball: "We've gotten so much in the habit of the wonderful simplifications of the Cold War as the basis for all our foreign policy thoughts. We haven't tried to solve problems outside that framework." The Style section of the *Washington Post*, which solicited these welcoming words, did not neglect to consult Georgi Arbatov, another authoritative news commentator. "Arbatov," says the *Post* writer, "has read Paul Kennedy's book and given thought to his notion of the decline of Great Powers, whose ambitions abroad lead to economic crumbling at home. 'I like it,' says Arbatov. 'The essence of it is very correct' . . He adds: 'The U.S. needs *perestroika*, too.' "

But other commentators have accepted Kennedy's diagnosis with no such joy. One is the Berkeley diplomatic historian Walter McDougall, who among critics of *Rise and Fall* brings a solemn personal perspective to Kennedy's theme. McDougall, born in 1946, grew up under the glow of American preeminence and was to be observer-participant in the Vietnam War, witnessing the humiliation of U.S. power and the rapid fading of the national consensus of which the post-1945 policy had been based. Fascinated by the ensuing American "cultural decadence," McDougall now routinely asks his Berkeley students how it feels to live in a nation in decline. "They stare dumbly or joke about moving to Australia. How have the mighty fallen!"

McDougall attributes most of America's relative economic decline to U.S. policy which after the war deliberately fostered European and Japanese recovery. During Vietnam, he argues, it became evident that the U.S. had become victim of "overstretch," no longer able to bear the cost of far-flung military commitments. The 1970s witnessed the familiar series of events—SALT's ratification of Soviet nuclear parity; Watergate's decapitation of the Nixon presidency; the OPEC embargo; America's degeneration into the role of the world's greatest debtor nation; a Democratic Congress's defanging of American covert-action capabilities; the ensuing string of Soviet/communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Libya, and elsewhere; the catastrophe of Iran, the communization of Ethiopia, etc.

It falls to McDougall to point out, *pace* Bloom, that the American decline is attributable to changes within American culture, and not just to the cost of commitment-maintenance; after all, the burdens on the U.S. economy have largely come from the huge outlays for domestic caring programs, not from military expenditures which percentagewise are much smaller than they were in (the other!) Kennedy's years. They come from a huge, bloated federal bureaucracy; from an

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enormous welfare state; from a relative decline in key-industry productivity; and from wage scales which price U.S. firms out of foreign markets. He might well have mentioned the startling emigration of U.S. firms overseas, carrying with them many of the essential defense ingredients of "the Arsenal of Democracy," which helped bring victory to America's allies in World War II.

It is also to McDougall's credit that he, unlike some of Kennedy's Solvency School friends, notices Kennedy's small-print and bottom-line fatalism about this American decline. Even while Kennedy to the end of his book remains obsessed with economic indicators, McDougall, who accepts Kennedy's bottom line assessment, is all too aware of the terrible dilemmas of a cost-accounting foreign policy. While some of the Solvency School crowd call for U.S. withdrawal from Europe and from the Far East, McDougall is willing to admit the costs of such withdrawal—were Europe "Finlandized" or subject to Soviet control, the price of U.S. defense likely would be far higher than it is now. While U.S. overseas commitments now are large, there is no reason why all commitments would be called simultaneously. Some vital regions, he argues, such as Northeast Asia, contain strong allies. Furthermore, unilateral disengagement might well tempt the Soviets to translate their military power into economic power—an "empire of plunder." The small-print message of Kennedy can be read several ways. One might be that—accepting Kennedy's message of declining resources—the present dispersal of U.S. commitments may be cheaper to sustain than a hemispheric garrison state armed to the teeth. It falls to McDougall to ask more hard questions about the consequences of drastic U.S. retrenchments. How would our competitors—sorry, our allies—react? Would the Europeans beef up their own conventional deterrence to balance the Soviet Union, or would they cut a deal with Moscow? Who would defend the sea lanes? The Gulf? These questions are inspired by the last chapter of Kennedy and have the odd effect of weakening the case for complacency and retrenchment.

IV

AMONG THE critics of America's "bloated and debilitating" defense outlays, there long has been a litany of beneficent transfers: less defense spending, more prosperity and economic growth. "Oh, let us never, never doubt, what nobody is sure about," Hilaire Belloc once warned. Is there really an iron law about this? Certainly there has been much contrary evidence. Walt Rostow has noted that amidst the relentless rhetorical charges of a spiraling arms race, U.S. military spending as the proportion of GNP has fallen from 13.2 percent (1953) to 6.5 percent (1987), with no observable benign consequences for American competitiveness. But even had expenditures remained constant at 1953 levels, would America *for that reason* have paralyzed itself? Mysteries abound in the matter. There would seem to be no necessary relationship between large defense outlays and low economic growth rates, or the reverse. In recent times, Switzerland, Taiwan, South Korea and others have successfully combined huge defense outlays, as proportion of GNP, with astonishing rises in national economic productivity. Others, like Canada (which lately has spent virtually nothing on its national defense) have experienced protracted economic stagnation. And then, of course, the Soviet Union is said to owe its sad state of civil sector productivity to huge military outlays. The relationships are obviously far more complex than members of the Solvency School care to admit. Greater interallied burden sharing, or unilateral disarmament, offer no panaceas.

There is, however, another explanation of America's relative decline, which bears little resemblance to Kennedy's thesis about the eclipse of overextended and profligate empires. America's relative economic decline has coincided with not the economic growth of its strategic adversaries, but with the rise of the economies of its close friends, *and this is precisely what American policy-makers from the beginning [i.e., 1946] wished to be the case.* The huge outlays and costly programs created and

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inspired by U.S. policy (the Marshall Plan being the most dramatic) were designed to restore and reinvigorate the economies of European nations and, later, of Japan. The rationale was clear, if perhaps innocent: prospering civil economies would be America's friends; poverty-wracked ones would be dangerous to world peace. These economies were to be joined in a de facto productive community, as well as a security community under American deterrent guarantees.

The ensuing geographic realm—stretching from the Western Pacific (Japan) eastward through the North American heartland across the Atlantic through Western Europe has been a zone of international peace and prosperity for more than forty years. The remaining regions of the world have had far less happy experiences. This zone happens also to be covered by America's (costly!) strategic guarantees, including "overstretched" garrisons and bases. Whether this tranquil realm would be put at risk were the American strategic guarantees and emplacements drastically reduced (and America's erstwhile partners left to cope with their separate strategic destinies) remains an open and disputed question. In any event, the huge Soviet Empire, in Gorbachev's time still busily arming itself to the teeth, remains the common strategic peril. This may change, but it has not. The USSR may not be "well" (as James Thurber's mother used to say of their family dog which bit people), but, as Thurber remarked, he may not have been well but he was terribly strong.

IT MAY BE THAT, like other political/economic "schools", the Solvency School contains contradictory sub-groups. Clearly there are some who actually advocate and welcome an American strategic retrenchment on its own merits, inevitable or not. For them, what to Kennedy is historical necessity can be handmaiden to their own desires: America should choose to be an "ordinary country", a nice trading state in an interdependent global community, no man's enemy, a friend and reconciler to all.

In Lewis Carroll's *Adventures*, Alice at one point yearned to become small, so as to reassure and befriend those who feared her for her size and power. She came upon a bottle labelled "drink me" which did the job; she became small and inoffensive. Later, when she had reason to regret her loss of size, she fortunately found a small cake labelled "eat me," which she gobbled up and regained her previous size.

Such cakes do not exist in world politics, and even if they did they would be risky to eat. In theory, however, a nation can *choose* to become pleasantly inoffensive; it may at a later date change its mind. There are severe risks in both such options, but at least there are choices. Kennedy's historical book, however, makes things linear and irreversible. It has been gobbled up by a reading public which, for the moment, enjoys being told that gentle decline can be good for you.

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No Exit

David C. Hendrickson

THOUGH DISAFFECTION with the Atlantic Alliance has long existed in American opinion, the number of voices now calling for far-reaching change is unprecedented and does not correspond to the usual fault-lines of political rivalry. Global unilateralists, military reformers, maritime strategists, neo-conservatives, and old-fashioned isolationists unite in thinking that fundamental changes in the relationship between Western Europe and the United States are long overdue. Their reasons for doing so often differ, but the extent of their disaffection remains remarkable. Were it not for the Alliance's demonstrated ability to confound the prophets of doom, one would be tempted to go along with the judgment that its decomposition seems only a matter of time.

In *Beyond American Hegemony*, David Calleo reviews the evolution of the Alliance from its inception in 1949 and argues that the old arrangements have become increasingly untenable.[1] NATO remains what it was at the outset—an American military protectorate of Europe—while the conditions that once made that role necessary have long since changed. For Calleo, this is cause for both celebration and alarm—celebration, because American policy did succeed in rebuilding the ravaged economies and polities of Western Europe and thus is a victim of its own success; alarm, because the global economic system is fated to endure ever more violent storms unless the United States puts its own economic house in order and Europe assumes the military and political role commensurate with its economic power. "Our greatness occasioned our fall," Frederick von Gentz once wrote; "our insatiable desire of advancing was the cause of our enervation; our meritorious ambition led to our present humiliation." The story is a familiar one to students of the rise and fall of empire; for Calleo, as for Paul Kennedy, the American Century has come and gone. The task of policy is to adjust to that decline as gracefully as possible.

The origins of the current crisis are skillfully examined by Calleo in a series of chapters treating the three cycles through which NATO has passed in the postwar era, each of which has pushed American policy "back and forth between hard and soft lines." The previous two rearmament cycles (under Truman and the Kennedy-Johnson administrations)

David C. Hendrickson is assistant professor of political science at Colorado College. He is the author of *Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

[1] *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, Inc./A Twentieth Century Fund Book, 1987). 288 pp. $20.95.

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were each followed by periods of retrenchment (along with a renewed interest in detente and arms control) under Eisenhower and Nixon. President Reagan's turn to comparable strategies in the final years of his administration thus resembles the traditional pattern, which Calleo calls "hegemony on the cheap." That policy is distinguished by its unwillingness to surrender any of the geopolitical commitments the United States has undertaken while nevertheless maintaining those commitments at lesser economic and political cost. For Eisenhower, the answer was found in America's nuclear superiority; for Nixon and Kissinger, in hyper-active diplomacy. In Calleo's view, the example of neither administration is of much relevance today. What is needed is not another instance of "hegemony on the cheap" but of a devolution of America's postwar responsibilities.

Two dominant problems confront the Alliance: economic and military. America's extended nuclear deterrent—the essence of the American military protectorate—"has become less reliable and therefore more dangerous as the Soviets have reached strategic parity." So, at least, it has long appeared to Americans, who have urged greater European efforts at conventional defense. The Europeans, by contrast, cling to the remnants of a strategy overtaken by time, unwilling to abandon American nuclear protection or to provide more robust conventional defense. Their answer to the lost bloom of youth is . . . more make-up! Hence the Alliance's fundamental dilemma: The solution preferred by most Americans—a conventional deterrent that would reduce nuclear risk—cannot be provided by the United States, since the requisite forces are too expensive. Meanwhile, "the solution the Europeans should logically prefer—an indigenous nuclear deterrent—they cannot or will not provide, at least not for Germany, where it is most needed." The traditional structure of the Alliance, in sum, has produced neither robust conventional defenses nor a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear predicament. It is, in all likelihood, incapable of doing so. "Europeanization," Calleo asserts, "is probably the only way to reach a convincing conventional balance, should one eventually be desired. And given the intractable problems of extended nuclear protection, Europeanization may prove the only way to sustain nuclear deterrence as well."

Though Calleo devotes a good deal of attention to NATO's military problem, his analysis lacks a certain conviction. NATO's military arrangements, though deemed in part "frivolous" and "difficult to take seriously," are apparently good enough to accomplish their main purpose: the deterrence of Soviet attack. "For American devolution to succeed militarily," he argues, "a Europeanized NATO would not have to constitute a military improvement: it would need only to be adequate or, in any event, no worse militarily than what is now in place." Whether that objective can be met in the aftermath of his proposed devaluation of the American nuclear guarantee and a 50 percent cut in American ground forces committed to Europe is the main question raised by his analysis; in any event, it indicates that his disgruntlement with NATO is founded largely on economics. "America's endemic economic disorder," he believes, "is a more serious threat to the postwar international liberal order than is any plausible Soviet aggression. For whereas Soviet expansionism is reasonably contained, American fiscal and monetary disorder is not. So long as America continues its present geopolitical role, containing Soviet military power and maintaining a viable world economy seem increasingly incompatible."

THIS IS INDEED the nub of the matter. Though the ultimate consequences of America's budgetary and trade deficits remain today a matter of uncertainty, it is unquestionably true that they have placed increasing strains on the world financial system. A perpetuation of either of the twin deficits on anything like their current scale will certainly cause serious long-term damage to the future economic prospects of the United States, and may, as Calleo argues, constitute a formula for the progressive derangement of

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international monetary order. Even under the best of circumstances, there is much that could go wrong in effecting the remedy—economic expansion abroad and a contraction of the federal deficit at home—that most economists believe is necessary. The crash of equity values in 1987, the growing spectre of protectionism, and the likely turn of the credit cycle toward deflation all suggest an economic climate of increasing danger over the next few years. And they suggest that Calleo is right in thinking that "American policy-makers can no longer give military commitments automatic priority over fiscal balance." The real question concerns whether the coming period of famine in defense expenditures—and the economic storms that may lurk on the horizon—will also require a general alteration of American policy toward Europe.

On this critical question, Calleo is by no means as radical as one might at first suspect. He is at pains to distinguish "devolution" from "disengagement." He concedes that the United States continues to have a vital interest in the preservation of Western Europe's internal freedom and external security. His remedy thus falls well short of a divorce: it is the geopolitical equivalent of that rare (and inherently unstable) arrangement, the "open marriage." Though Calleo would cut half of the ten U.S. divisions earmarked for European defense, two or three would remain in Western Europe. American nuclear forces would remain "in reserve" (a tidy arrangement whose meaning, however, is not entirely clear). This falls well short of the "shock treatment" that many critics have called for; nevertheless, Calleo believes that it would be sufficient to produce far greater efforts among the Europeans themselves.

It is one of the curiosities of this argument that the devolution of America's postwar responsibilities would produce, in Calleo's view, no real sacrifice of American interests. Despite his scorn for past attempts to achieve "hegemony on the cheap," it would appear that his own policy seeks something not too dissimilar, though at a cost far less than the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations were prepared to pay. The difference, presumably, is that the Atlantic relationship would no longer be "hegemonic," meaning that the United States would no longer take the initiative in structuring and managing the Alliance. But the fundamental interest the United States has in ensuring the peace and prosperity of the old continent would, Calleo assures us, be better satisfied under the proposed new arrangements than under the old ones, and at greatly reduced cost.

THAT THIS PROMISE is false is one of the principal themes of Josef Joffe's excellent recent work, *The Limited Partnership.*[2] Though Joffe does not analyze the "middle solution" proposed by Calleo, he does devote a great deal of attention to the multitude of proposals that arose in the 1980s to recast NATO's military strategy. Joffe's core conviction is that the American nuclear guarantee has been the key ingredient in creating the extraordinary stability of post-1945 Europe. No replacement for this guarantee, he argues, exists on the horizon. None of the alternatives that have been proposed—the creation of a European superstate, the extension of the French and British deterrents, or the acquisition by West Germany (and perhaps others) of an independent power of nuclear decision—offers a resolution of the intractable problems of extended deterrence. An American withdrawal, he argues, would more likely lead to a Western Europe incapable of "managing either its internal order or the military balance on the Eurasian continent."

In this conclusion, Joffe goes further than most observers, who have traditionally seen the containment of Soviet power as the sole function of the Alliance. Joffe thinks the presence of the United States has helped dissolve intra-Alliance rivalries as well. That presence is one of the reasons for the emergence of what cooperation has emerged in Europe since World War II; remove it, and the precarious

[2] *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987). 225 pp. $29.95.

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unity that advocates of reconstruction hope to build upon will suffer as well.

Joffe's dark vision need not be accepted in toto; it is sufficiently persuasive, however, to cast doubt on Calleo's optimistic assumption that the Europeans would coalesce around a common defense strategy equal in deterrent weight to what exists now. At the nuclear level, Calleo too rejects the idea of a European superstate and considers a nuclear Germany to be a "second best" solution. His strategy, therefore, amounts to shifting the dilemmas of extended deterrence from our shoulders onto those of the British and the French. Calleo never satisfactorily explains why dilemmas that are unbearable for us would prove manageable for Europe's existing nuclear powers, whose forces, though growing, will remain quite small in comparison to those of the Soviet Union. Even on fairly optimistic assumptions, it seems apparent that the uncertain nuclear protection afforded to Germany today (as well as to the other non-nuclear European states) would be seriously impaired by such an arrangement.

At the conventional level, "Europeanization" would also raise a host of problems. The withdrawal of five American divisions would create substantial gaps in the NATO forward defense line that indigenous forces are unlikely to fill adequately. Given Germany's manpower crisis, it will be a significant accomplishment merely to maintain fighting strength at present levels over the next decade. Nor might one expect much help from the British and the French, especially given their greatly expanded nuclear tasks and their continuing need to maintain modest interventionary forces for non-European contingencies. Whether the resulting force structure would be "adequate" to deter Soviet aggression is an open question; there is little doubt, however, that it would be much worse than the military arrangement now in place.

There is, admittedly, much uncertainty about the European response to such an American initiative, if only because of the ambiguous message Calleo wants to send to them. Roughly translated, it is: "We will no longer protect you, but we will not abandon you. The maintenance of your security is too dangerous for us (because of the nuclear and financial risks it entails), but it continues to be a vital American interest. We want out, but we will stay in." This peculiar message is apparently intended to weaken deterrence sufficiently so that the Europeans will discover the political will that has eluded them in the past, yet not so much as to afford an opportunity for Soviet meddling. It might produce something quite different: a greater willingness on the part of the Europeans, not to spend more on defense, but to accommodate themselves (in small but cumulatively significant ways) to the needs and prerogatives of the dominant military power on the continent.

NONE OF THIS is to dismiss the possibility of a partial withdrawal of American military forces from Europe. If that objective seems less chimerical today than it did only a few years ago, it is largely because of the "Moscow Spring" and the possibility of a genuine change in the Soviet military threat toward Europe. The cul-de-sac in which Gorbachev found the Soviet economy—and the pressing need for a reduction in military expenditures if his economic reforms are to have a chance of succeeding—suggests the possibility of a general relaxation of conventional armaments in Europe to parallel the agreement on intermediate range forces ratified in 1988. The obstacles to a formal agreement are of course quite formidable; nevertheless, it is an area where Soviet and American interests may well coincide.

With or without formal agreements, the new detente may simply take the form of a breathing spell, during which both societies turn inward, to renew the contest at some later date. Surely it is then reasonable to insist that our own retrenchment continue to have a Soviet equivalent—a linkage that Calleo would have us break. His reconstruction of NATO would proceed quite apart from the general tone and tenor of East-West relations and risks squandering NATO's genuine accom-

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plishment in creating a balance of power in Europe over the last generation.

THERE REMAIN the nuclear and financial risks entailed by the American commitment. Neither, in truth, is unbearable. Europeans demand a greater degree of coupling and of shared risk than most Americans feel comfortable with; Americans search for ways of reducing nuclear risk through strategies of graduated conflict that provoke in Europe the spectre of a limited nuclear war. Nevertheless, the parameters of this debate remain such as to instill great caution in Soviet leaders contemplating an attack against NATO. As Joffe argues, the very clarity of the American commitment reduces the chances of a Soviet miscalculation to almost zero. "Not all bonds," he writes, "breed existential risks—only loose ones." In a fashion typical of European elites, Joffe insists upon a bond so tight as to preclude the possibility of sanctuaries, reassuring the Europeans (and depressing us). Americans retain the mental reservation that this commitment does not in fact deprive us of our freedom to limit conflict in an actual war (thus reassuring ourselves, though alarming the Europeans). The two sides in this intractable debate are unlikely to ever reach a true meeting of the minds. Their failure to do so, however, need not result in the end of alliance or the breakdown of deterrence. In either case, the Soviet Union is left with the knowledge that in launching a war it would face possibilities ranging from the merely horrendous to the utterly fatal—a prospect that is likely to preserve the peace in Europe for a long time to come.

Nor are the financial risks of maintaining the American commitment to Europe insuperable. The road to economic solvency will doubtless prove to be a difficult one, and cuts in defense expenditures (alongside tax increases and the continuing limitation of social expenditures) will have to be part of the bargain. There is, however, a range of defense cuts that can be made that do not require the United States to abandon the principal—and still indispensable—role it has played in containing Soviet power in Europe. A program of selective cuts—including less expensive solutions to the problem of strategic nuclear vulnerability, a reduction in planning requirements for American ground force interventions in the Third World (with corresponding savings in strategic mobility forces), and partial reductions in force structure in both the Navy and the Air Force—would also save a lot of money, and could be undertaken without remaking the postwar European order.

This order has persisted for over a generation, during which time the states of Western Europe have enjoyed a political stability and economic prosperity beyond the imagination of those who witnessed the preceding years of depression, war, and genocide. The hope that this order might evolve in a fashion yet more benign should not be simply dismissed. If this change comes, however, we should look for it in the mellowing of the East, not in the reconstruction of the West. And we should also have the consolation of knowing that, whatever happens in the Soviet Union, we have not in the interim dismantled the structure of security that continues to provide the best guarantee against another European war.

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The Soul of the Left's Machine

Arch Puddington

ALTHOUGH THOROUGHLY discredited as an ideology, communism has left a powerful imprint on the strategic thinking of the American Left. American radicals—or at least the most successful among them—have undertaken to expand their influence through an approach closely resembling the Communist party's Popular Front tactics of the 1930s. The Popular Front was, of course, the period of the Party's greatest success. Operating through myriad front organizations, having subordinated the class struggle to the anti-fascist cause, and speaking the vocabulary of Communism-as-Americanism, the Communist party gained an impressive measure of acceptance and prestige, albeit only briefly. At bottom, of course, the Popular Front rested on deceit. Yet the strategy enabled the Party to prosper as it never did when issuing demands for the nationalization of the means of production or the creation of a Soviet America.

Consciously or otherwise, the contemporary Left has borrowed extensively from the organizational repertoire developed during the Popular Front. The job has been simplified by the absence of serious left-wing parties whose ideologies, programs, or foreign links might elicit public scrutiny—and hostility. Instead of working through organized parties, the Left presses its agenda through single-issue projects—on the misconduct of the CIA, the menace of nuclear power, Central American "war crimes," multinational corporate greed, U.S.-Soviet relations. At any given time, it has going literally hundreds of projects, coalitions, committees, task forces, and commissions of inquiry. Many achieve little beyond a few newspaper clippings; a few, however, have changed the very complexion of American politics.

Situated at the center of this network is the Institute for Policy Studies, a Washington-based organization founded in 1963 by Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin, two dropouts from the Kennedy administration. The shorthand description for the IPS favored by the general media is "liberal think tank." This is a misnomer on all counts. The IPS is certainly not liberal; its ideology, insofar as it can be discerned, reflects a mixture of anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism. Nor is it a think tank, properly understood. The IPS is not known for its intellectual flair, and its leading figures contribute little to the debate over national policy. But it does have a reputation for ef-

Arch Puddington works for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in New York City. He is the author of *Failed Utopias: Methods of Coercion in Communist Regimes,* to be published this fall by ICS Press.

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fectiveness, even brilliance, in its use of the organizational weapon.

As becomes clear from S. Steven Powell's informative, if blunt-edged, study of the IPS,[1] Barnet, Raskin, and their associates speak two distinct languages: one directed to fellow members of the leftist fraternity, the other to a broader audience consisting largely of liberal Washingtonians. Although many of the statements recounted by Powell represent IPS writings of ten or twenty years ago, one gets the clear sense that the somewhat embarrassing past declarations are more indicative of the organization's philosophy than, for example, Barnet's carefully-modulated *New Yorker* essays. There is IPS fellow Michael Parenti explaining away the ubiquitous Soviet queues on the grounds that Soviet citizens "have a good deal of what economists call 'discretionary' income," rather than too few consumer items. There are Joseph Collins and Frances Moore Lappé, IPS "food experts," urging the U.S. to give direct aid to "countries where steps are being taken to democratize control over agricultural resources, such as Vietnam and Mozambique." There are Derek Shearer and Martin Carnoy, writing of "the spirit of cooperatives and well-being that pervades Chinese and Cuban life." There is Barnet himself, writing, in 1969: "The U.S. has no alternative to offer the poor nations that is any better than revolution, which, for all its brutality, has had some spectacular successes. The rapid modernization of Russia and her transformation into the world's second power, the end of massive starvation in China, and the progress in literacy in Cuba are examples of what regimentation and the shakeup of an old corrupt order can do." And, finally, there is the Reverend William Sloan Coffin, a close collaborator with the IPS on various disarmament projects:

> I think that Communism is a page torn out of the Bible . . . the social justice that's been achieved in China and North Vietnam . . . that's an achievement no "Christian Society" on that scale has ever achieved. That is a real indictment of Christians; that we are not able to do what they do. One could say that without a dictatorial approach to these things they couldn't have been accomplished.

It hardly needs to be added that IPS notables will not espouse such straightforwardly pro-communist sentiments when they appear on the McNeil-Lehrer program or write for the *New York Times* op ed–page. The word "socialism" has been expunged from IPS usage, replaced by such catchwords as "democratic" and "participatory." The impulse to blame America first has been reined in; American withdrawal from the world is strongly urged, but only, we are told, because it is in the national interest. Where once U.S. disengagement was encouraged in order to facilitate Third World revolution, now retrenchment is proposed as a means of preventing the rise of revolutionary dictatorships. Likewise, defense cuts are supported for reasons of fiscal prudence, not because an effective military feeds America's imperial appetite. Such unradical opinions are barely distinguishable from the views of any number of Democrats, moderate Republicans, or even libertarians.

THE IPS HAS made a mark in Washington through shrewd and diligent organizational entrepreneurship. Many of its creations have been spun off into putatively independent existence. Among this group are found such diverse enterprises as the Government Accountability Project, designed to defend federal "whistleblowers"; the Transnational Information Exchange, an international research institute focusing on such sensitive areas as Western investment in South Africa, nuclear power, and agribusiness; Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America, founded in 1983 to thwart the Reagan administration's Central American policies; Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, a clearinghouse for

[1] *Covert Cadre: Inside the Institute for Policy Studies* (Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, 1988). 469 pp. $29.95.

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leftist political initiatives at the state and local levels.

On another level are projects which, although never formally connected with the IPS, owe their existence to present or former IPS leaders. For example, the Institute for Food and Development Policy, which promotes various socialist agricultural schemes in the Third World, was founded by the aforementioned IPS fellow Joseph Collins and was funded by many of the same foundations which support IPS.

Furthermore, IPS leaders and former staff honeycomb the staffs and boards of a wide variety of peace, anti-CIA, environmental, and anti-corporate lobbies which ply their trade in Washington. Here one of the most instructive examples is SANE, whose executive director was, until recently, David Cortright, a former IPS leader. Marcus Raskin is vice chairman of SANE, and the current executive director is Reverend Coffin.

To expand its network further, the IPS established, in 1978, the Washington School, which offers courses and informal seminars on such topics as current political and international issues. More to the point, the Washington School provides a gathering place for leftist-oriented Washingtonians—congressional staff members, "public interest" lobbyists, federal bureaucrats. The courses are taught not just by IPS figures, but by government officials like Paul Warnke and prominent journalists like Raymond Bonner and Karen DeYoung, a fact which indicates the degree of acceptance the IPS has earned in liberal establishment circles.

The IPS's organizational talents also extend into the crucial realm of fund-raising. Powell quotes the IPS as claiming an annual budget of some $1.7 million, puny in comparison with organizations like the American Enterprise Institute or the Brookings Institution. But this figure is misleading, since it does not include the—in some cases substantial—budgets of the various spin-offs and subsidiary organizations. For an activist-oriented instrument like IPS, the overriding purpose of fundraising is to provide jobs for the cadres; by this standard, the IPS would appear to have succeeded rather well, even during the 1980s, a barren period for radical causes.

ALTHOUGH THE IPS has periodically succeeded in tapping the Ford Foundation and other mainstream foundations, in general the organization is sustained by the wealthy Left. Here credit must go to the IPS leadership, which stresses competence, professionalism, and results—attributes often scorned on the Left. In response, the IPS has been anointed the institution of preference of rich left-wingers, successful capitalists who nevertheless believe, as one IPS donor put it, that the "chief enemy of mankind" is "the injustice of governments and the United States in particular." The IPS has benefited from financial sources with ties to the Old and the New Left. Its main initial source of funds, the Samuel Rubin Foundation, was established by a man who, although a communist, amassed a fortune through Fabergé cosmetics.

Not all IPS initiatives have borne fruit. Indeed, one of the flaws in Powell's analysis is to treat each and every IPS enterprise as a mortal threat to capitalism, democracy, and the Free World. Many projects launched or assisted by the IPS achieved little more than fleeting notoriety. The Left's failure is particularly notable in the domestic sphere. For example, a highly publicized initiative to rally support for massive government regulation of the food, housing, energy, and health care industries produced nothing in the way of serious legislation, even in the inflation-ridden 1970s. More fundamentally, the Left's noisy disarmament campaign proved incapable of preventing the deployment of the Euromissiles, the Reagan administration's military buildup, or American aid to the Afghan resistance. Much the same can be said of a carefully-plotted IPS effort to enhance the image of the Soviets; Americans came to view the Soviets in a more benign light only after Mikhail Gorbachev launched his *glasnost* offensive.

But a few IPS campaigns have been highly successful and none more so than its campaign

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against the intelligence community. This was the first major IPS project of the post-New Left era, and the institute's leadership showed that it had learned important lessons from the counterculture's demise. The IPS did not then, nor has it ever, tried to build a mass movement of the Left, with its resolutions, self-absorption, and inevitable factionalism. It also avoided the politics of culture, which, during the sixties, led down avenues many Americans found bewildering and offensive. Its energies were concentrated on the men and women of Washington, especially congressional aides and journalists, many of whom were sympathetic to the anti-war cause and, more broadly, to any initiative which would transform the direction of American foreign policy. Furthermore, the IPS had something of a vested interest in placing restrictions on the intelligence community, having established close relations with individuals and organizations from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other foreign adversaries of the U.S.

By Powell's account, the IPS's major function was as the nerve center of a growing network of anti-CIA organizations, ranging from the respectable, like the American Civil Liberties Union, to the shadowy National Lawyers Guild. Perhaps the key organization was a direct IPS spin-off, the Center for National Security Studies. CNSS was initially run by IPS figures; later, Morton Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, was named director. Halperin has emerged as a respected spokesman for the anti-intelligence cause; where other CIA critics might be dismissed out of hand, his views frequently appear in the mainstream media. CNSS thus is ideally placed to propose legislation, brief congressional committees, and express views on intelligence matters to the public. Complementing the work of CNSS is the Campaign for Political Rights, set up by Halperin and other IPS figures. The CPR is concerned not simply with the CIA, but with domestic intelligence activities of the FBI and local law enforcement agencies; it devotes much of its energies to secure information about intelligence gathering through the Freedom of Information Act.

The IPS thus can boast of having played the key role in establishing a permanent anti-intelligence lobby. This, in turn, has helped stimulate an anti-CIA mood which itself has become an apparently permanent fixture in our culture. Indeed, so widespread is the anti-intelligence impulse that the IPS seems not to have suffered from charges that its foreign affiliate, the Transnational Institute, has been cooperating with Soviet bloc intelligence agencies, by its open support for Philip Agee, the renegade CIA agent who openly bragged of having worked with communist intelligence agencies to undermine American foreign policy (Agee served for a while as director of the Transnational Institute). Nor has it been publicly discredited by its association with *Counterspy*, the journal whose policy of identifying alleged American intelligence officers may have led to several American deaths.

ANOTHER FOCUS OF IPS activity is human rights. Here again, the IPS prefers to remain in the background, functioning as the organizational nucleus of a broad network of leftist-oriented organizations whose principal agenda is discrediting the human rights records of governments allied with the United States. Launched coincidentally with the Carter administration's human rights campaign, the Left's program seeks above all else to divert attention from the abuses of communist and radical Third World regimes, and to reframe the human rights debate from the traditional emphasis on individual rights and civil liberties to the "group rights" presumably protected by "socialist" governments.

The result of this exercise, from the perspective of the IPS and the Left generally, has been ambiguous. The unremitting attacks on certain right-wing governments and anti-communist resistance movements have certainly contributed to the erosion of national support for a foreign policy based on the roll-

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back of the Soviet empire, with the abandonment of the *contras* being Exhibit Number One. Americans, however, have totally rejected the premise that Fidel Castro's definition of human rights is preferable to the Founding Fathers' version. Ultimately, it was the Soviets who emerged as the big losers in the human rights debate, a judgment which has been confirmed by the statements of numerous Soviet officials and writers since the onset of *glasnost.* Here again was a case where the IPS lost the intellectual conflict (if anything, the traditional Western stress on civil liberties and political rights has been reinforced as it has become increasingly apparent that communist regimes guarantee neither individual nor group rights) while scoring a few crucial victories through the shrewd mobilization of its organizational network.

OF ALL IPS activities, its relations with the Soviets raise some of the most serious questions about its ultimate ambitions. Unlike previous generations of leftists, who conducted long and occasionally quite valuable debates over the nature of the Soviet system and the Soviet Union's impact on world revolution, IPS figures carefully avoid serious investigation of what was formerly known as the "Russian question." On the other hand, the IPS clearly believes that so long as American policy is motivated by the anti-communist impulse, radical domestic change is impossible. Furthermore, the IPS seems to believe, as senior fellow Saul Landau put it, that "The Soviet Union has been the one insurance policy of successful [Third World] revolutions."

Landau's remark is significant, suggesting a clear affinity for what most regard as straightforward Soviet imperialism. This helps to explain the refusal of IPS figures to criticize the most blatant act of imperialism, the invasion of Afghanistan. Some IPS figures even defended the invasion, on the grounds, as Fred Halliday put it, that that resistance "was feudal and clerical in ideology, fighting for a return to social conditions that have kept the Afghan people crouched in untold backwardness and misery."

WITH THE ELECTION of Ronald Reagan, the IPS began to focus more attention on U.S.-Soviet relations. This meant, on the one hand, writing article after article explaining why, as Barnet claimed, "The Soviet threat is the big lie of the arms race." To complement its intellectual work, the IPS greatly expanded its contacts with Soviet officials, joining with the Soviets in sponsoring a series of conferences where the issues separating the superpowers were presumably to be hashed out. Today, such meetings are commonplace and perhaps even worthwhile given the Gorbachev regime's apparent willingness to permit some independent-minded Soviets to meet openly with foreigners. But the IPS events were of an entirely different nature; the Soviet participants were graduates of the Brezhnevite, KGB school of diplomacy who followed the tried and true path of admitting nothing, and conceding nothing. For their part, IPS officials tried to keep the affairs running smoothly by holding to a narrow agenda stressing arms control, and deflecting embarrassing questions about human rights by arguing that such secondary matters could only be taken up after the arms race had been resolved.

Powell regards these activities with considerable alarm, and comes close to accusing the IPS of treason for its espousal of Soviet positions. The issues he raises are important, especially regarding the Transnational Institute and the IPS's willingness to cooperate with Soviet officials who have obvious KGB connections. But in retrospect, it is clear that IPS efforts were unsuccessful in changing American attitudes towards the Soviets. Our view of Soviet behavior has obviously altered, but this is due almost entirely to a perception that Moscow has embarked on a new course and to the reversal in American policies brought about by none other than Ronald Reagan.

Unless the changes ushered in by Gor-

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bachev are reversed in the near future, the future agenda of the IPS will be problematical. To begin with, the Soviets are much less likely to present themselves to America through favorably-disposed leftist organizations, and more apt to deal directly with mainstream American institutions. More serious could be Soviet retrenchment in the Third World. From its origins, the IPS has made the support of Third World revolution its principal mission, remaining undeterred by the horrifying repressiveness of revolutionary socialist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. A Soviet decision to accept, even temporarily, the role of status quo power may compel the IPS to seek new outlets for its considerable energies.

Where might those new avenues lie? One likely possibility is a revived campaign against the Atlantic Alliance. Barnet and Raskin have a long history of hostility towards NATO, arguing initially that the Alliance was evil, and later that it was obsolete. Given the growing perception of a less bellicose Soviet Union and the emergence of a debate over the future of the Alliance within establishment circles, an anti-alliance campaign by the Left (although, in true IPS fashion, employing non-leftist language) is a distinct possibility.

More likely is a renewed focus on domestic affairs. American attitudes towards government activism have shifted as the Reagan years wind down, a development which cannot have escaped the IPS leadership. More to the point, the presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson has succeeded in mobilizing the Democratic party's left wing as a cohesive force for the first time in years. Robert Borosage, IPS executive director, once spoke of the Left as maintaining an "invisible presence" within the Democratic party. In 1988, Borosage was named as Jesse Jackson's chief issues adviser, and other IPS figures have played key roles in the campaign. The presence may no longer be so invisible.

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Munich in Prague

Ernest Gellner

MUNICH, experienced from Prague, was not a political event but the end of a moral order.

The actual sequence of events remains fairly clear in my mind. I was twelve years old and a secondary school boy at the time. On the surface (and I did not see beneath it), initially there was a great nationalist fervor and enthusiasm for confrontation with Nazi Germany. With that talent for propaganda which seems to be the attribute of the modern Czech, a temporary mobilization earlier in 1938 was presented as if it were already a successful and heroic battle. An informal presidential poet laureate promptly wrote a poem about it. Somehow or other, the circumstances of the Czech national rebirth, which was a cultural struggle rather than a political one, had produced an atmosphere in which the really successful patriot was primarily an international public relations officer.

During the previous winter, the world ice-hockey championships were played in Prague. An unexpected victory for Czechoslovakia over the supposedly formidable USA, which for some reason arrived with a seriously depleted team, was treated as a kind of omen. When the Czechs took the lead, the commentator could hardly believe his eyes and shouted, "Well, whatever happens later in the match, we can say *we took the lead over the Americans!*" In the event, the Czech team managed to *keep* the lead till the end, and won. The pervasive mood was such that at the end of a match, the crowd would burst into the national anthem, even if the Czechoslovak team was neither playing nor victorious. Some other small country (Switzerland, I think) then also managed to beat the USA. This somewhat diminished the achievement, and annoyed the Czechs by showing there wasn't all that much to it. In the end Canada won the championship, which in pre-war ice-hockey was held to be inevitable. Nevertheless, the entire tournament, like the temporary mobilization some months later, was turned into a great collective ritual and a vindication of national existence and will to independence.

As Munich time approached, the anticipation of war and of the bombing of Prague which, it was thought, would certainly accompany it, caused my mother to take me and my sister to a small town in central Bohemia, where her kin (one of only two Jewish families in the community) ran an ironmonger shop. I found nothing much to do in the little town, was bored, and wished (not only for that reason) that the war would start. It didn't. In-

Ernest Gellner is a fellow of Kings College and William Wyse professor at the department of social anthropology, University of Cambridge.

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stead there was a series of dramatic news items about Chamberlain's coming and going, and an outburst of Czech bitterness against Lord Runciman, who advised Chamberlain concerning the realities of the Czechoslovak situation, including the unwillingness of the large Sudeten German minority to remain within the borders of the Czech state. It was widely believed, no doubt correctly, that Runciman spent his weekends in the country seats of German noblemen, who persuaded him of the injustice of the Czech case. The Czechs being a profoundly petty bourgeois nation, it is unlikely that there were many of their number who could have provided Runciman with the kind of weekend to which he was accustomed. The opportunist clients of the Czech right-wing Agrarian party, who had secured good country houses at knock-down prices as the residues of estates broken up during the land reform, probably seldom served good claret: I expect they sent the maid with a jug to collect the local draught beer. At the time, I certainly did not anticipate that one day I would become an academic in England, and would come to know close kinsmen of Seton-Watson (who helped Masaryk invent Czechoslovakia) and Runciman (who helped Chamberlain abolish it).

Anyway, President Beneš first announced that he had a *plan* to cope with the crisis, without disclosing what it was. Whatever it was, it was never implemented, but in due course he resigned, and later flew off to Switzerland. In Czech, the word *plan* is the same as the final part of the word aero*plane*, and the joke went round—yes, he had a plan, an aeroplane. After some speculation that he might be replaced by the industrialist Bată, of cheap shoes fame, the job was given to a High Court judge named Hácha, a small man in every sense. When speaking to Hitler and consenting to the final abolition of independence, Hácha said that personally he had always considered Czech independence to be a mistake, and had not joined in the rejoicing when it was promulgated in 1918. Mind you, a highly placed official of the present communist Czechoslovak regime has, on a very private occasion, allowed himself to say exactly the same thing, and added for good measure that socialism did not work either—thus vigorously conveying his personal contempt of both the national and social aspects of official ideology.

THE NEW collaborationist president, apart from his humbleness vis-à-vis Hitler, and notwithstanding his high status in the legal hierarchy, was an incarnation of the local petty bourgeois tradition. In the evening, his maid did go off to the local *hospoda* to bring back a jug of beer for his delectation. Anyway, the crisis was over, Munich accepted, Sudentenland surrendered to Hitler, and there was no war (as yet anyway), so we returned to Prague by car. Whilst returning, we had to pass some of the inner ring of fortifications, which had been prepared for the war. They were still manned, and one had to pass, not without difficulty, through some checkpoints. These were used in an attempt to stop too many refugees leaving Sudentenland for central Bohemia, which was destined to remain, for another half year, part of an independent Czechoslovakia. The new boundaries were determined by ethnic criteria, and the argument was that if too many German speakers (Jews or anti-Nazi Germans) fled, they could upset the ethnic or linguistic balance of the region which received them, and thus constitute a new danger. We managed to establish, with the help of various documents (including my student tram ticket) that we were bona fide residents of Prague, and were eventually allowed to pass. I shall always remember the soldier, with bayonet fixed, who was guarding us and our car, and blocking the way whilst our documents were scrutinized. When our eyes met he smiled wryly. I took him to mean, "My weapon was not intended for *this*."

The rump so-called Second Republic was not destined to last even a year (a bit like the terminal winter King of Bohemia of over three centuries earlier), though this wasn't immediately obvious at the time. The moral climate, however, changed immediately and drastically. Informal anti-Semitism had al-

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ways been pervasive, but at the public level, in the media, and in education, Masaryk's Republic had firmly upheld the liberal decencies. All this now changed, and overt anti-Semitism appeared in the press. At school, the Czech literature professor (*gymnasium* teachers were called professors) just happened to select, for reading aloud, a passage from a novel about peasant life in which the main character indulged in an anti-Semitic expletive. There was also an outburst of re-slavonizing the language. For instance, many Prague cinemas had Western names. These were replaced by new and impeccably slavonic appellations. This was meant to punish the West for Munich. I expect Daladier and Chamberlain squirmed when they heard of it.

However, the cult of Masaryk persisted. The same professor also asked us to cite any remarks or aphorisms of the late Professor-President-Liberator. I turned to my neighbor and whispered, "*A state can only survive by upholding the ideals of which it was born.*" (I did not know at the time that this was a Latin tag—Cicero perhaps?—which Masaryk had borrowed rather than invented.) My neighbor smiled and, less unwilling than I to put himself forward, raised his hand and offered this specimen of presidential wisdom. The prof (who later, during the war, supported the League against Bolshevism, and after the war, joined the Bolsheviks themselves), made no comment, and allowed himself no change of expression. The boy in question was destined to have a distinguished war, to be sentenced *in absentia* by the Communists after 1948, and now works for Radio Free Europe. I wonder whether he remembers the episode.

The Masarykian Republic had been based on a very definite political philosophy and theory of history. I do not remember any explicit formulation of it—in any case I was too young to be subjected to formal philosophy—but it pervaded the public and educational atmosphere. Briefly and simply formulated, it went something as follows. The West is democratic and liberal. The West is also very very strong, and won the first World War in consequence, and would win any replay. The Western victory of 1918 was a glorious culmination of a century or so of progress which had begun in 1789, and which included the principle of national independence as well as democracy. We are legitimate because we are the outcome of that development and this superiority, both physical and moral. We Czechs had made a very early contribution to all this at the time of the Hussites, but unfortunately the forces of reaction had then obliterated us for three centuries.

BECAUSE we are the fruit of this ineluctable and beneficent development, and allies of its most formidable incarnation (France), we are quite safe. The other main incarnation of the West, England, is a far away country of which we know little, but our best known writer, Karel Capek, is much appreciated there, has written some amusing descriptions of it, and they receive him in their best clubs. Our professorial president, or presidential professor, understands these things, is listened to and respected in the West, and has a reliable line to the underlying political and philosophical realities of world development. Only much later, in England, I learned with surprise that, for English intellectuals, the war of 1914–18 was the demolition, not the culmination, of a century-long illusion of safe liberal progress. I also then learned to respect the Munich motives: The generations of men who felt guilty at having survived the trenches, and were not willing to impose them lightly on the next generation—especially for so complex and dubious a cause.

Both an internal and an external policy had been based on this pervasive background philosophy. It was crushed by Munich, presumably forever. The lesson of Munich, greatly reinforced by the military events of 1940, was that the West was neither strong nor concerned with protecting those who adopted its values. The lesson was clearly pondered during the war (when Czech Resistance was unimpressive) and also in 1948. After the war, the Sudeten Germans were ruthlessly and brutally expelled in an act of collective and

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indiscriminate reprisal, though not without apprehension of an eventual German revenge. Even in 1945, the Czechs were perfectly clear that Germany would revive before too long.

The joint implication of the recollection of Munich and of the expulsion of the Germans seemed obvious: Safety could only be secured in the East. The Russians appeared to be more enthusiastic about their ideology than the West was about its own, and perhaps they felt more commitment to those who implemented it. In the course of his exile in the West during the war, Beneš continued to be haunted by the fear of Munich, and believed that it could easily be repeated, in the form of a separate peace with Germany, which would leave the Czech lands to Hitler. His credulity towards face values and official pronouncements, however, did not leave him, and he was bitterly hurt and, astonishingly, surprised, when Stalin failed to keep his promise. When a young member of his party (now a North American professor of politics) urged him to distribute arms in 1948 so that the communists should be resisted by the same methods as they employed themselves, he refused, insisting that democrats used discussion not violence. We are democrats, we must *discuss*, said Beneš. Masaryk had defined democracy as *discussion*.

But 1948 was no replay of 1938: Stalin did not betray Beneš to the Germans (who had not yet recovered), but instead devoured him himself. Almost inevitably, however, 1938 had led to 1948. The lesson learned then and reinforced by new factors in the situation was applied. In one of his last *samizdat* publications, the philosopher Jan Patocka criticized the Masaryk tradition for failing to understand the brutal realities of history and politics in the age of Hitler and Stalin, and overrating the power of Western rationality. Nietzsche, Patocka suggested, would have been a much better guide. I never understood why the communists obliged this pamphlet to remain underground. They should have acclaimed, publicized, and distributed it. His insight was virtually the same as their own, even if articulated *mit ein bisschen anderen Worten*.

ALL THIS was obvious to me in 1945, even before it all happened. I particularly recall a Communist party poster in liberated Prague, which proclaimed 'Everyone with a clean shield, into the Party.' The official meaning was: We want those who have a good record during the occupation to join us. The real meaning, which everyone understood, was quite different: If your record is appalling and does not bear investigation, you'd better throw in your lot with us. We'll look after you, knowing full well that we can trust you. We'll have something on you, and we know you are pliable anyway.

Whilst I did foresee the developments which culminated in the Communist takeover of 1948 and the Stalinization of the early 1950s, what I did not anticipate was the powerful and spontaneous push towards liberalization which culminated in 1968. This showed that the Czech impulse toward democracy and liberalism did not spring only from the other-directed reverence for Western might and values (whatever they might be), which had pervaded the Masarykian republic, and which was so easily transmuted into its opposite by the trauma of Munich. It was also rooted in the genuine egalitarian traditions of a nation reborn 'from below' and in the natural orientation of an educated and technologically sophisticated population.

Czech democracy has the same roots as the remarkable and persistent tendency to produce first-class tennis players. Well-disciplined authoritarian regimes produce the best athletic teams, for obvious reasons (talents are easily spotted in obligatory gymnastics, disciplined training is imposed, and rival temptations are few); but it takes a reasonably prosperous, individualist, and embourgeoised suburbia to produce a mass of good tennis players, and hence a few really outstanding ones. The Czech lands are the Surbiton of Europe.

Tennis and democracy have similar roots.

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We can, with reasonable confidence, expect the output of tennis players to continue. The re-emergence of democracy is a more delicate matter. The roots are there, but the conditions for unimpeded growth are uncertain. The climate in the eastern half of Europe will have to stabilize before there is much movement in Prague. As late as May 1988, a confidential set of instructions went out to Party branches, warning the comrades *not* to anticipate winds of change and fraternize with religious or semi-dissident groups. For a time, news *from* Moscow had to be censored.

The basic stratification of contemporary Czech society is simple: cynical opportunism at the top; inner emigration amongst the professional middle class (hang on to your work, try not to soil your hands more than absolutely necessary, but do not provoke, and off to the cottage for the weekend); and slacking, boozing, and the double economy at the bottom. The recollections of 1938, 1948, and 1968 continue to be decisive for the formation of political attitudes. Those who wish for liberty are unlikely to take precipitate first steps. Those in power, who owe it all to their contribution to the suppression of liberty, will show no zeal in undermining their own position. Powerlessness corrupts; absolute powerlessness does not corrupt absolutely, but it does not constitute a healthy political education either.

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Now Go It Alone
Israel and the West Bank

Amos Perlmutter

THE NINE-MONTH old Palestinian *Intifada*—or Uprising—in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the announcement last July by King Hussein that he would no longer seek the reunification of Jordan with the West Bank, have changed everything except old habits of Israeli thought. What should be recognized is that what was possible before the *intifada* is no longer so. New circumstances call for new approaches. What appeared outlandish yesterday is only reasonable today. What I propose, then, is that Israel should adopt a bold new strategy for solving the problems created by the Palestinian uprising.

The essence of this new approach is a unilateral withdrawal of Israel's military and administrative occupation forces from the West Bank, coupled with boundary modifications to satisfy Israel's security needs, and the immediate establishment of an autonomous area governed by the local Palestinian population. This new strategy is not the best in an ideal world. It is merely the best when compared to all other possible solutions.

Years ago, during the Camp David negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, I had a chilling conversation with a senior Egyptian adviser to the late President Anwar Sadat. When asked about the Egyptian position on the Palestinian issue, the official, who is now a ranking official in the government of Hosni Mubarek, made the following observation: "We will, hopefully, draw Israel into the Palestinian quagmire. The Palestinians are poison and they will corrode the Israeli body politic and mar its image as a democracy. They are the Arabs' best weapon against Israel." The statement turned out to be prophetic.

The bloody, protracted Palestinian-Israeli conflict has taken many forms, from an all-out war to acts of terrorism, raids, demonstrations, uprisings, and incursions. It was at the root of the Israeli War of Independence between 1947 and 1949; it was one of the major causes of the Sinai war of 1956; it helped trigger the Six Day War of 1967, and was the reason for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

It is time for Israel to find a political-diplomatic solution to the conflict. Without one, it may well face another Arab-Israeli war, more horrible than the previous ones. Israeli civilian population centers have been spared in previous Arab-Israeli wars. This may change in any future conflict. Since 1979 the Iraq army has grown in strength from eleven untried divisions to forty-two battle-hardened ones. In its long war with Iran, Iraq has used medium-range missiles and chemical warfare in attacks against Iranian cities. Saudi Arabia is now armed with newly-acquired missiles, while Egypt and Syria possess formidable armed forces equipped with sophisticated weapon systems. In any new Arab-Israeli war Israel is likely to face an Arab eastern front coalition comprising Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Whether short or lengthy in duration, such a war would be devastating.

Amos Perlmutter is professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of *The Journal of Strategic Studies.*

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Are there policies which would enable Israel to extricate itself from the Palestinian morass? Israel could try to return to the pre-*intifada* status quo, but this is unrealistic and likely to spark another Arab-Israeli war. It could also adopt the solution of former defense minister Ariel Sharon and subject the population of the West Bank and Gaza to an ever more oppressive occupation, including mass deportation of young Palestinian leaders. This too could lead to another war, and to the tarnishing of Israel's image as a liberal and democratic nation. Neither option is advisable in terms of Israel's long-term survival as a member of the civilized world.

Then there is the option of negotiating directly with the PLO. But meaningful negotiations between Israel and the PLO are impossible, not only because of the PLO's rigid ideological stance, but because its peculiar organizational structure reinforces its uncompromising positions.

The PLO as it is constituted today could not and would not be a serious partner in peace. It is riven by fratricidal warfare, a consequence of the multiplicity of organizations, factions, and divisions within it. The result is organizational chaos, as each of the PLO's various factions' try to justify its own historic existence in the Palestinian arena.

The Palestinian National Congress (PNC), the so-called PLO "parliament," manifests this reality. It is an unelected, unrepresentative body, possessing no features of any true parliament in the world today. It functions only to derail any pragmatic policy that might emanate from the PLO Executive Committee (EC). Since no elections to the PNC have ever been held, and since each faction keeps its membership secret, the principal determinant of a faction's strength within the PNC has been its *Fidai* (terrorist) actions. Small organizations that could mount only few operations resorted to more spectacular actions, such as hijacking airplanes, or missions designed to result in heavy loss of life. Each faction exaggerates absurdly the scope and effectiveness of its activities.

The result is that this so-called legislature is hostage to the more extreme elements in the PLO. The Palestinian movement has been traditionally led and dominated by its most fanatic elements—revolutionaries whose orientations, tending always towards maximalist and unattainable utopian goals, have enveloped the movement in a suffocating ideological strait jacket. It is a movement incapable of compromise and reconciliation and unable to pursue politically realistic goals.

Recently, for example, Yasir Arafat's spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, put forward a proposal—titled "PLO Views: Prospects of a Palestinian Israeli Settlement"—for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a referendum in the occupied territories to allow local inhabitants to determine who will speak for them in negotiations with Israel. He was immediately condemned as a traitor by several Palestinian factions, some calling for putting him on trial for treason.

IN THE WAKE OF the uprising, it has become clear that neither the PLO nor the Palestinians in the occupied territories are yet prepared to embrace compromise and moderation as a policy. For Israel, the option of negotiating with the PLO does not really exist. Calling for the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is tantamount to postponing a solution indefinitely.

But there is another Israeli option: a unilateral pullback from the West Bank. Such a policy would rest on three essential elements: there should be no Arab military presence west of the Jordan River; the security of Israel beyond the "green line" of 1967 must be guaranteed; and Jerusalem and its environs remain under Israeli control. A new policy based on this framework is suitable to the conditions of the late 1980s. It offers a way of confronting the Palestinian issue constructively while ensuring the security of Israel's eastern frontier. It recognizes the *uvdot ba'shetach* ("facts on the ground"), as they say in Israel, and it is not dependent on much hoped-for but unrealistic treaties with neighboring Arab states. An Israeli withdrawal need not be subject to ne-

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gotiations with Jordan or the Palestinians, but can be carried out unilaterally. Such a withdrawal might well hasten such negotiations, while making them less crucial. The Palestinians will, after all, have a measure of control over their own fate. Israel will no longer be controlling the daily lives of over a million Palestinians.

Israel stands to achieve greater security by ending the military occupation. The termination of Israeli bureaucratic and military domination would lower the level of antagonism to Israel in the West Bank. It would give Israel freedom to maneuver and establish its security zone on the Jordan River. It would free it from the opprobrium of public opinion at home and abroad. All this can be accomplished on Israel's own initiative, for its own good reasons, even if there is no readiness to negotiate on the part of the Arabs.

BUT WHO OR WHAT would fill the vacuum created by the end of the Israeli military occupation? The Palestinian Arabs could now decide their political future without the advice and consent of the Israelis. The only condition they would have to observe would be not to violate the security policy Israel formulates as it withdraws its military administration from the West Bank. The policy is based on the following tenets:

- The only security line between Israel and Jordan is the Jordan River. Israel will maintain military bases along the river's western bank as a counter to any threat to its security.
- Regardless of the political form of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, it will not build an army or any other form of military formation, open or clandestine.
- Any act of hostility toward Israel, such as encouraging anti-Israeli actions by Israeli Arabs in the Galilee or elsewhere, or taking active steps towards political unity with Jordan, would lead Israel to intervene militarily.

Collaboration with the Arabs of Israel in anti-Israeli acts would clearly constitute a grave threat for Israel. But it is difficult to exaggerate the danger to Israel from a unified Palestinian state, under PLO rule, on both banks of the Jordan. For Israel, a PLO-dominated state straddling the Jordan river would be as dangerous as another Syria on its border.

The three options most often mentioned as a way out of the present impasse are thus unfeasible, ill-advised, or both. The pre-*intifada* status quo cannot be recreated. Turning Jordan into a Palestinian state (Sharon's preference) would in effect create a Greater Syria, with grave security implications for Israel. Turning the West Bank over to King Hussein (Labor's preference) would amount to the same thing—the Palestinization of Jordan—albeit rather more gradually. In any event, King Hussein's recent announcement that he was relinquishing Jordan's administrative and legal ties to the West Bank made this option even more remote. Waiting for the PLO to moderate its stance and negotiate seriously with Israel is almost certainly a waste of time.

Thus, distasteful as it may be for Israelis of the center and the Right, a small PLO state in the West Bank, created as a result of unilateral Israeli evacuation, and conditioned on its tacit respect of Israel's security concerns, may well be the best option.

One cannot talk of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank without addressing the issue of the Jewish settlers. The magnitude of the problem is not as great as it first appears. When taking into account Israeli border modifications around Jerusalem, and the Israeli security zone in the Jordan valley, it appears that a large number of the settlers will still be under Israeli control. The rest will have to make a hard choice: Either stay where they are under whatever government the Palestinians choose for themselves, or dismantle their settlements and move to areas in the West Bank remaining under Israeli jurisdiction. Jewish settlers in northern Sinai had to face a similar dilemma (although northern Sinai did not have the religious or national significance of the West Bank).

There is no reason for Israel to march toward a disastrous war in which it could lose 5,000 men fighting an alliance of Iraq, Syria, the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia, when it

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can, in one stroke, eliminate the possibility of a large Palestinian state and unburden itself of the onerous chore of occupation.

There is another reason why Israel should take this step unilaterally. Recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations increase the likelihood that the two superpowers may join in imposing a "solution" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be less satisfactory to Israel's interests than any move it makes of its own volition.

Israel possesses one of the most modern and efficient armies in the world. It is not a weak, insecure state about to be pushed into the sea by its neighbors. The PLO certainly cannot threaten its existence. The fundamental, unpopular truth is that an occupied territory populated with a million Arabs is no strategic asset. And since Israel is powerful enough to initiate unilateral political and military steps that meet its security needs and purposes, the time has come for bold moves.

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Why Gorbachev Won't Make It

Ernest van den Haag

ON TAKING OFFICE some three years ago Mikhail Gorbachev found the Soviet economy in a deplorable state. He more or less acknowledged that its backwardness and inefficiency are caused by the absence of economic incentives inherent in central planning and by the suppression of all free discussion and individual initiative by and within the Communist party. Gorbachev is publicly committed to restructuring the economy and to introducing the modicum of individual freedom which is indispensable to economic efficiency. Can he succeed?

Most Soviet satellite countries (e.g., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany) offer more economic incentives and are less centralized than the Soviet Union. Each has its peculiarities; but it seems clear that different degrees and kinds of centralized planning are compatible with communist domination. It also seems clear, however, that communist domination is least pervasive where there is least central planning.

Most satellites have higher living standards than the Soviet Union. However, they are now experiencing mounting economic difficulties. Poland and Hungary already are unable to repay the Western loans that helped to enhance their economies. Romania is repaying by drastically cutting the already low standard of living of its oppressed population. Moreover, all the satellite economies are now stagnant (even if above the Soviet level). They cannot progress without further decentralization which they dare not undertake. At present even the rhetoric of their leaders lags behind Gorbachev's. Still, if Gorbachev could make the Soviet economy as efficient as Hungary's, it would be major progress for Soviet citizens. Yet the Soviet bureaucracy is bound to oppose even modest reforms, because they are perceived as the first step on a slippery slope leading to the loss of its bureaucratic privileges.

Western scholars have long known that central planning does not allow the incentives required for efficiency. But they rarely have asked why so inefficient a system has lasted so long. The purpose of central planning is to defeat market forces, to defeat any demand originating outside the bureaucracy, in favor of allocations and rules preferred by the planners. Government and party bureaucrats decide who is to produce what. If central planning was intended merely to do what the market does automatically, why not have a market?

The reason is that there are powerful special interests which benefit from central planning, however disadvantageous it is for the population at large. Such special interests are familiar in capitalist economies. Everywhere manufacturers of obsolete machinery, or of merchandise the consumers do not want, or of defective goods, would like to continue producing and selling. But competition—the market—makes that impossible. The most efficiently produced and attractive goods win. Capitalist enterprises disappear if they are uneconomic or do not innovate.

Not so if the economy is dominated by central planning. Factories that act according to plan do very well; innovators do not. Innovations are not predictable and interfere

Ernest van den Haag is (with Tom J. Farer) most recently the author of *U.S. Ends and Means in Central America,* published by Plenum.

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with planning and with all those doing well in the old way. There is no incentive for them, no competition forcing them. In centrally planned economies the vested interests prevail, although their existence is seldom recognized. They dominate as a rule, rather than as an exception. Perhaps this is why they are so rarely noted.

Hitherto the Soviet population has been divided into two groups: a small group of planners who decide what should be produced, where and how, and the planned—the rest of the population—who do the producing. The planners reserve to themselves all power and the privileges that go with it, including high relative income in kind and in money, high status, and a comparatively wide range of opportunity. The planners make sure that the planned produce what is needed to consolidate the power of the planners. Hence military and security expenditures have priority over anything else, followed by investment. Consumption comes last.

To introduce efficiency into the Soviet economy, Gorbachev would have to compel, or induce, the planning and managerial bureaucracy—ultimately the Communist party—to give up its monopoly of economic power. But people always are reluctant to give up their power. A more efficient Soviet economy would be run by economically successful businessmen, not by politically successful central planners. The bureaucracy, however, will not easily accept its replacement by myriad independent economic power centers, responsive to market incentives and the demands of consumers. History knows no powerholding monopolistic elite which has volunteered to give up its power. Gorbachev will have to fight the bureaucracy. His chances for victory are not overwhelming, for he cannot count on powerful groups for support.

THEORETICALLY Gorbachev could try to persuade the planning bureaucracy to give up power by promising to allow the bureaucrats to retain their privileges other than power. They would stop planning but keep their income and their status. This would be analogous to what happened to the French nobility in the seventeenth century. Louis XIV deprived the nobles of power, but allowed them to keep all other privileges. It worked fairly well and led to the unification of France and to the centralization of political power. But the nobles were allowed to hang on to their property. The privileges of planners, however, are based entirely on their power within the Soviet state. They would see the writing on the wall: Ultimately, despite all promises, their privileges would vanish once their power is gone. Pensions and ceremonial duties could protect them only for a brief interval. Prestige and comfort would end up going to those able to use the market to make themselves wealthy.[1]

Against the resistance of the bureaucrats and the party bosses, Gorbachev will not have much to support him. He cannot readily mobilize the great majority of the people most likely to benefit from the planners' dethronement. Soviet citizens are accustomed to impotence. The only organizations they know are dominated by the Communist party. Moreover, the reconstruction of the economy that is in their long-run interest will produce many drawbacks in the short-run. As subsidies for foodstuffs are reduced the standard of living will decline temporarily. As market forces become more effective, and labor productivity is emphasized, less drinking and gold-bricking will be permitted. Job security will be reduced. There will be some unemployment. Increases in political freedom are

[1] Another analogy was suggested by a high-ranking planner in Hungary. He intimated that former planners could form something akin to the House of Lords in Great Britain. He did not stress that the Lords lost power as a result of a long and sometimes bloody process, and of the persistent pressures of a powerful new class—the bourgeoisie—created by the free market. The Lords, like the French nobles, owned and were allowed to keep much property. In contrast, Gorbachev has no independent bourgeoisie to help him loosen the grasp of the bureaucracy on the Soviet economy. He will have less help than the Commons did in England.

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unlikely to compensate for these losses. A moderate increase in freedom and initiative at first will affront as many people as it will gratify. Not least, any increase of political freedom is dangerous for a regime that has always brutally suppressed opposition. Such a regime has every reason to fear stored-up resentments as well as those created by transitory economic hardships. Finally, the Soviet government has good reason to fear that even a slight relaxation of controls will stimulate resurgent nationalism, dangerous to a multinational state hitherto dominated by Russians.

The military does not have a tradition of political activity and will have little interest in supporting—or opposing—Gorbachev, as long as its privileges remain intact. Yet these privileges will limit Gorbachev's ability to reduce conventional armaments and increase non-military investment. Although the Soviet Union produces far less per capita than Western countries do, it channels a much greater proportion of its output to the armed forces. However, it is unlikely that Gorbachev will be incautious enough to seriously reduce military expenditures. He can limit nuclear armaments. However desirable, this doesn't save much; nor does it greatly affect the traditional military privileges. But to reduce the enormous Soviet expenditure on conventional forces—on manpower, tanks, planes, ships, artillery—would be to interfere with the size, power, and livelihood of the officer corps. The economic benefits may be great but the political risks are greater. Only if he does not try to reduce its privileges can Gorbachev keep the military out of power struggles within the party.

When Lenin reintroduced the market through his NEP (New Economic Policy) the Soviet economy literally was in ruins. It had nowhere to go but up. The bureaucracy was not yet entrenched. Wherefore Lenin could introduce the NEP which revived the economy—until Stalin changed course. Gorbachev however faces a very different situation. The economy is stagnant, the standards of living low. But there is no emergency, no disaster, no famine. The long run benefits of Gorbachev's reforms are not likely to be perceived to justify the many temporary dislocations and drawbacks and anxieties.

GORBACHEV thus faces a difficult, indeed a nearly unsurmountable task. If he persists in trying to reconstruct the economy at the expense of present power-holders he certainly risks his job. Within the next three years Gorbachev will either lose power, or, to avoid this, will declare victory, having achieved but minor reforms.

There is one further possibility which must seem quite attractive to the Soviet leader. He might entice European and American capitalists to lend the money for investments and imports to soften the temporary fall in living standards which his partial restructuring could not otherwise avoid. In short, the West could finance his reforms.

From the capitalist viewpoint there are two objections to the prospect of financing Gorbachev's reforms, each powerful in its own right. The Soviets have a good record in repaying comparatively minor and short term loans. However the chances of repayment for the major and long term loans and investments required for restructuring would depend on domestic Soviet political and economic developments which are quite unpredictable. The loans would be extremely, indeed prohibitively, risky.

There is a second, more political, reason. Should Gorbachev succeed, even partially, the Soviet Union would be much stronger than it is now. There is no reason to believe that Soviet expansionary goals would be dropped. They might well be pursued with more vigor. Do we want this? Western financing of Gorbachev's reform is in the Soviet interest, but not in the interest of those who could provide the money. We have loaned much money to Hungary, Poland and other Soviet satellites. This financing never has been shown to benefit the United States, and it is doubtful that these loans will be repaid. We may well do the same for Gorbachev's Soviet Union, in the belief—however unwarranted by historical evidence—that international commerce, lending, and investment will bring peace.

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A Comradely Difference

From a *Tass* report of Eduard Shevardnadze's statement on foreign policy, 26 July:

THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING views peaceful coexistence in the context of the realities of the nuclear century. *We are fully justified in refusing to see in it a special form of class struggle. One must not identify coexistence, which is based on such principles as nonaggression, respect for sovereignty and national independence, noninterference in internal affairs and so on, with class struggle.* The struggle between two opposing systems is no longer a determining tendency of the present-day era. At the modern stage, the ability to build up material wealth at an accelerated rate on the basis of front ranking science and high-level techniques and technology, and to distribute it fairly, and through joint efforts to restore and protect the resources necessary for mankind's survival acquires decisive importance.

From *Moscow Television Service's* recording of Yegor Kumich Ligachev's speech, 5 August:

HERE, COMRADES, I WOULD like to touch on an issue of vital importance, the question of the correlation between general human and proletarian class interests. We must stress straightaway that what we are talking about are not things in opposition, but a primordial and deep interlinking between the general human approach and the class approach in foreign policy. The true meaning of socialism, as you understand, consists in the liberation of man and mankind from all types of exploitation and oppression. The question arises: Can we Communists disregard reality and global problems? For example, can we remain apart from the struggle to save human civilization? Of course not. Unless people win this struggle, you must understand that all attempts to improve the life of the working people and to make it, as they say, freer and more worthy and more rich, lose all their point. *The struggle for peace and for the survival of mankind is indeed also the struggle for the root interests of the working class,* for the right of the people to choose their own road to and to decide on their own fate for themselves. It makes it possible to fetter the forces of imperialist militarism. No doubt, opposition to its expansionist aspirations with regard to other countries is stimulated by efforts directed toward the political settlement of regional conflicts of all kinds.

We proceed, comrades, from the fact that international relations are particularly class in character, and that is of fundamental importance. Any other way of putting this question introduces confusion into the consciousness of our people and our friends abroad. Active involvement in the solution of general human problems, and primarily the struggle against the nuclear threat, by no means signifies any—I would say—artificial braking of the social and national, national liberation, struggle. It does not mean that class contradictions and antagonisms are being ignored. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the report given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the 19th CPSU Conference again confirmed our party's unchanging solidarity with the working people of the whole world and with those fighting against colonialism, racism, and reaction.

(emphasis added in both passages)

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Dump the WEU

Robert Rudney

THE WESTERN European Union (WEU), the long-dormant offspring of the Paris Treaty of 1954, has regularly been touted as the most attractive institutional formula for increasing European defense cooperation. Every couple of years, efforts are made to "relaunch," "reactivate," or simply "resurrect" the WEU. Just as often, these efforts come to naught.

The truth is that the WEU is ill-designed and ill-prepared to undertake any program to coordinate and intensify European defense collaboration. It remains a forum without a mission. For this reason alone, it should be abolished.

The WEU Council met last December at the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev Washington summit and the signing of the INF Treaty, which signified a new era in the European security system. Did the Council debate the critical issues of a Western European response to the summit developments? No. Most of its time and energy was spent ruminating over personnel reductions at its Paris office.

This inaction caused Eric Hintermann, then WEU assistant secretary general, to write an open letter criticizing the "bureaucratic paralysis" afflicting the organization. The major international conflict absorbing the WEU's attention is between Britain and France over whether to consolidate the organization's headquarters in Brussels (the British choice) or Paris (the French preference).

The dispute has ominous bureaucratic overtones. At present the Permanent Council and Secretariat General are located in London, while the WEU Assembly (composed of eighty-nine member-state legislators) is situated in Paris. The consolidation in Brussels is favored by the British to reinforce the idea that for the foreseeable future the WEU will remain subordinate to the NATO collective security system. On the other hand, the French are pushing Paris to conform with their own impression of the WEU as a distinctly European defense entity (led, *naturellement*, by France).

These squabbles and back-biting derive from the organization's distinctly unheroic origins. Following the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) by a French Assembly non-vote in August 1954, the Europeans needed to find a mechanism for sanctioning West German armament without excessively embarrassing France. The solution was the Western European Union.

The WEU traces its genesis even further back to the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, when Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg pledged their common will "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression." Obviously, the Western European threat perception was as keen then as it is today.

By 1954, however, Western Europe was enjoying all the advantages of the American protective umbrella. Unfortunately, the United States insisted that the upstart Federal Republic of Germany play a role in this defensive network. In 1950, the French premier, Rene Pleven, had put forward a plan, ghostwritten by Jean Monnet, for a common European army (including West Germans) under a single European authority, the EDC. After

Robert Rudney is a research analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy.

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four years of hysterical dithering, the French Assembly renounced this Gallic creation, provoking U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to speak cryptically of an "agonizing reappraisal" with regard to Europe. Those masters of last-minute compromise, the British, jumped into the breach by proposing a revision of the Brussels Treaty to transform the status of West Germany from potential foe to cherished ally. Through the Paris accords, a hitherto innocuous organization created by the Brussels Treaty, the Western Union (not to be confused with the telegram deliverers), added a magic middle initial and became the WEU. For their part, the British agreed to maintain a permanent military presence on the continent to protect the French from the Germans. Basically, the object of this whole exercise was to integrate West Germany into a European defense structure before proceeding to the much more important task of negotiating its membership in NATO.

The Paris Treaty also represents one of the first major successes in postwar international arms control imposed on the West Germans to calm French paranoia. To qualify for WEU and thus NATO membership, the West German ally foreswore atomic, biological, and chemical weaponry, as well as long-range missiles, guided missiles, influence mines, large warships, submarines, strategic bombers, and other weapon systems. A WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments was established to enforce compliance. Appropriately enough, this agency became an institutional nuisance to French efforts to develop nuclear weaponry, and France refused for years to participate in many of its activities. The conventional arms restrictions on West Germany were progressively reduced and ultimately abolished in 1984, although the Agency for the Control of Armaments, now an official non-entity, has remained in place.

THE WEU ALSO set up a Standing Armaments Committee in 1955 to promote the joint production of armaments. From the very start, this committee proved to be superfluous, since weapons procurement planning was concentrated in NATO. A much more vigorous organization, the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), was formed in 1976 to increase European allied cooperation in this area. According to the official WEU history, the IEPG "never allowed the Standing Armaments Committee to assume the importance that the authors of the 1955 decision intended it to have." So, both in terms of arms control and arms production, the WEU served no real purpose. In all other realms, the WEU abdicated its responsibilities to NATO and lapsed into three decades of well-deserved institutional stupor.

Only in the early 1980s, when anti-missile protests first brought Alliance security policies into question, was there any renewed European interest in the WEU. The prime movers were the French who, though officially "disintegrated" from NATO, viewed with alarm the neutralist tendencies of the peace movement in West Germany. Maintaining its doctrinal distance from NATO, the French government seized on the moribund WEU as the perfect institutional panacea for reconfirming its European defense commitment without appearing to submit to U.S. dictates. At first, this French initiative encountered a mix of reticence and resistance from the six other WEU members who feared undermining the NATO system and reacted badly to "alliance solidarity" sermons from the prodigal French.

Ultimately, the French succeeded in bringing together the fourteen ministers for foreign affairs and defense in Rome in October 1984 and pushed through a declaration "to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus." The member-states agreed to reactivate the WEU Council at the ministerial level, but took pains to reiterate the NATO commitment.

One structural problem for the WEU has been intermittent friction between the Council (and its Secretariat) and the WEU Assembly, made up of the member-state parliamentarians. Until recently, the Assembly had been a glorified debating and banqueting society.

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However, with all the interest in increased European defense cooperation, the Assembly has expressed a desire for a more active part in WEU activities. This move has been largely resisted by the Council which found the Assembly too cumbersome a deliberative body. On the other hand, the Assembly (whose resolutions are non-binding) has criticized the Council for presenting it with a series of *faits accomplis*. In the ministers' view, the WEU Assembly should have a consultative mission roughly analogous to that of the North Atlantic Assembly in relation to NATO. The legislators, however, have lobbied for a much more intensive policy role. This internal tension has hamstrung reorganization efforts.

Under prodding by then-French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, the WEU Council did adopt a Platform on European Security Interests in October 1987. Other member-states insisted on the word "platform" as distinguished from the stronger-sounding term "charter," proposed by Chirac in a speech to the Assembly the previous December. As the *Washington Post* reported, "several members, particularly Britain and the Netherlands, objected that calling the declaration a charter would confer too much weight on it and could leave an impression that revitalizing the union would create an alternative to NATO . . . " The Platform did affirm the seven countries' commitment to European unification and to "a more cohesive European defense identity." Nevertheless, the document restated the need for a strong NATO alliance and an American presence in Europe, directly linked to the U.S. strategic deterrent. The usual diplomatic bromides about "improving consultations" and "extending coordination" were trotted out for public consumption. Yet, in the crunch, during the recent Persian Gulf crisis, the member-states took unilateral action in dispatching naval forces and only later worried about coordinating their activities through the WEU.

In the WEU's case, however, nothing succeeds like failure. Both Spain and Portugal have expressed their intention to join the club, although the British did hold up their applications with a view to first defining what the organization is all about. The WEU does fill a hole, but fills it badly. The European Community has a very narrow security responsibility, largely owing to the membership of Ireland, a neutral, and Greece and Denmark, two quasi-neutrals. The IEPG only has jurisdiction over weapons procurement cooperation. Promising bilateral arrangements, especially the Franco-German *rapprochement*, do not yet provide a nucleus for expanding to European defense collaboration. For all its warts, the WEU appears to be irreplaceable.

This is a mistaken impression. The Paris Treaty will only be up for renewal in 2004, but the WEU members should admit to its failings to renegotiate its provisions. The best way to start would be from scratch, dissolving the organization and engaging in a *real* debate on Western security interests and needs. This would be a form of political shock therapy forcing Western Europeans to consider each other's perspective and to put forward a viable set of security consciousness-raising measures (or CRAMs). The WEU, as presently constituted, is simply a bureaucratic impediment obscuring the vital issues of how Europe is to be defended over the long-term future.

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Discriminate Deterrence
A Response to Critics

Fred Charles Iklé

WHEN CONFRONTED with questions of military strategy, the best and the brightest nowadays prefer to change the subject. They will instead talk about diplomacy and economics; about deficits, demography, and democratization; about anything but the central issue of military strategy—that ghastly subject called "war." To be sure, it is the avoidance, the prevention of war that sound military strategy pursues as its first objective. But we will not serve that objective if, by digressing into every social and economic problem, we fail to consider war itself.

The bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy was established two years ago to explore how the United States, together with its allies, should prepare for the possibility that world events might again confront us with an imminent threat of military aggression or with an actual armed attack. While the Commission developed forecasts on broad economic and political developments, it chose not to be diverted from its central subject. Not surprisingly, some of the responses to *Discriminate Deterrence* (the Commission's report) express disappointment about this disciplined focus. These readers, perhaps, wanted to change the subject.

By and large, however, the Commission has been lucky. It managed to stir up serious comment and criticism precisely on questions that are central to our military strategy. One of the Commission's main points, in particular, elicited a rich reaction in Europe. This point bore on the nature and role of the nuclear threat that backs up NATO's defense posture. Clearly, this has long been a neuralgic node in the strategic dialogue of the Atlantic Alliance.

The three distinguished European strategists whose responses to *Discriminate Deterrence* were published in *The National Interest* (Summer 1988) all have useful things to say on this neuralgic node. Each of these renowned defense experts—Christoph Bertram, Pierre Lellouche, and Laurence Martin—avoids the anxieties and misunderstandings of earlier European reactions and advances the dialogue with thoughtful points.

Laurence Martin, for example, makes a good point on the ambiguity that surrounds NATO's strategy of nuclear response. This ambiguity, he reminds us, has been highly functional, permitting the Alliance to maintain a unified position by leaving "the worst dilemmas" to be resolved only if and when the crisis should arise. If Martin means the ambiguity in the selection of militarily purposeful, nonsuicidal nuclear responses, we are in agreement, and *Discriminate Deterrence* (contrary to Martin's concern) did not seek to "clear up" this uncertainty.

Ambiguity and uncertainty are fundamental phenomena in all military strategy. The "fog of deterrence" is as dense as the "fog of war." But this fog enshrouds friend and foe. Strategic ambiguities affect both Moscow and NATO capitals. As seen from Moscow,

Fred Charles Iklé, former undersecretary of defense for policy from 1981 to 1988, is currently a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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NATO's policy on a nuclear response is ambiguous, and (Laurence Martin is right) usefully so. At least up to a point such ambiguity is useful—as long as it does not tempt the reckless to gamble.

As seen from Brussels, ambiguities also have a profound impact. Advance warning signals of a Warsaw Pact attack would be highly ambiguous in most contingencies, and hence would paralyze NATO's reinforcement decisions. Also, if an attack did occur, its scope and objectives as seen from Allied capitals might remain highly uncertain for quite some time. A rational Soviet strategy would in fact seek to magnify this uncertainty so as to impose hesitation, delay, and disagreement on the decisions of our Alliance. The better prepared we are for discriminate responses, the better we could cope with such uncertainty. It is the indiscriminate Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy that collapses in the fog of war.

Many of the European reactions to *Discriminate Deterrence* betray a certain discomfort with the report's emphasis on Third World conflicts, fearing American concern with these conflicts would detract from the U.S. support for the defense of Western Europe. While Christoph Bertram and Pierre Lellouche recognize the importance of Third World conflicts that occurred in past decades, both fault the Commission for its failure to anticipate the emergence of Europe (do they mean Central Europe?) as the key arena for our long-term strategy. According to Christoph Bertram, the Commission's report "tends to concentrate on the threats of yesterday and today rather than those of tomorrow."

Our Commission recognized that the future might bring major surprises and sharp discontinuities in current trends. It therefore advocated building more flexibility into our military forces, so as to have military assets that can be adapted to meet a wide range of contingencies.

The "threats of yesterday" may appear to have vanished today because we have repelled them successfully. If a strategy has been successful recently, it does not follow that we should abandon it. Christoph Bertram argues that *Discriminate Deterrence* made too much of threats to the Persian Gulf region, and that such threats have become less important now that the Soviets have committed themselves to withdraw from Afghanistan and did not directly intervene in the Iran-Iraq war. But these favorable developments in the Gulf are not irreversible. They came about in large part because our Alliance had pursued successful policies.

Consonant with this experience, the Commission argues that the United States must have the means to help protect U.S. and allied interests in the Third World and that these means should include "assistance to anti-Communist insurgents who are resisting a hostile regime imposed from the outside." If we had not used that arrow in our quiver, the "threat of yesterday" to the Gulf region might confront us vividly today. We might worry, for example, about an ongoing expansion of a major Soviet air base in Kandahar.

Pierre Lellouche suggests that the "developing world" is more and more "irrelevant economically." But the Commission's concern about Third World conflicts was not motivated by economic considerations (except for oil-producing regions, the importance of which Lellouche concedes). Indeed, Pierre Lellouche reminds us that Europe will have its own "backyard problem." He predicts, for example, that in twenty-five years Morocco will have a conscript army as large as the *Bundeswehr*. Yet, he asks what are the interests that "the West ought to defend by getting involved in bloody regional wars?"

Doubly wrong!

First, *Discriminate Deterrence* recommends that the U.S. preserve and improve its various capabilities to help its friends defend themselves. It argues against U.S. combat forces getting involved in "bloody regional wars."

Second, Western nations will have many important interests in these regions: preserving their access and transit rights throughout the world, protection of their territory and citizens from terrorist blackmail, narcotics

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trade, and (as mentioned by Lellouche) illegal migration; and dissuading Moscow from resuming the expansion of its empire. A more united Europe, in particular, would have to play an active role on behalf of these strategic interests. To this end, Europe and the United States need some tools: security assistance, systems for providing intelligence support, programs to aid anti-communist insurgents where appropriate.

Discriminate Deterrence does not question the primacy of Western Europe for the United States. What it argues is that the United States should not tailor its conventional forces so predominantly for large-scale warfare in the center of Europe, and that a major Soviet conventional attack is more likely (or less unlikely) at other fronts, such as the Persian Gulf region. Further, the report argues that we should not neglect the means for judicious military intervention (preferably indirect) in other regions where armed conflict challenging U.S. and allied interests might be more probable.

In a way, the European commentators of *Discriminate Deterrence* get caught in their own contradictions. They argue that our military strategy should give more weight to Central Europe while, at the same time, they postulate a more benign Soviet foreign policy that will eschew opportunities for expansion in the Third World. If Soviet policy becomes in fact more benign—less willing to use Soviet military assets for expansion—our military strategy should not have to face armed attack on Central Europe as its top priority. Such a new Soviet foreign policy might indeed present new challenges—for our diplomacy, our international economic policy, and our ability to prevail in the contest of words and ideas. These are valid problems for our long-term foreign policy; they are not the central issues of military strategy.

So here we go again. When confronted with questions of military strategy, the best and the brightest nowadays prefer to change the subject.

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

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

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

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